Discussion:
CAFC took JMRI case under advisement
(too old to reply)
Alexander Terekhov
2008-05-10 17:04:50 UTC
Permalink
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oralarguments/mp3/2008-1001.mp3

More context:

http://jmri.net/k/docket/index.shtml
http://jmri.net/k/docket/cafc-pi-1/index.shtml

regards,
alexander.

--
http://gng.z505.com/index.htm
(GNG is a derecursive recursive derecursion which pwns GNU since it can
be infinitely looped as GNGNGNGNG...NGNGNG... and can be said backwards
too, whereas GNU cannot.)
Robert Heller
2008-05-10 19:00:58 UTC
Permalink
Post by Alexander Terekhov
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oralarguments/mp3/2008-1001.mp3
Is there a transcript available?
Post by Alexander Terekhov
http://jmri.net/k/docket/index.shtml
http://jmri.net/k/docket/cafc-pi-1/index.shtml
regards,
alexander.
--
http://gng.z505.com/index.htm
(GNG is a derecursive recursive derecursion which pwns GNU since it can
be infinitely looped as GNGNGNGNG...NGNGNG... and can be said backwards
too, whereas GNU cannot.)
--
Robert Heller -- Get the Deepwoods Software FireFox Toolbar!
Deepwoods Software -- Linux Installation and Administration
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Alexander Terekhov
2008-06-27 10:49:01 UTC
Permalink
Post-argument briefs:

http://jmri.net/k/docket/cafc-pi-1/39.pdf
(JMRI's post-argument "citation of supplemental authority")

http://jmri.net/k/docket/cafc-pi-1/40.pdf
(Amici's "response")

http://jmri.net/k/docket/cafc-pi-1/41.pdf
(Katzer's response)

I'm shocked by Amici's citation of Nimmer on Copyright talking about
"appropriate contractual provisions" and "appropriate contract
construction"... What!? I thought that licenses are not contracts in
"free as in free speech" world.

LOL.

regards,
alexander.

--
http://gng.z505.com/index.htm
(GNG is a derecursive recursive derecursion which pwns GNU since it can
be infinitely looped as GNGNGNGNG...NGNGNG... and can be said backwards
too, whereas GNU cannot.)
amicus_curious
2008-06-27 18:21:46 UTC
Permalink
Post by Alexander Terekhov
http://jmri.net/k/docket/cafc-pi-1/39.pdf
(JMRI's post-argument "citation of supplemental authority")
http://jmri.net/k/docket/cafc-pi-1/40.pdf
(Amici's "response")
http://jmri.net/k/docket/cafc-pi-1/41.pdf
(Katzer's response)
I'm shocked by Amici's citation of Nimmer on Copyright talking about
"appropriate contractual provisions" and "appropriate contract
construction"... What!? I thought that licenses are not contracts in
"free as in free speech" world.
There is a recording of the oral arguments (or lack thereof) at
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oralarguments/mp3/2008-1001.mp3

It seems to me that an appropriate punishment for presenting such nonsense
from both sides should be that both attorneys are barred from ever
litigating in court again. Clearly neither knew how to present a case.

The amicus brief file by Moglen and his minions framed the issue pretty
squarely:

"The District Court's decision that the asserted violations of the Artistic
License at issue in this case sound in contract, not copyright, was
erroneous. If the
decision were applied broadly, it could disrupt the settled expectations of
literally
millions of copyright holders who have depended upon the copyright system to
secure the right to enforce public licenses....

....Traditional copyright licenses grant exclusive rights in exchange for
money
or other remuneration. Public licensors leverage the exclusive rights that
copyright
confers for public good, for example to secure freedom to derivative authors
and
users, or to enhance innovation. The conditions and limitations in public
licenses
are designed to increase the freedom of downstream authors and users without
imposing the typical copyright clearance burdens. One common condition of
public licenses is a requirement that prior to any distribution of the work
(or a
derivative version of the work), copyright notices and license provisions
included
in the original version must be copied and included in the distribution."

This seems like a plan to go "all in" as in the popular Hold-em poker game.
It is an opportunity for the circuit court to put this nonsense out of its
misery once and for all.
rjack
2008-06-27 22:29:07 UTC
Permalink
Post by amicus_curious
http://jmri.net/k/docket/cafc-pi-1/39.pdf (JMRI's post-argument "citation
of supplemental authority")
http://jmri.net/k/docket/cafc-pi-1/40.pdf (Amici's "response")
http://jmri.net/k/docket/cafc-pi-1/41.pdf (Katzer's response)
I'm shocked by Amici's citation of Nimmer on Copyright talking about
"appropriate contractual provisions" and "appropriate contract
construction"... What!? I thought that licenses are not contracts in "free
as in free speech" world.
There is a recording of the oral arguments (or lack thereof) at
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oralarguments/mp3/2008-1001.mp3
It seems to me that an appropriate punishment for presenting such nonsense
from both sides should be that both attorneys are barred from ever litigating
in court again. Clearly neither knew how to present a case.
The amicus brief file by Moglen and his minions framed the issue pretty
"The District Court's decision that the asserted violations of the Artistic
License at issue in this case sound in contract, not copyright, was
erroneous. If the decision were applied broadly, it could disrupt the settled
expectations of literally millions of copyright holders who have depended
upon the copyright system to secure the right to enforce public licenses....
Eben Moglen is asking the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to overturn
the clear and unequivocal language of the Supreme Court in De Forest Radio Tel.
& Tel. Co. v. United States, 273 U.S. 236, United States Supreme Court (1927):

"Whether this [act] constitutes a gratuitous license, or one for a
reasonable compensation, must, of course, depend upon the circumstances; but
the relation between the parties thereafter in respect of any suit brought must
be held to be contractual, and not an unlawful invasion of the rights of the
owner."

The same Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held in Storage Technology
Corporation v.Custom Hardware Engineering & Consulting, Inc.; 421 F.3d 1307
(CAFC) (2005):

"In light of their facts, those cases thus stand for the entirely unremarkable
principle that “uses” that violate a license agreement constitute copyright
infringement only when those uses would infringe in the absence of any license
agreement at all."

In the absence of any license at all, there is obviously no "right of
attribution" mentioned in 17 USC 106.
Post by amicus_curious
....Traditional copyright licenses grant exclusive rights in exchange for
money or other remuneration. Public licensors leverage the exclusive rights
that copyright confers for public good, for example to secure freedom to
derivative authors and users, or to enhance innovation. The conditions and
limitations in public licenses are designed to increase the freedom of
downstream authors and users without imposing the typical copyright clearance
burdens. One common condition of public licenses is a requirement that prior
to any distribution of the work (or a derivative version of the work),
copyright notices and license provisions included in the original version
must be copied and included in the distribution."
This seems like a plan to go "all in" as in the popular Hold-em poker game.
It is an opportunity for the circuit court to put this nonsense out of its
misery once and for all.
Clearly Moglen does not want to suffer with the "typical copyright clearance
burdens" of the Copyright Act and instead wants to substitute Richard Stallman's
idealogical version of copyright "freedoms". This leads one to ask if Moglen has
has ever wondered why Congress passed 17 USC sec. 301:

"Preemption with respect to other laws.
(a) On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright
as specified by section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible
medium of expression and come within the subject matter of copyright as
specified by sections 102 and 103, whether created before or after that date and
whether published or unpublished, are governed exclusively by this title.
Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any
such work under the common law or statutes of any State."

Obviously Congress thinks that its members, and not Richard Stallman, are
empowered to write the copyright laws that apply to the general public.

Sincerely,
Rjack :}

-- "Although the United States Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101- 1332, grants
exclusive jurisdiction for infringement claims to the federal courts, those
courts construe copyrights as contracts and turn to the relevant state law to
interpret them."; Automation by Design, Inc. v. Raybestos Products Co., 463 F.3d
749, (United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 2006) --
Hyman Rosen
2008-07-02 21:59:54 UTC
Permalink
Post by rjack
Eben Moglen is asking the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
to overturn the clear and unequivocal language of the Supreme Court
in De Forest Radio Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 273 U.S. 236,
"Whether this [act] constitutes a gratuitous license, or one
for a reasonable compensation, must, of course, depend upon
the circumstances; but the relation between the parties
thereafter in respect of any suit brought must be held to be
contractual, and not an unlawful invasion of the rights of
the owner."
Here's the decision: <http://supreme.justia.com/us/273/236/case.html>.
First of all, the case was about a patent, not a copyright. Second,
the decision also says

'Concede that, if the owner had said, "If you go on and infringe
my patent, I shall not attempt to enjoin you, but I shall
subsequently sue you for infringement," the tort would not be
waived;'

and that is similar to language contained in the GPL.
Alexander Terekhov
2008-07-02 22:46:02 UTC
Permalink
Hyman Rosen wrote:
[...]
Post by Hyman Rosen
Here's the decision: <http://supreme.justia.com/us/273/236/case.html>.
First of all, the case was about a patent, not a copyright. Second,
the decision also says
'Concede that, if the owner had said, "If you go on and infringe
my patent, I shall not attempt to enjoin you, but I shall
subsequently sue you for infringement," the tort would not be
waived;'
If you go on and infringe my copyright -- make use of my exclusive
right(s) *before* telling the world that I am "Alexander The Great and
Powerful" -- I shall not attempt to enjoin you, but I shall subsequently
sue you for infringement. True.
Post by Hyman Rosen
and that is similar to language contained in the GPL.
Oh really?

Go to doctor, Hyman.

regards,
alexander.

--
http://gng.z505.com/index.htm
(GNG is a derecursive recursive derecursion which pwns GNU since it can
be infinitely looped as GNGNGNGNG...NGNGNG... and can be said backwards
too, whereas GNU cannot.)
rjack
2008-07-04 15:34:47 UTC
Permalink
Post by Hyman Rosen
Post by rjack
Eben Moglen is asking the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
to overturn the clear and unequivocal language of the Supreme Court
in De Forest Radio Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 273 U.S. 236,
"Whether this [act] constitutes a gratuitous license, or one
for a reasonable compensation, must, of course, depend upon
the circumstances; but the relation between the parties
thereafter in respect of any suit brought must be held to be
contractual, and not an unlawful invasion of the rights of
the owner."
Here's the decision: <http://supreme.justia.com/us/273/236/case.html>.
First of all, the case was about a patent, not a copyright. Second,
the decision also says
'Concede that, if the owner had said, "If you go on and infringe
my patent, I shall not attempt to enjoin you, but I shall
subsequently sue you for infringement," the tort would not be
waived;'
and that is similar to language contained in the GPL.
How 'bout this discussion:

"However, implicit in a nonexclusive license is the promise not to sue for
copyright infringement. See In re CFLC, Inc., 89 F.3d 673, 677 (9th Cir. 1996),
citing De Forest Radio Telephone Co. v. United States, 273 U.S. 236, 242 (1927)
(finding that a nonexclusive license is, in essence, a mere waiver of the right
to sue the licensee for infringement); see also Effects Associates, Inc. v.
Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 558 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the granting of a
nonexclusive license may be oral or by conduct and a such a license creates a
waiver of the right to sue in copyright, but not the right to sue for breach of
contract)." Jacobsen v. Katzer, No. 3:06-cv-01905, (N.D. Cal. 2007)

Sincerely,
Rjack :)

-- "Whether express or implied, a license is a contract 'governed by ordinary
principles of state contract law.'"; McCoy v. Mitsuboshi Cutlery, Inc., 67. F.3d
917, (United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 1995) --

-- "Although the United States Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101- 1332, grants
exclusive jurisdiction for infringement claims to the federal courts, those
courts construe copyrights as contracts and turn to the relevant state law to
interpret them."; Automation by Design, Inc. v. Raybestos Products Co., 463 F.3d
749, (United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 2006) --
Alexander Terekhov
2008-07-04 16:52:32 UTC
Permalink
Post by rjack
Post by Hyman Rosen
Post by rjack
Eben Moglen is asking the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
to overturn the clear and unequivocal language of the Supreme Court
in De Forest Radio Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 273 U.S. 236,
"Whether this [act] constitutes a gratuitous license, or one
for a reasonable compensation, must, of course, depend upon
the circumstances; but the relation between the parties
thereafter in respect of any suit brought must be held to be
contractual, and not an unlawful invasion of the rights of
the owner."
Here's the decision: <http://supreme.justia.com/us/273/236/case.html>.
First of all, the case was about a patent, not a copyright. Second,
the decision also says
'Concede that, if the owner had said, "If you go on and infringe
my patent, I shall not attempt to enjoin you, but I shall
subsequently sue you for infringement," the tort would not be
waived;'
and that is similar to language contained in the GPL.
"However, implicit in a nonexclusive license is the promise not to sue for
copyright infringement. See In re CFLC, Inc., 89 F.3d 673, 677 (9th Cir. 1996),
citing De Forest Radio Telephone Co. v. United States, 273 U.S. 236, 242 (1927)
(finding that a nonexclusive license is, in essence, a mere waiver of the right
to sue the licensee for infringement); see also Effects Associates, Inc. v.
Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 558 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the granting of a
nonexclusive license may be oral or by conduct and a such a license creates a
waiver of the right to sue in copyright, but not the right to sue for breach of
contract)." Jacobsen v. Katzer, No. 3:06-cv-01905, (N.D. Cal. 2007)
Hey Hyman,

To repeat: suppose that a copyright license contract of mine clearly
states that

*Before* you make use of my exclusive right(s) you must tell the world
that I am "Alexander The Great and Powerful."

That is a license condition (violation of which I may recover in
copyright.)

http://www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/C/Conditionprecedent.aspx

------
Condition precedent

A contractual condition that suspends the coming into effect of a
contract unless or until a certain event takes place.
------

Consider also the following:

http://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F3/110/110.F3d.749.96-2636.html

------
"Conditions precedent are disfavored and will not be read into a
contract unless required by plain, unambiguous language." Effects
Associates, 908 F.2d at 559 n. 7. On July 2, 1993
------

regards,
alexander.

--
http://gng.z505.com/index.htm
(GNG is a derecursive recursive derecursion which pwns GNU since it can
be infinitely looped as GNGNGNGNG...NGNGNG... and can be said backwards
too, whereas GNU cannot.)
Hyman Rosen
2008-07-06 04:08:45 UTC
Permalink
Post by Alexander Terekhov
http://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F3/110/110.F3d.749.96-2636.html
I just did. Did you? Everything about that case acts in support
of the provisions of the GPL, not against it.

"Albion's approving conduct--his granting of permission to
the Miracle on July 2, 1993 to play his song at the next
day's game even though he had not yet been paid, his
attendance without demur at subsequent games at which the
song was played, his letter to Kuhn urging the Miracle to
continue to play the song at games, and his failure to
withdraw permission until October--clearly expressed
Albion's permission for the Miracle to play the song when
it did.

In other words, if you notice problems and take no action, and
even encourage further use, the court isn't going to believe that
the use was without permission. That's why the GPL clearly states
what you are permitted to do, what you are not permitted to do,
and that you immediately lose distribution rights if you do not
conform to the conditions of the license.
Post by Alexander Terekhov
"Conditions precedent are disfavored and will not be read into a
contract unless required by plain, unambiguous language." Effects
Associates, 908 F.2d at 559 n. 7. On July 2, 1993
Yes, exactly what the GPL contains. And that's why the GPL contains
its clear preamble explaining its intent. That's so that when someone
tries to weasel out of its plain requirements, the court will know
exactly what the intent of the license is.
Alexander Terekhov
2008-07-07 07:46:03 UTC
Permalink
Post by Hyman Rosen
Post by Alexander Terekhov
http://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F3/110/110.F3d.749.96-2636.html
I just did. Did you? Everything about that case acts in support
of the provisions of the GPL, not against it.
"Albion's approving conduct--his granting of permission to
the Miracle on July 2, 1993 to play his song at the next
day's game even though he had not yet been paid, his
attendance without demur at subsequent games at which the
song was played, his letter to Kuhn urging the Miracle to
continue to play the song at games, and his failure to
withdraw permission until October--clearly expressed
Albion's permission for the Miracle to play the song when
it did.
In other words, if you notice problems and take no action, and
even encourage further use, the court isn't going to believe that
the use was without permission. That's why the GPL clearly states
what you are permitted to do, what you are not permitted to do,
Why did you not quote the following subsequent text?

"Implicit in that permission was a promise not to sue for copyright
infringement--a promise that at least one court has found to be the
essence of a nonexclusive license. See In re CFLC, Inc., 89 F.3d 673,
677 (9th Cir.1996) ("[A] nonexclusive patent license is, in essence, 'a
mere waiver of the right to sue' the licensee for infringement.")
(quoting De Forest Radio Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. United States, 273
U.S. 236, 242, 47 S.Ct. 366, 368, 71 L.Ed. 625 (1927)). We think it
follows that until permission was withdrawn in October, JMI granted to
the Miracle a nonexclusive license to play the song at games.

In so saying, we do not suggest that Albion and JMI waived their rights
to be compensated by the Miracle in accordance with their oral
understanding. What they waived was any right to sue for breach of
copyright on account of the playing of the song while the license was in
effect. As discussed in the following section, the Miracle's failure to
provide the agreed quid pro quo could not, on the facts of this case,
invalidate the legal effect of Albion's permission to play."
Post by Hyman Rosen
and that you immediately lose distribution rights if you do not
conform to the conditions of the license.
You just can't "lose" any licensed rights if you do not conform to the
conditions PRECEDENT to the license contract. That's because a condition
precedent is a contractual condition that suspends the coming into
effect of a contract (conveying the rights) unless or until certain
events takes place. You can't "lose" a right that *wasn't* conveyed to
you.

Anyway, I think you would agree that even if a court theoretically
determined that my license to, say, a copy of Vista was in fact
terminated, I could go to Best Buy or CompUSA and buy another copy. The
fact that my license to one copy is terminated would not render invalid
my license to all subsequent copies that I lawfully acquire. What is the
basis for arguing that the situation is any different with respect to
"free" software?

If the license contract is terminated, what would prohibit the former
licensee from lawfully acquire another license to the software? Where in
the GPL does it say that past infringers are prohibited from obtaining a
license? The answer is nowhere.
Post by Hyman Rosen
Post by Alexander Terekhov
"Conditions precedent are disfavored and will not be read into a
contract unless required by plain, unambiguous language." Effects
Associates, 908 F.2d at 559 n. 7. On July 2, 1993
Yes, exactly what the GPL contains.
The GPL doesn't contain any conditions precedent. All obligations stated
in the GPL a contractual covenants and not conditions precedent.

regards,
alexander.

--
http://gng.z505.com/index.htm
(GNG is a derecursive recursive derecursion which pwns GNU since it can
be infinitely looped as GNGNGNGNG...NGNGNG... and can be said backwards
too, whereas GNU cannot.)
Alexander Terekhov
2008-08-23 13:33:01 UTC
Permalink
http://jmri.net/k/docket/227.pdf

Jacobsen says:

--------
Implementation of Federal Circuit Ruling

Jacobsen has proposed an injunction, which is attached as Exhibit A. The
original motion for preliminary injunction sought to enjoin infringement
of JMRI Decoder Definitions 1.7.1. Jacobsen asks the Court to expand the
preliminary injunction to cover all versions of JMRI software. Jacobsen
will also ask the Court to enjoin Defendants from violation Sec. 1202.

Defendants argue that they need further briefing relating to irreparable
harm. Plaintiff addressed irreparable harm and balance of hardships in
his motion, so Defendants had the opportunity to address the issues
then. Also, as noted earlier, Defendants have argued—and continue to
argue in their motions to strike—that Plaintiff is not entitled to
monetary damages. Thus, Defendants admit damages are inadequate, which
is an important factor in favor of the issuance of an injunction.
Furthermore, the eBay decision issued 18 months ago, so again Defendants
have had long enough to file a surreply to discuss eBay. To delay the
injunction until further briefing is complete is to draw this case out
further and waste judicial resources. The preliminary injunction should
issue.

Jacobsen’s copyright covers JMRI materials. If Defendants make copies or
derivative works, or distribute JMRI materials, then Defendants are
infringing. Defendants’ products do not work unless they use a range of
decoder definition files, such as that which JMRI provides. Thus,
Defendants are motivated to use JMRI materials as a basis for their
products. Having already been found to infringe JMRI materials,
Defendants must provide documentation that they have independently
created their products, in order to bar an injunction. They had provided
nothing. Thus, the injunction should issue.
--------

Katzer says:

--------
Kamind Associates, Inc. and Matthew Katzer (collectively referred to as
“Katzer”) disagree with the entirety of Plaintiff’s statement above and
the attached Exhibit A and submit the following regarding the recent
decision of the Federal Circuit:

[...]

Implementation of the Federal Circuit’s Opinion

The Federal Circuit’s August 13, 3008 Opinion remands this case to this
Court for further findings on whether Jacobsen has demonstrated (1) a
likelihood of success on the merits and either a presumption of
irreparable harm or a demonstration of irreparable harm; or (2) a fair
chance of success on the merits and a clear disparity in the relative
hardships and tipping in his favor. Opinion at 15.

This Court did not reach these questions in its August 17, 2007 Order
denying Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. Since this
Court held that Plaintiff’s claim sounds only in contract, this Court
concluded:

“therefore Plaintiff has not met his burden of demonstrating likelihood
of success on the merits of his copyright claim and is therefore not
entitled to a presumption of irreparable harm. See Sun Microsystems, 188
F.3d at 1119. Plaintiff has not met his burden of demonstrating either a
combination of probable success on the merits of his copyright claim nor
the existence of serious questions going to the merits. See GoTo.com,
202 F.3d at 1204-1205.”

Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion forPreliminary Injunction at 11 [Dkt.
#158]. The Federal Circuit has held that Plaintiff has a viable
copyright claim, therefore these conclusions regarding irreparable harm
and success on the merits must be revisited by this Court.

To complicate matters, the law regarding the test for irreparable harm
for a preliminary injunction in the copyright law context has changed
dramatically since this Court issued its August 17, 2007 Order. In its
Order, this Court noted that:

“Under federal copyright law, however, a plaintiff who demonstrates a
likelihood of success on the merits of a copyright claim is entitled to
a presumption of irreparable harm. Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft
Corp., 188 F.3d 1115, 1119 (9th Cir. 1999), citing Cadence Design
Systems v. Avant! Corp., 125 F.3d 824, 826-27 (9th Cir. 1997). ‘That
presumption means that the balance of hardships issue cannot be accorded
significant-if any-weight in determining whether a court should enter a
preliminary injunction to prevent the use of infringing material in
cases where…the plaintiff has made a strong showing of likely success on
the merits.’”
Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion forPreliminary Injunction at 8 [Dkt.
#158].

In 2006, the Supreme Court eviscerated the presumption of irreparable
harm to motions for permanent injunctions in the patent infringement
context, holding that a Plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must
demonstrate that the traditional equitable factors for granting an
injunction have been met. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388,
126 S. Ct. 1837, 164 L. Ed. 2d 641 (2006). Since that time, and
subsequent to this Court’s August 17, 2007 Order, numerous courts,
including this Court, the Northern District of California, have held
that, as a result of eBay, the presumption of irreparable harm no longer
exists in the preliminary injunction context either. See e.g. Hologic,
Inc. v. Senorx, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist LEXIS 36693 at *44-46 (N.D. Cal.
April 25, 2008), Tiber Labs, LLC v. Hawthorn Pharms., Inc., 527 F.
Supp.2d 1373, 1380 (N.D. Ga 2007); Voile Mfg. Corp. v. Dandurand, 551,
F.Supp.2d 1301, 1306 (D. Utah 2008); Sun Optics, Inc. v. FGX Int’l,
Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56351, 2007 WL 2228569, at *1 (D. Del.
August 2, 2007); Torspo Hockey Int’l Inc. v. Kor Hockey Ltd., 491 F.
Supp. 2d 871, 881 (D. Minn. 2007); Allora, LLC v. Brownstone, Inc., 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31343 (W.D.N.C. April 27, 2007) (copyright
infringement).

Additionally, a district court in the Ninth Circuit has recently held
that no presumption of irreparable harm results from a finding of
liability in a copyright case following eBay. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 518 F. Supp. 2d. 1197, 1210-1214. (C.D.
Cal. 2007). Therefore, Katzer believes that the cases cited in this
Court’s August 17, 2007 Order regarding the presumption of irreparable
harm are no longer good law post-eBay.
As a consequence, Katzer believes that Plaintiff is now required to meet
his burden of demonstrating irreparable harm and can no longer rest on
this former presumption as he did in his papers in support of his motion
for preliminary injunction. Additionally, Katzer believes that since the
presumption of irreparable harm is gone, it is now necessary for the
Court to make findings on the balance of hardships between the parties
should an injunction issue, and for Katzer to introduce evidence into
the record regarding the hardship imposed by a preliminary injunction
from this Court. Since Plaintiff must now prove irreparable harm and
Katzer is entitled to introduce evidence of the hardship created by an
injunction, Katzer believes that a hearing is necessary for the
introduction of this evidence before any injunction can issue. See Fed.
Rule Civ. P. 65. Katzer also requests that he be allowed to provide this
Court additional legal briefing on why the presumption of irreparable
harm no longer exists in a copyright preliminary injunction proceeding
following eBay and how it is not possible for Plaintiff to demonstrate
irreparable harm in this case.

Lastly, Plaintiff must prove a likelihood of success on the merits or a
fair chance of success on the merits of his copyright claim. Plaintiff
has not yet specifically identified the copyrighted material that is the
subject of the proposed motion and Plaintiff’s attached Exhibit A
broadens significantly the scope of the injunction from the original
motion. Therefore, further findings must be made by this Court to
determine whether Plaintiff has met his burden on the merits issue and
the scope of any proposed injunction.

Katzer proposes the following briefing schedule on the preliminary
injunction motion:

October 3, 2008: Plaintiff submits Supplemental Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Preliminary Injunction

November 7, 2008: Defendant submits Supplemental Memorandum in
Opposition

November 21, 2008: Plaintiff submits Reply

December 13, 2008: Evidentiary hearing on Plaintiff’s Motion for
Preliminary Injunction
--------

regards,
alexander.

--
http://gng.z505.com/index.htm
(GNG is a derecursive recursive derecursion which pwns GNU since it can
be infinitely looped as GNGNGNGNG...NGNGNG... and can be said backwards
too, whereas GNU cannot.)
Rjack
2008-08-24 01:04:23 UTC
Permalink
Post by Alexander Terekhov
http://jmri.net/k/docket/227.pdf
Lastly, Plaintiff must prove a likelihood of success on the merits or
a fair chance of success on the merits of his copyright claim.
It's a loooooooong way from over. The Federal Circuit ruled narrowly on
whether the terms were "covenants" or "conditions" and that's all --
discovery has yet to be initiated concerning the merits of the case.

Contract "conditions" and "covenants" are both "contract terms". Terms
of a contract are subject to the rules of contract interpretation
whether they are covenants or conditions.

Consider:

"You may copy my work if you *promise* to murder your mother" and
another that states, "You may copy my work *provided that* you murder
your mother". One contains a contract covenant the other a contract
condition but they are both illegal terms that are held against the
drafter of the contract.

Copyright preemption, illegal terms ("against public policy"), mutual
mistake, and impossibility of terms (among a thousand other rules) have
yet to be examined under the Federal Circuit's implimentation of
"condition" versus "covenant".

Anyone remember Yogi Berra's "It ain't over 'till it's over"?

Sincerely,
Rjack :)

-- "Whether express or implied, a license is a contract 'governed
by ordinary principles of state contract law.'"; McCoy v.
Mitsuboshi Cutlery, Inc., 67. F.3d 917, (United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit 1995) --

-- "Although the United States Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 101-
1332, grants exclusive jurisdiction for infringement claims to the
federal courts, those courts construe copyrights as contracts and
turn to the relevant state law to interpret them."; Automation by
Design, Inc. v. Raybestos Products Co., 463 F.3d 749, (United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 2006) --
David Kastrup
2008-08-24 10:03:05 UTC
Permalink
Post by Rjack
Post by Alexander Terekhov
http://jmri.net/k/docket/227.pdf
Lastly, Plaintiff must prove a likelihood of success on the merits or
a fair chance of success on the merits of his copyright claim.
It's a loooooooong way from over. The Federal Circuit ruled narrowly on
whether the terms were "covenants" or "conditions" and that's all --
discovery has yet to be initiated concerning the merits of the case.
Contract "conditions" and "covenants" are both "contract terms". Terms
of a contract are subject to the rules of contract interpretation
whether they are covenants or conditions.
"You may copy my work if you *promise* to murder your mother" and
another that states, "You may copy my work *provided that* you murder
your mother". One contains a contract covenant the other a contract
condition but they are both illegal terms that are held against the
drafter of the contract.
Copyright preemption, illegal terms ("against public policy"), mutual
mistake, and impossibility of terms (among a thousand other rules) have
yet to be examined under the Federal Circuit's implimentation of
"condition" versus "covenant".
With your remarkable grasp of legal matters I would not be overly
surprised if you considered dumping your household garbage in a cemetery
to be perfectly feasible since their policies of only burying dead
persons amounts to asking for murder and thus any of their conditions
and tariffs need not be heeded.
Post by Rjack
Anyone remember Yogi Berra's "It ain't over 'till it's over"?
When only isolated lunatics remain, it is over.
--
David Kastrup, Kriemhildstr. 15, 44793 Bochum
Linonut
2008-08-24 13:51:17 UTC
Permalink
Post by David Kastrup
When only isolated lunatics remain, it is over.
--
David Kastrup, Kriemhildstr. 15, 44793 Bochum
Sig material!

Although the one below I just have to leave stet, even though it break
Usenet etiquette.
--
I suppose some of the variation between Boston drivers and the rest of the
country is due to the progressive Massachusetts Driver Education Manual which
I happen to have in my top desk drawer. Some of the Tips for Better Driving
are worth considering, to wit:
[110.13]:
"When traveling on a one-way street, stay to the right, so as not
to interfere with oncoming traffic."
[22.17b]:
"Learning to change lanes takes time and patience. The best
recommendation that can be made is to go to a Celtics [basketball]
game; study the fast break and then go out and practice it
on the highway."
[41.16]:
"Never bump a baby carriage out of a crosswalk unless the kid's really
asking for it."
Alexander Terekhov
2008-08-30 14:34:05 UTC
Permalink
David Kastrup wrote:
[...]
Post by David Kastrup
persons amounts to asking for murder and thus any of their conditions
and tariffs need not be heeded.
C'mon dak, according to CAFC's moronic trio, a license stating that "you
can reproduce and/or perform my song _provided that_ the sound level
doesn't exceed 80 dB" creates a copyright (not a contract) liability at
80.0000000000000001+ dB and more because "provided that" is treated as a
"condition" by three CAFC's idiots.

regards,
alexander.

--
http://gng.z505.com/index.htm
(GNG is a derecursive recursive derecursion which pwns GNU since it can
be infinitely looped as GNGNGNGNG...NGNGNG... and can be said backwards
too, whereas GNU cannot.)
Alexander Terekhov
2008-08-30 15:11:40 UTC
Permalink
"Technically, the Federal Circuit's ruling will have no precedential,
effect. Because of an unusual quirk in US law, the court had to apply
the legal standards of a sister appellate court, the 9th Circuit Court
of Appeals; and the Federal Circuit's interpretation of 9th Circuit law
has no precedential value. "Even a future Federal Circuit case on this
area of the law must look again to the regional [9th] circuit and not
the Federal Circuit interpretation," according to Harold Wegner, a
partner in the Washington, DC office of Foley & Lardner."

regards,
alexander.

--
http://gng.z505.com/index.htm
(GNG is a derecursive recursive derecursion which pwns GNU since it can
be infinitely looped as GNGNGNGNG...NGNGNG... and can be said backwards
too, whereas GNU cannot.)
Alexander Terekhov
2008-09-06 13:10:01 UTC
Permalink
Post by Alexander Terekhov
"Technically, the Federal Circuit's ruling will have no precedential,
effect. Because of an unusual quirk in US law, the court had to apply
the legal standards of a sister appellate court, the 9th Circuit Court
of Appeals; and the Federal Circuit's interpretation of 9th Circuit law
has no precedential value. "Even a future Federal Circuit case on this
area of the law must look again to the regional [9th] circuit and not
the Federal Circuit interpretation," according to Harold Wegner, a
partner in the Washington, DC office of Foley & Lardner."
It follows that Katzer has invited the District Court to ignore the
CAFC's ruling:

http://jmri.net/k/docket/230.pdf

-----
RE-NOTICE

To the Court and all interested parties, please take notice that a
hearing on Defendants Matthew Katzer and Kamind Associates, Inc.’s
Motion to Dismiss Counts 5 and 6 of the Second Amended Complaint and
Motion to Strike [Dkt.#192] and Motion to Dismiss Counts 1, 2, and 3 of
Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint as Moot [Dkt. #203] will be held on
December 19, 2008 at 9:00am in Courtroom 2, Floor 17, of the
above-entitled court located at 450 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco,
California.

MOTION

Defendants Matthew Katzer (“Katzer”) and Kamind Associates, Inc. (“KAM”)
move the court for an order dismissing Counts 5 and 6 of Plaintiff’s
amended complaint without leave to amend; and striking certain portions
of the amended complaint. This Motion is supported by Defendants
previously filed memoranda in support located at Docket entries 192 and
200

MOTION

Defendants Matthew Katzer (“Katzer”) and Kamind Associates, Inc. (“KAM”)
move the court for an order dismissing Counts 1, 2 and 3 of Plaintiff’s
second amended complaint, and the associated relief requested in
Plaintiff’s Prayer for Relief A, B, C, D, E, F, G and T (requesting
costs and attorney fees pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 285), as moot under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). This Motion is supported by the Defendants’
previously filed memoranda in support located at Docket entries 203 and
214 and Defendants’ Statement of Additional Authority [Dkt.#220].
-----

http://jmri.net/k/docket/231.pdf

Jacobsen says:

-----
TAKE NOTICE that, on Friday, December 19, 2008, at 9:00 a.m. in
Courtroom 2, 17th floor of the San Francisco Division of the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California, located
at 450 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, California, Plaintiff Robert
Jacobsen will move to enjoin Defendants’ copyright infringement and DMCA
violations. This Motion is based on the Memorandum of Points and
Authorities, and declarations, to be filed Friday, October 3, 2008.

MOTION

Plaintiff Robert Jacobsen moves for a court order to enjoin Defendants
Matthew Katzer and KAMIND Associates, Inc. from infringing Jacobsen’s
copyrights and from violating 17 U.S.C. Sec. 1202.
-----

He he.

regards,
alexander.

--
http://gng.z505.com/index.htm
(GNG is a derecursive recursive derecursion which pwns GNU since it can
be infinitely looped as GNGNGNGNG...NGNGNG... and can be said backwards
too, whereas GNU cannot.)
Rjack
2008-09-06 19:28:52 UTC
Permalink
Post by Alexander Terekhov
Post by Alexander Terekhov
"Technically, the Federal Circuit's ruling will have no precedential,
effect. Because of an unusual quirk in US law, the court had to apply
the legal standards of a sister appellate court, the 9th Circuit Court
of Appeals; and the Federal Circuit's interpretation of 9th Circuit law
has no precedential value. "Even a future Federal Circuit case on this
area of the law must look again to the regional [9th] circuit and not
the Federal Circuit interpretation," according to Harold Wegner, a
partner in the Washington, DC office of Foley & Lardner."
It follows that Katzer has invited the District Court to ignore the
http://jmri.net/k/docket/230.pdf
Post by Alexander Terekhov
Post by Alexander Terekhov
It follows that Katzer has invited the District Court to ignore the
CAFC's ruling: <<<

Unfortunately, many posters in this group do not appreciate your wisdom
Alex.

"[In} Bandag, Inc. v. Al Bolser's Tire Stores, Inc., 750 F.2d 903, at
909 (Fed.Cir.1984), this court said:

Accordingly, we deem it appropriate here to decide non-patent matters
in the light of the problems faced by the district court from which
each count originated, including the law there applicable. In this
manner, we desire to avoid exacerbating the problem of intercircuit
conflicts in non-patent areas. A district court judge should not be
expected to look over his shoulder to the law in this circuit, save as
to those claims over which our subject matter jurisdiction is
exclusive. [Footnote omitted.]
...
The freedom of the district courts to follow the guidance of their
particular circuits in all but the substantive law fields assigned
exclusively to this court is recognized in the foregoing opinions and
in this case."; ATARI, INC., v. JS & A GROUP, INC., 747 F.2d 1422, 223
USPQ 1074 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (en banc)

"Oh my", exclaimed Jacobsen, Moglen and Lessig, "Why, after all our spin?"

Sincerely,
Rjack :)

-- "Whether express or implied, a license is a contract 'governed
by ordinary principles of state contract law.'"; McCoy v.
Mitsuboshi Cutlery, Inc., 67. F.3d 917, (United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit 1995) --

-- "Although the United States Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 101-
1332, grants exclusive jurisdiction for infringement claims to the
federal courts, those courts construe copyrights as contracts and
turn to the relevant state law to interpret them."; Automation by
Design, Inc. v. Raybestos Products Co., 463 F.3d 749, (United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 2006) --
Hyman Rosen
2008-09-07 14:40:56 UTC
Permalink
Post by Alexander Terekhov
It follows that Katzer has invited the District Court to ignore the
CAFC's ruling
Asking and getting aren't the same thing.
Alexander Terekhov
2008-10-08 11:39:57 UTC
Permalink
Post by Alexander Terekhov
http://jmri.net/k/docket/231.pdf
-----
TAKE NOTICE that, on Friday, December 19, 2008, at 9:00 a.m. in
Courtroom 2, 17th floor of the San Francisco Division of the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California, located
at 450 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, California, Plaintiff Robert
Jacobsen will move to enjoin Defendants’ copyright infringement and DMCA
violations. This Motion is based on the Memorandum of Points and
Authorities, and declarations, to be filed Friday, October 3, 2008.
Just in:

http://jmri.sourceforge.net/k/docket/236.pdf

LOL.

------
The Artistic License permits reproduction, modification, and
distribution provided that the user meet the terms of the license. Id.
Ex H. GPL has similar requirements, but also requires that software
which incorporates GPL-licensed code to be free and distributed under
GPL. Id. Ex I. Both licenses use the phrase “provided that”. The Federal
Circuit held this language indicates a condition restricting the scope
of the license. Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir.
2008). The Court implicitly held that these licenses bind a user through
a bilateral implied-in-fact contract. See id.
------

I just wonder how soon will PJ of Groklaw publish the breaking news
story that the GPL and Artistic licenses "bind a user through a
bilateral implied-in-fact contract"...

http://www.groklaw.net/article.php?story=20031214210634851
"The GPL is a License, Not a Contract, Which is Why the Sky Isn't
Falling"

ROFL.

regards,
alexander.
--
http://gng.z505.com/index.htm
(GNG is a derecursive recursive derecursion which pwns GNU since it can
be infinitely looped as GNGNGNGNG...NGNGNG... and can be said backwards
too, whereas GNU cannot.)
Alexander Terekhov
2008-12-22 22:37:14 UTC
Permalink
http://jmri.sourceforge.net/k/docket/279.pdf
(NOTICE OF TENTATIVE RULING AND QUESTIONS. Signed by Judge Jeffrey S.
White on December 17, 2008. (jswlc2, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 12/17/2008))

"[[...]]" below is my own remarks, not judge's.

-----
[...]
Motion for Preliminary Injunction

1. As Defendants have already admitted to infringement [[ did they?
there's the reference?? ]], there is likelihood of success on the merits
of Plaintiff’s copyright infringement claim. The sole issue before this
Court is a demonstration of irreparable harm or a clear disparity in the
relative hardships tipping in Plaintiff’s favor. See eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006). The Federal Circuit found that
the lack of money changing hands in open source
licensing should not be presumed to mean that there is no economic
consideration, however. The substantial benefits, which might constitute
irreparable injury in the context of this motion, are generating market
share for program creators, benefit to the program developers’
reputation, and improvements in the software. See Jacobsen v. Katzer,
535 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2008). This potential harm is not
compensable with money damages [[ really? :-) ]] and therefore an
injunction is appropriate. On what basis do Defendants contend that such
harm has not been demonstrated, given the procedural history of this
matter?

2. If the Court finds there has been a demonstration of [[ irreparable?
]] harm by the Federal Circuit’s definition [[ LOL ]], and likelihood of
success on the merits [[ based on what? there's the reference?? ]] due
to the admitted infringement [[ which one? there's the reference?? ]],
the issue before the Court is the scope of the injunction [[ LOL ]].
What is the best language to encapsulate the material allegedly
infringed? In terms of drafting the scope of the injunction, should the
Court borrow from the Federal Circuit’s decision which defines the
admission of infringement as “portions of the DecoderPro software
[which] were copied, modified, and distributed as part of the Decoder
Commander software.” [[ LOL ]] Jacobson v. Katzer, 535 F.3d at 1379.

3. In terms of the scope of the injunction, how can the Court enjoin the
use of the old versions of Defendants’ products, which Plaintiff claims
he (and, presumably, other users) may still access and utilize the old
versions of Defendants’ products [[ ROFL ]]?

4. Do the partes have anything further they wish to address?

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 17, 2008
JEFFREY S. WHITE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
-----

Ha ha.

regards,
alexander.
--
http://gng.z505.com/index.htm
(GNG is a derecursive recursive derecursion which pwns GNU since it can
be infinitely looped as GNGNGNGNG...NGNGNG... and can be said backwards
too, whereas GNU cannot.)
Rjack
2008-12-23 01:52:06 UTC
Permalink
Post by Alexander Terekhov
http://jmri.sourceforge.net/k/docket/279.pdf
(NOTICE OF TENTATIVE RULING AND QUESTIONS. Signed by Judge Jeffrey S.
White on December 17, 2008. (jswlc2, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 12/17/2008))
A must read before analyzing the above referenced NOTICE OF
TENTATIVE RULING AND QUESTIONS:

http://jmri.sourceforge.net/k/docket/264.pdf

Sincerely,
Rjack (:
Alexander Terekhov
2009-01-07 21:48:16 UTC
Permalink
http://jmri.sourceforge.net/k/docket/284.pdf

-----
Jacobsen’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction on Copyright Claim.

1. Legal Standard.

Plaintiff moves for preliminary injunction, seeking a court order
enjoining Defendants from willfully infringing Plaintiff’s copyrighted
material. A plaintiff is entitled to a preliminary injunction when it
can demonstrate either: (1) a combination of probable success on the
merits and the possibility of irreparable injury, or (2) the existence
of serious questions going to the merits, where the balance of hardships
tips sharply in plaintiff’s favor. GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co.,
202 F.3d 1199, 1204-05 (9th Cir. 2000). To establish copyright
infringement, a plaintiff must show (1) ownership of the copyrights, and
(2) copying of the protected expression by Defendants. Sun Microsystems,
Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 188 F.3d 1115, 1109 (9th Cir. 1999).

Initially, when this matter was before the Court on a motion for
preliminary injunction, federal copyright law provided that a plaintiff
who demonstrates a likelihood of success on the merits of a copyright
claim was automatically entitled to a presumption of irreparable harm.
Id. at 1119 (citing Cadence Design Systems v. Avant! Corp., 125 F.3d
824, 826-27 (9th Cir. 1997)). “That presumption means that the balance
of hardships issue cannot be accorded significant – if any – weight in
determining whether a court should enter a preliminary injunction to
prevent the use of infringing material in cases where ... the plaintiff
has made a strong showing of likely success on the merits.” Sun, 188
F.3d at 1119 (citing Cadence, 125 F.3d at 830 (internal quotations
omitted)).

However, because of the passage of time, the governing law has changed.
Now, a plaintiff is not granted the presumption of irreparable harm upon
a showing of likelihood of success on the merits. Instead, a plaintiff
seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to
succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in
the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in
his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, 129 S. Ct. 365, 374 (2008) (citations
omitted). In this recent case, the Supreme Court found that the Ninth
Circuit’s standard of the likelihood of irreparable injury was too
lenient and held that a plaintiff must demonstrate that irreparable
injury is “likely in the absence of an injunction.” Id. at 375. “Issuing
a preliminary injunction based only a possibility of irreparable harm is
inconsistent with our characterization of injunctive relief as an
extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that
the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Id. at 375-76 (citing Mazurek
v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam)). Because a
preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy, “[i]n each case,
courts ‘must balance the competing claims of injury and must consider
the effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the requested
relief.’ Id. at 376 (citing Amoco Production Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S.
531, 542 (1987)). “‘In exercising their sound discretion, courts of
equity should pay particular regard for the public consequences in
employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction.’” Id. at 376-77
(citing Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982)).

2. Procedural History.

Plaintiff appealed this Court’s denial of his original motion for
preliminary injunction on the issue of copyright infringement. The
Federal Circuit court found that this Court had erred in its legal
finding that a copyright holder of work open and available to the public
free of charge under an “open source” nonexclusive copyright license may
not control future distribution and modification of such work under
federal copyright law, but may only pursue remedies under a breach of
contract theory. The Federal Circuit court found that Jacobsen may
maintain a cause of action for trademark infringement based on the facts
alleged in the complaint. In its decision, the appellate court found
that copyright holders who engage in open source licensing have the
right to control the modification and distribution of copyrighted
material and that the Artistic License present on the JMRI Project
website governed Jacobsen’s copyrighted material and required that any
downstream user follow the restrictive terms of the license. Because the
Federal Circuit found that this Court had erred in its legal finding,
and, having found that the terms of the Artistic License are enforceable
copyright conditions, the court vacated the denial of a preliminary
injunction and remanded “to enable the District Court to determine
whether Jacobsen has demonstrated (1) a likelihood of success on the
merits and either a presumption of irreparable harm or a demonstration
of irreparable harm; or (2) a fair chance of success on the merits and a
clear disparity in the relative hardships and tipping in his favor.”
Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d at 1382-83.

The Federal Circuit was faced with an incomplete record and only the
allegations in the complaint, and made its determination as a matter of
legal interpretation. The appellate court did not make a finding that
Jacobsen is entitled to a preliminary injunction on the allegations of
his complaint. It only found that this Court erred in finding that a
cause of action for trademark infringement could not lie. This Court is
again faced with a perfunctory record and is bound by the legal finding
of the appellate decision. However, in the intervening time, the Supreme
Court precedent governing the standard to be applied in deciding whether
the extraordinary remedy of a preliminary injunction is appropriate has
changed. This Court is bound by such intervening authority. In order to
grant Jacobsen a preliminary injunction, the Court must find, based on
the entire record, that Jacobsen is likely to succeed of the merits,
that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and
that an injunction is in the public interest. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 374.

3. Jacobsen Fails to Meet Heightened Burden of Demonstrating Harm.

In its opinion, the Federal Circuit found that in the open source field,
there are potential harms to copyright holders, although they may not be
exclusively monetary. The court found that

the lack of money changing hands in open source licensing should not be
presumed to mean that there is no economic consideration, however. There
are substantial benefits, including economic benefits, to the creation
and distribution of copyrighted works under public licenses that range
far beyond traditional license
royalties. For example, program creators may generate market share for
their programs by providing certain components free of charge.
Similarly, a programmer or company may increase its international
reputation by incubating open source projects. Improvement to a product
can come rapidly and free of charge from an expert not even known to the
copyright holder.

Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d at 1379. On this basis, the court found
that there could indeed be harm based exclusively on a copyright
infringement theory.

However, the Federal Circuit did not find, based on the record of this
case, that there was indeed either actual, current infringement or that
there was a likelihood of irreparable harm that tipped the balance of
equities in Jacobsen’s favor. The Federal Circuit court’s list of
potential harms that a copyright holder may face in the open source
field are just that – potential harms. There is no showing on the record
before this Court that Jacobsen has actually suffered any of these
potential harms. The standard under Winter requires that Jacobsen
demonstrate, by the introduction of admissible evidence and with a clear
likelihood of success that the harm is real, imminent and significant,
not just speculative or potential. 129 S. Ct. at 374. Jacobsen has
failed to proffer any evidence of any specific and actual harm suffered
as a result of the alleged copyright infringement and he has failed to
demonstrate that there is any continuing or ongoing conduct that
indicates future harm is imminent.3 Because Jacobsen fails to meet the
burden of presenting evidence of actual injury to support his claims of
irreparable injury and speculative losses, the Court cannot, on this
record, grant a preliminary injunction. See Goldie’s Bookstore, Inc. v.
Superior Court, 739 F.2d 466, 472 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that
speculative harm is insufficient to establish irreparable harm).

3 Although Jacobsen makes legal arguments regarding the alleged harm he
may suffer, for instance delays and inefficiency in development and time
lost in the open source development cycle, he has failed to put forward
any evidence of such harms. Jacobsen has failed to proffer evidence of
harm suffered or any evidence of a real or immediate threat of imminent
harm in the future. The Court also finds that Jacobsen has failed to
identify with the requisite particularity the extent of his copyright
ownership over the disputed underlying material. The JMRI Project
Decoder Definition Files incorporate many manufacturers’ specifications
data as well as rights to specific terms whose copyright is owned by
Defendants. Even if Jacobsen’s heavy burden to warrant injunctive relief
had been met, it is unclear how the Court would fashion an injunction
which would be narrowly tailored to enjoin only those allegedly
infringing uses of Jacobsen’s copyrighted content.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to
dismiss for mootness; GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendants’
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim; DENIES the motion to
strike; and DENIES Jacobsen’s motion for preliminary injunction.
Jacobsen may file an amended complaint within twenty days of the date of
this Order. If Jacobsen does not file a third amended complaint,
Defendants shall file an answer within twenty days of the deadline to
file the amended complaint. If Jacobsen elects to file a third amended
complaint in accordance with this Order, Defendants shall either file an
answer or move to dismiss within twenty days of service of the third
amended complaint.
-----

<chuckles>

regards,
alexander.

--
http://gng.z505.com/index.htm
(GNG is a derecursive recursive derecursion which pwns GNU since it can
be infinitely looped as GNGNGNGNG...NGNGNG... and can be said backwards
too, whereas GNU cannot.)
Hyman Rosen
2009-01-07 23:09:36 UTC
Permalink
Post by Alexander Terekhov
http://jmri.sourceforge.net/k/docket/284.pdf
Of the various claims, the only one relevant to this
newsgroup is the request for a preliminary injunction.
The others are patent claims, DMCA claims, attorney
fee claims, and other such irrelevancies.

The District Court appears to have decided to ignore
the meat of the opinion of the Appeals Court
<http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/opinions/08-1001.pdf>
while selectively reading just a bit of it and claiming
to obey it. The Appeals Court said

"The choice to exact consideration in the form of
compliance with the open source requirements of
disclosure and explanation of changes, rather than
as a dollar-denominated fee, is entitled to no less
legal recognition. Indeed, because a calculation of
damages is inherently speculative, these types of
license restrictions might well be rendered
meaningless absent the ability to enforce through
injunctive relief."

Instead, the District Court decided to focus on the part
of the Appeals Court decision where the judges enumerated
some possible non-monetary considerations that an author
might benefit from, and said that a plaintiff must show
that he was specifically harmed in one of these ways. That
is exactly contrary to what the Appeals Court said above.
I predict another round trip through the appeals process.
Clearly, the District Court judge was drunk.
Rjack
2009-01-08 02:30:52 UTC
Permalink
Post by Hyman Rosen
Clearly, the District Court judge was drunk.
"I ate his liver with some fava beans and a nice Chianti."
JEFFREY S. WHITE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE



Sincerely,
Rjack :)
Rahul Dhesi
2009-01-08 05:33:11 UTC
Permalink
Post by Hyman Rosen
The District Court appears to have decided to ignore
the meat of the opinion of the Appeals Court
<http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/opinions/08-1001.pdf>
while selectively reading just a bit of it and claiming
to obey it....
No, he probably did the right thing -- notice he gave leave to amend. If
he rules in favor of JMRI without establishing enough facts, then the
defendant would contest that and maybe win. If JMRI refiles its motion
with more facts, it may get an injunction that would be upheld on
appeal.
--
Rahul
http://rahul.rahul.net/
amicus_curious
2009-01-08 14:34:25 UTC
Permalink
Post by Hyman Rosen
Post by Alexander Terekhov
http://jmri.sourceforge.net/k/docket/284.pdf
Of the various claims, the only one relevant to this
newsgroup is the request for a preliminary injunction.
The others are patent claims, DMCA claims, attorney
fee claims, and other such irrelevancies.
The District Court appears to have decided to ignore
the meat of the opinion of the Appeals Court
<http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/opinions/08-1001.pdf>
while selectively reading just a bit of it and claiming
to obey it. The Appeals Court said
"The choice to exact consideration in the form of
compliance with the open source requirements of
disclosure and explanation of changes, rather than
as a dollar-denominated fee, is entitled to no less
legal recognition. Indeed, because a calculation of
damages is inherently speculative, these types of
license restrictions might well be rendered
meaningless absent the ability to enforce through
injunctive relief."
Instead, the District Court decided to focus on the part
of the Appeals Court decision where the judges enumerated
some possible non-monetary considerations that an author
might benefit from, and said that a plaintiff must show
that he was specifically harmed in one of these ways. That
is exactly contrary to what the Appeals Court said above.
I predict another round trip through the appeals process.
Clearly, the District Court judge was drunk.
I think that the issue of consideration is paramount. The copyright laws
exist to protect the author's ability to benefit from the author's artistic
cleverness. If the author chooses not to benefit in a conventional way, the
benefit that is expected must at least be defined clearly enough to
determine if someone's alleged violations actually harm the author. The
circuit court enumerated some possible claims that could be made and it is
reasonable to require the plaintiff to demonstrate the value of those
claims. There has always been a sense of balance of harms in civil
litigation and it has to continue.
Hyman Rosen
2009-01-08 15:02:22 UTC
Permalink
Post by amicus_curious
I think that the issue of consideration is paramount. The copyright
laws exist to protect the author's ability to benefit from the author's
artistic cleverness.
In the U.S., the source of copyright is the constitution:

To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries;

So in the U.S., copyright laws exist to promote progress,
and they do this by giving authors exclusive right to their
works. Exclusive rights mean nothing if authors cannot
enforce the terms upon which they choose to license those
rights to others. Absent that enforcement, authors will be
discouraged from participating in the creation of works of
science and useful arts, retarding progress.
Alexander Terekhov
2009-01-08 15:43:58 UTC
Permalink
Mark Radcliffe ("I earned a B.S. in Chemistry magna cum laude from the
University of Michigan and a J.D. from Harvard Law School. I have been
practicing law in Silicon Valley for over 25 years and am now a senior
partner at DLA Piper. DLA Piper is a new global law firm formed in 2005
from the merger of three law firms. The firm now has 3600 lawyers in 25
countries and 65 cities. My practice is a mix of corporate securities
and intellectual property. I work with many startups as well as large
global companies. I have had the opportunity to work with companies in
many industries, ranging from semiconductor to digital media to open
source. I am the General Counsel, pro bono, of the Open Source
Initiative and I ran the "Users" committee reviewing the GPLv3 draft.")
opined:

http://lawandlifesiliconvalley.com/blog/?p=141

-------
Jacobsen: District Court Denies Preliminary Injunction 06/01/09

The District Court in San Francisco in the Jacobsen v Katzner case
denied Jacobsen a preliminary injunction (as well as clarifying the
scope of some of the claims) in its decision issued yesterday (See the
decision here: http://jmri.sourceforge.net/k/docket/284.pdf). This
decision is very disappointing for the open source community. The
decision by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (”CAFC”) last
year was a great victory for open source licensors.
http://lawandlifesiliconvalley.com/blog/?p=64

The District Court drew on a very recent Supreme Court decision which
required a higher standard of proof of damages for the grant of a
preliminary injunction: Jacobsen must prove that he is “likely to
succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in
the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in
his favor and that an injunction is in the public interest”. The Court
then noted that Jacobsen had made no showing that he had actually
suffered any of these potential harms and that Jacobsen had “failed to
proffer any evidence of any specific and actual harm suffered as a
result of the alleged copyright infringement and he has failed to
demonstrate that there is any continuing or ongoing conduct that
indicates future harm is imminent.” The important details of the
Court’s concerns are found in footnote 3 [3 Although Jacobsen makes
legal arguments regarding the alleged harm he may suffer, for instance
delays and inefficiency in development and time lost in the open source
development cycle, he has failed to put forward any evidence of such
harms. Jacobsen has failed to proffer evidence of harm suffered or any
evidence of a real or immediate threat of imminent harm in the future.
The Court also finds that Jacobsen has failed to identify with the
requisite particularity the extent of his copyright ownership over the
disputed underlying material. The JMRI Project Decoder Definition Files
incorporate many manufacturers’ specifications data as well as rights to
specific terms whose copyright is owned by Defendants. Even if
Jacobsen’s heavy burden to warrant injunctive relief had been met, it is
unclear how the Court would fashion an injunction which would be
narrowly tailored to enjoin only those allegedly infringing uses of
Jacobsen’s copyrighted content.] which should be read carefully by
lawyers and licensing professionals. Without reviewing the actual
evidence presented, it is difficult to assess the Court’s decision.
However, it is clear that the standard for injunctive relief is higher
than it has been in the past.

Another important part of the decision is the dismissal of the breach of
contract claim for failure to state a cause of action. This type of
dismissal is unusual because the Federal courts have a relatively low
standard for pleading. The Court noted that as currently drafted the
alleged damages do not arise from the breach of the Artistic License. In
addition, the Court notes that, as drafted, the breach of contract claim
overlaps with the copyright infringement claim and is preempted by
copyright law. The Court granted leave to amend and this claim is
likely to revised to meet these requirements.

The Court did permit Jacobsen’s claim under the Digital Millenium
Copyright Act to proceed forward for the deletion of “Copyright
Management Information.” Copyright Management Information includes:

“(1) The title and other information identifying the work, including the
information set forth on a notice of copyright.

(2) The name of, and other identifying information about, the author of
a work.

(3) The name of, and other identifying information about, the copyright
owner of the work, including the information set forth in a notice of
copyright.

(4) With the exception of public performances of works by radio and
television broadcast stations, the name of, and other identifying
information about, a performer whose performance is fixed in a work
other than an audiovisual work.”

These claims may be particularly useful for open source licensors
because of the importance of attribution to many software developers.
This decision is disappointing and we will need to continue to moniter
the case.

ShareThis

Post tags: injunctive relief, jacobsen
-------

Now, let's recall what two other practicing IP lawyers said back in
August regrading the CAFC decision:

1. http://www.crynwr.com/cgi-bin/ezmlm-cgi?3:mss:15936

-------
This is not legal advice...

As an attorney spending a great deal of time on software related IP
licensing and litigation matters, I find the CAFC decision in the
Jacobsen case to be troubling. While I am sympathetic to the court's
apparent desire to validate the concept of open source licensing and
its alternative forms of consideration, I do not believe that the
court's ruling justifies a euphoric response by the open source
community.

First, the CAFC's decision is a clear repudiation of the "bare
license" theory long espoused by Mr. Moglen and his followers. The
CAFC's decision reflects the fact that open source licenses, like any
other form of software licenses, are contracts. I agree with this
aspect of the decision as it is well supported by precedent at all
levels. Neither Mr. Moglen, nor any of his followers have cited legal
precedent in support of the bare license theory. The CAFC's decision
should serve as clear notice that the bare license theory is nothing
more than Moglen's wishful thinking. The necessary implication of this
finding by the court is that open source licenses must be interpreted
in the context of applicable state law, and to an extent, the common
law of the Federal Circuit in which the open source agreement is
interpreted. (This is directly in conflict with the CAFC's willful
failure to follow state law and Ninth Circuit precedent regarding the
interpretation of restrictions as conditions precedent).

Second, the CAFC's opinion creates a great deal of uncertainty for
software licensing (whether proprietary or open source). Let's take
the GPLv3 as an example. As most peoople are aware, there are a
variety of disagreements over exactly what is required of a licensee
to comply with various provisions of the GPL. Section 2 of the GPL
appears to "condition" the rights granted under the license on the
licensee's compliance with the "conditions" stated in the license.
Under the CAFC's decision in Jacobsen, it stands to reason that a
licensee that fails to fully satisfy the "conditions" stated in the
GPLv3 would infringe the licensor's copyrights rather than merely
breaching the license. Thus, even if the licensee unintentionally
violated the terms of the GPLv3 because the meaning of the terms are
not clear, the licensee would be liabile for infringement.

Why does this matter? State courts, the federal circuit courts of
appeal and the US Supreme Court have all uniformly and routinely
interpreted license restrictions as covenants rather than conditions
precedent. In other words, the courts presume that the restrictions
are covenants rather than conditions precedent unless the agreement
clearly defines the restrictions as conditions. the CAFC's decision
wholly ignores this long held principle of law.

Most licenses, open source or proprietary, contain provisions whose
meanings are open to viable debate. In the past, parties to a
software license have largely understood that a licensee that breaches
a license agreement's terms is liable to the licensor for damages
decided under contract law. Proprietary licenses typically include
provisions which define or otherwise limit the scope of damages that
may be recovered in the event of a breach. On the other hand, a party
that is liable for infringement of a copyright is subject to
injunctive relief and damages equal to the owner's actual damages
(plus the infringer's profits not covered by the owner's actual
damages) OR statutory damages of up to $150,000 per incidence of
infringement. Any contractually agreed limitations on damages would
be irrelevant in the infringement setting.

The CAFC's Jacobsen decision unwittingly attempts to radically change
the risks of licensing software. The CAFC states that any failure to
comply with a license provision that the license even generally calls
a "condition" is an infringement rather than a breach. Thus, any
licensee that violates the "conditions" of a license, even if
unintentional, is subject to infringement damages. If the CAFC's
decision stands and is generally followed in the Circuits and state
courts, (which it should not be), every license from this point
forward will need to clearly state which, if any, restrictions are
"conditions precedent" and which restrictions are merely covenants
(all other restrictions). Moreover, the provisions that are
conditions precedent will need to be defined with a high degree of
care to minimize a licensee's risk of unintentionally infringing the
copyrights as a result of miinterpreting the provisions.

Another side note - many licesne agreement issues are brought in state
courts. Section 301(a) of the Copyright Act, however, preempts any
state court from hearing or deciding any cause of action which is
equivalent to a copyright claim. If the CAFC's position is indeed the
law of the land, then any cause of action relating to a breach of a
provision in a license agreement that merely mentions the word
"condition" (or some synonym thereof), or that could conceivably be
interpreted as a condition precedent, will need to be decided by a
federal court. Otherwise, the parties run the risk of going through a
full trial in state court only to find that the state court has no
jurisdiction to even hear the matter in the first place because the
breach in fact constitutes an infringement.

Ultimately, the only people that will benefit from this decision are
attorneys. All open source licenses will need to be modified if the
decision stands ....
-------

2. http://www.crynwr.com/cgi-bin/ezmlm-cgi?3:mss:15939

-------
If the CAFC's position is indeed the law of the land, then
any cause of action relating to a breach of a provision in a license
agreement that merely mentions the word "condition" (or some synonym
thereof), or that could conceivably be interpreted as a condition
precedent, will need to be decided by a federal court. Otherwise,
the parties run the risk of going through a full trial in state
court only to find that the state court has no jurisdiction to even
hear the matter in the first place because the breach in fact
constitutes an infringement.
That is a technical matter that I have no opinion on.
[Marc Whipple] I am a lawyer, but this is not legal advice. Always
consult an attorney licensed in your jurisdiction and familiar with the
relevant law before making legal decisions.

I think you probably mean, "I do not consider myself able to offer an
informed opinion on this point," but the way it was phrased sounds a
little dismissive. If you didn't mean it that way, accept my apology if
I've over-read your statement.

That being said, calling this a "technical matter" is oversimplification
to a rather radical degree. As an attorney who often walks the line
between questions of Federal and State jurisdiction it was one of my
first concerns when I read a summary of the decision this morning. The
utter pre-emption of matters even remotely concerned with the Copyright
Act means that this is a question of the utmost importance to anyone who
has anything to do with such licenses. I haven't read the full decision
yet, and so won't comment on whether the assertion the OP makes is
accurate, but if it is, he is right to be concerned. Among other things
it would mean that the enforcement of OS licenses just got, at the bare
minimum, a lot more expensive.
-------

<chuckles>

regards,
alexander.

--
http://gng.z505.com/index.htm
(GNG is a derecursive recursive derecursion which pwns GNU since it can
be infinitely looped as GNGNGNGNG...NGNGNG... and can be said backwards
too, whereas GNU cannot.)
Alexander Terekhov
2009-01-08 15:57:42 UTC
Permalink
Alexander Terekhov wrote:
[...]
Post by Alexander Terekhov
Now, let's recall what two other practicing IP lawyers said back in
1. http://www.crynwr.com/cgi-bin/ezmlm-cgi?3:mss:15936
David A. Temeles, Jr. back in February 2008:

http://www.crynwr.com/cgi-bin/ezmlm-cgi?3:mss:15580

-------
Many of you may already be aware, but the Jacobsen v. Katzer case is not the
only case in the last year or two with the potential to significantly impact
the open source licensor's ability to rely on injunctive relief.

The eBay v. MercExchange case is now beginning to filter through the
circuits and injunctions in patent and copyright cases are no longer
automatic. See, e.g., In Christopher Phelps & Associates, LLC v. Galloway,
477 F.3d 128 at page 139 (4th Cir., 2007), where the Fourth Circuit stated:

Insofar as Phelps & Associates suggests that it is entitled to injunctive
relief, we reject the argument. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., ___
U.S. ___, ___, 126 S.Ct. 1837, 1839, 164 L.Ed.2d 641 (2006). In eBay, the
Supreme Court rejected any notion that "an injunction automatically follows
a determination that a copyright has been infringed." 126 S.Ct. at 1840
(reversing the Federal Circuit, which had articulated "a `general rule,'
unique to patent disputes, `that a permanent injunction will issue once
infringement and validity have been adjudged'"). The Supreme Court
reaffirmed the traditional showing that a plaintiff must make to obtain a
permanent injunction in any type of case, including a patent or copyright
case:

A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable
injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are
inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance
of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is
warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a
permanent injunction.

Id. at 1839. Moreover, the Court reiterated that even upon this showing,
whether to grant the injunction still remains in the "equitable discretion"
of the court.
-------

regards,
alexander.

--
http://gng.z505.com/index.htm
(GNG is a derecursive recursive derecursion which pwns GNU since it can
be infinitely looped as GNGNGNGNG...NGNGNG... and can be said backwards
too, whereas GNU cannot.)
Rjack
2009-01-08 18:13:45 UTC
Permalink
Post by Alexander Terekhov
Why does this matter? State courts, the federal circuit courts of
appeal and the US Supreme Court have all uniformly and routinely
interpreted license restrictions as covenants rather than conditions
precedent. In other words, the courts presume that the restrictions
are covenants rather than conditions precedent unless the agreement
clearly defines the restrictions as conditions. the CAFC's decision
wholly ignores this long held principle of law.
One need only read the well reasoned opinion in RT Computer
Graphics, Inc. v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 747 (1999)
to understand why the CAFC muddled the distinction between
"covenants" and "conditions precedent".

http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=fedclaim&vol=1999/97476c

--------------------------------------------------------------------

"The court in Graham v. James then noted that the programmer had
furnished the publisher with the file-retrieval program before any
royalties were paid, and "contract obligations that are to be
performed after partial performance by the other party are not
treated as conditions." Id. at 237 (citations omitted).
A similar situation to that presented to the court in Graham v.
James is presented in plaintiff's case. Plaintiff performed its part
of the bargain by furnishing the border designs for use by the
Postal Service. As the required credit was to be given by the Postal
Service after the plaintiff furnished the material, crediting was
an obligation to be performed after performance by the plaintiff,
and, therefore, was not a condition precedent."

----------------------------------------------------------------------

The whole idea behind a condition precedent is that the condition
must be satisfied BEFORE the license is granted. If the condition
DEPENDS on the license grant then it is impossible for it to be a
condition PRECEDENT.

Why is it so hard for people to understand that you can't put the
horse before the cart?

Sincerely,
Rjack
Rjack
2009-01-08 18:40:42 UTC
Permalink
Alexander Terekhov wrote:

"The answer, I suspect, is that the Free Software Foundation is not
accepting compliance with the GPL as a solution. It wants more. It
wants to push Cisco around and it wants money. Here's how it thinks
it can do that." The Software Lawyer

http://softwarelawyer.blogspot.com/2009/01/fsf-sues-cisco-criticism.html

Sincerely,
Rjack :)
Hyman Rosen
2009-01-08 19:04:31 UTC
Permalink
Post by Rjack
"The answer, I suspect, is that the Free Software Foundation is not
accepting compliance with the GPL as a solution. It wants more. It wants
to push Cisco around and it wants money. Here's how it thinks it can do
that." The Software Lawyer
If the only consequence of being caught out of compliance is
to comply, then no one will be careful to properly comply from
the start. Imagine if the only penalty for theft was to return
the stolen items.

Shortly before he misspells "loses" as "looses", he also says
"It makes no sense to say that the license terminates with
respect to one licensee or another when the code remains
available to everyone under the same broad license."

I rather imagine that it makes no sense in pretty much the same
way that it makes no sense that I can't keep driving the car I
stole from the parking lot when all around me are people driving
their own cars.
Rjack
2009-01-08 21:52:08 UTC
Permalink
Post by Hyman Rosen
Post by Rjack
"The answer, I suspect, is that the Free Software Foundation is not
accepting compliance with the GPL as a solution. It wants more. It
wants to push Cisco around and it wants money. Here's how it thinks it
can do that." The Software Lawyer
If the only consequence of being caught out of compliance is
to comply, then no one will be careful to properly comply from
the start.
The only consequence of being caught out of compliance is to receive
a scathing, withering and punitive Rule 41(A) Voluntary Dismissal by
the FSF. Scathing, withering and punitive because we have to listen
to the unverifiable bullshit propaganda about what the FSF allegedly
won.

The FSF will NEVER, NEVER, NEVER allow a lawsuit to proceed to the
point where a federal judge will ever actually evaluate the GPL's
sec. 2(b) on the merits:

"20. Under the Licenses, Plaintiffs grant certain permissions to
other parties to copy, modify and redistribute the programs so long
as those parties satisfy certain conditions. In particular,
Section 2(b) of the GPL, addressing each licensee, states:

You must cause any work that you distribute or publish, that in
whole or in part contains or is derived from the Program or any part
thereof, to be licensed as a whole at no charge to all third parties
under the terms of this License."

This particular contractual covenant is total legal gibberish. In
the Second Circuit, the district courts know full well the
difference between a contractual covenant, a contractual condition
precedent and a delimiting scope of use restriction in a copyright
license. A district court judge would stuff the GPL's sec. 2(b) up
Eben Moglen's propagandistic butt.

Sincerely,
Rjack
David Kastrup
2009-01-08 22:16:44 UTC
Permalink
Post by Hyman Rosen
Post by Rjack
"The answer, I suspect, is that the Free Software Foundation is not
accepting compliance with the GPL as a solution. It wants more. It
wants to push Cisco around and it wants money. Here's how it thinks
it can do that." The Software Lawyer
If the only consequence of being caught out of compliance is
to comply, then no one will be careful to properly comply from
the start.
The only consequence of being caught out of compliance is to receive a
scathing, withering and punitive Rule 41(A) Voluntary Dismissal by the
FSF. Scathing, withering and punitive because we have to listen to
the unverifiable bullshit propaganda about what the FSF allegedly won.
The FSF will NEVER, NEVER, NEVER allow a lawsuit to proceed to the
point where a federal judge will ever actually evaluate the GPL's
To have the GPL evaluated on "its merits", the defendant has to state
that he considers being in compliance with the GPL. Up to now, none of
the defendants put forward that theory. So there is no point for the
judge to go to the GPL in detail when the defendant does not claim use
of the license: its acceptance is quite voluntary. If the defendant did
not accept it, the case is not about the GPL or its merits.
This particular contractual covenant is total legal gibberish.
Compared with the usual legal texts covering copyrightable material, it
is very clear. And I have yet to see the "I've read the text, but it
was gibberish to me so I assumed I could do what I want" defense with
respect to the GPL.
In the Second Circuit, the district courts know full well the
difference between a contractual covenant, a contractual condition
precedent and a delimiting scope of use restriction in a copyright
license.
Which is the reason why there is not much of a concern if the lower
courts would mess up a ruling. Since they quite consistently rule in
the manner that gets our good Alexander up in ruffles and calls of
inebriation, we have not seen significant GPL coverage there, however.
--
David Kastrup, Kriemhildstr. 15, 44793 Bochum
Rjack
2009-01-08 22:35:03 UTC
Permalink
Post by David Kastrup
To have the GPL evaluated on "its merits", the defendant has to state
that he considers being in compliance with the GPL.
And so, just why does the defendant *have* to state "that he
considers being in compliance with the GPL."? Is there a gun against
his head?

Why couldn't a defendant just as easily claim that Section 2(b) of
the GPL was:

(1) Contractually unenforcible.
(2) Preempted by 17 USC 301(a).

Sincerely,
Rjack :)
David Kastrup
2009-01-08 22:49:32 UTC
Permalink
Post by David Kastrup
To have the GPL evaluated on "its merits", the defendant has to state
that he considers being in compliance with the GPL.
And so, just why does the defendant *have* to state "that he considers
being in compliance with the GPL."? Is there a gun against his head?
To have the GPL evaluated on its merits. If that's not his intent, he
can state otherwise, and the case is not about the GPL. The court has
better things to do than evaluating a license that is not relevant to
the case because the defendant does not claim to use it.
Why couldn't a defendant just as easily claim that Section 2(b) of the
(1) Contractually unenforcible.
(2) Preempted by 17 USC 301(a).
Because in contrast to a contract, there is no presumed agreement
between the parties with a license. If the defendant does not even
claim to be in possession of a valid license, it is not the business of
the court to mangle the license into something better expressing the
common understanding of the parties, because there has been no agreement
between the parties in the first place.
--
David Kastrup, Kriemhildstr. 15, 44793 Bochum
ZnU
2009-01-08 23:14:05 UTC
Permalink
Post by David Kastrup
Post by Hyman Rosen
Post by Rjack
"The answer, I suspect, is that the Free Software Foundation is not
accepting compliance with the GPL as a solution. It wants more. It
wants to push Cisco around and it wants money. Here's how it thinks
it can do that." The Software Lawyer
If the only consequence of being caught out of compliance is
to comply, then no one will be careful to properly comply from
the start.
The only consequence of being caught out of compliance is to receive a
scathing, withering and punitive Rule 41(A) Voluntary Dismissal by the
FSF. Scathing, withering and punitive because we have to listen to
the unverifiable bullshit propaganda about what the FSF allegedly won.
The FSF will NEVER, NEVER, NEVER allow a lawsuit to proceed to the
point where a federal judge will ever actually evaluate the GPL's
To have the GPL evaluated on "its merits", the defendant has to state
that he considers being in compliance with the GPL. Up to now, none of
the defendants put forward that theory. So there is no point for the
judge to go to the GPL in detail when the defendant does not claim use
of the license: its acceptance is quite voluntary. If the defendant did
not accept it, the case is not about the GPL or its merits.
I'm not sure I understand this. If you reject the GPL, doesn't
downloading a copy of a Linux distro (for instance) become copyright
violation? The GPL is the only thing authorizing you to make that copy.
Post by David Kastrup
This particular contractual covenant is total legal gibberish.
Compared with the usual legal texts covering copyrightable material, it
is very clear. And I have yet to see the "I've read the text, but it
was gibberish to me so I assumed I could do what I want" defense with
respect to the GPL.
In the Second Circuit, the district courts know full well the
difference between a contractual covenant, a contractual condition
precedent and a delimiting scope of use restriction in a copyright
license.
Which is the reason why there is not much of a concern if the lower
courts would mess up a ruling. Since they quite consistently rule in
the manner that gets our good Alexander up in ruffles and calls of
inebriation, we have not seen significant GPL coverage there, however.
--
"If there is anyone out there who still doubts that America is a place where all
things are possible, who still wonders if the dream of our founders is alive in
our time, who still questions the power of our democracy, tonight is your
answer." -- Barack Obama, November 4th, 2008
Hyman Rosen
2009-01-08 23:30:53 UTC
Permalink
Post by ZnU
I'm not sure I understand this.
You are dealing with people who believe that the part of
the GPL that grants permission to do stuff can be obeyed
while the part that restricts how you may do that can be
ignored. Then when the copyright holder complains, he can
be sued for misuse of copyright. It's a wild and wacky
world that these people inhabit, but fortunately it isn't
our own.
David Kastrup
2009-01-08 23:38:53 UTC
Permalink
Post by ZnU
Post by David Kastrup
To have the GPL evaluated on "its merits", the defendant has to state
that he considers being in compliance with the GPL. Up to now, none
of the defendants put forward that theory. So there is no point for
the judge to go to the GPL in detail when the defendant does not
claim use of the license: its acceptance is quite voluntary. If the
defendant did not accept it, the case is not about the GPL or its
merits.
I'm not sure I understand this. If you reject the GPL, doesn't
downloading a copy of a Linux distro (for instance) become copyright
violation?
Sure. There is a reason most of these cases settle once judge or legal
counsel has pointed this out to the defendant.
Post by ZnU
The GPL is the only thing authorizing you to make that copy.
No, it is the only thing offering such authorization _a priori_ to any
interested party. Most certainly other agreements or authorizations may
be put in effect.
--
David Kastrup, Kriemhildstr. 15, 44793 Bochum
ZnU
2009-01-09 06:46:53 UTC
Permalink
Post by David Kastrup
Post by ZnU
Post by David Kastrup
To have the GPL evaluated on "its merits", the defendant has to state
that he considers being in compliance with the GPL. Up to now, none
of the defendants put forward that theory. So there is no point for
the judge to go to the GPL in detail when the defendant does not
claim use of the license: its acceptance is quite voluntary. If the
defendant did not accept it, the case is not about the GPL or its
merits.
I'm not sure I understand this. If you reject the GPL, doesn't
downloading a copy of a Linux distro (for instance) become copyright
violation?
Sure. There is a reason most of these cases settle once judge or legal
counsel has pointed this out to the defendant.
Post by ZnU
The GPL is the only thing authorizing you to make that copy.
No, it is the only thing offering such authorization _a priori_ to any
interested party. Most certainly other agreements or authorizations may
be put in effect.
Sure, I'm talking about the general case. Obviously if you can obtain
specific permission from the copyright holder(s) you can use the code
under other terms. (Though in practice this is nearly impossible with
some large GPL projects.)
--
"If there is anyone out there who still doubts that America is a place where all
things are possible, who still wonders if the dream of our founders is alive in
our time, who still questions the power of our democracy, tonight is your
answer." -- Barack Obama, November 4th, 2008
Rahul Dhesi
2009-01-09 07:10:09 UTC
Permalink
Post by amicus_curious
I think that the issue of consideration is paramount. The copyright
laws exist to protect the author's ability to benefit from the author's
artistic cleverness. If the author chooses not to benefit in a
conventional way, the benefit that is expected must at least be defined
clearly enough to determine if someone's alleged violations actually
harm the author...
No, this is complete nonsense. Copyright law exists (in the US) to
encourage creation and dissmemination of creative works for the benefit
of the public. "The Congress shall have Power...To promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries."

Free software licenses fit nicely in this, because these licenses are
designed to encourage the wide dissemination of works thus licensed. And
I hope the JMRI attorney remembers to remind the court of this.

Yes, it may reasonable to require a plaintiff to show what damages he
has suffered, but not because that's the goal of copyright law.

You are mixing up (a) the goal of copyright law and (b) the goal of this
specific lawsuit.
--
Rahul
http://rahul.rahul.net/
amicus_curious
2009-01-09 14:19:54 UTC
Permalink
Post by Rahul Dhesi
Post by amicus_curious
I think that the issue of consideration is paramount. The copyright
laws exist to protect the author's ability to benefit from the author's
artistic cleverness. If the author chooses not to benefit in a
conventional way, the benefit that is expected must at least be defined
clearly enough to determine if someone's alleged violations actually
harm the author...
No, this is complete nonsense. Copyright law exists (in the US) to
encourage creation and dissmemination of creative works for the benefit
of the public. "The Congress shall have Power...To promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries."
Why would anyone really care unless there were some benefit to be obtained
by the author due to the right to control the distribution? The copyright
act contains language such as "...to distribute copies or phonorecords of
the work to the public by sale or
other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;", all clearly
implying a financial value of the work and direct financial benefit to the
author. It is silly to suppose that the the purpose of a copyright is to
lock up the author's work and deny the public access.
Post by Rahul Dhesi
Free software licenses fit nicely in this, because these licenses are
designed to encourage the wide dissemination of works thus licensed. And
I hope the JMRI attorney remembers to remind the court of this.
It would seem obvious that no license at all would fit even more nicely into
the notion of widely disseminating some work. The GPL has a requirement
that someone deriving something useful from GPL licensed software disclose
the derivation and allow for similiar unrestricted use, but that is not the
case with these silly suits. The only issue is that the violator has failed
to follow the re-publication of the original source code. None of the
instances to date has contested any failure to disclose, which would seem to
be the only opportunity for determining any value.

It is hard to see how such republication has any meaning for the public as
well. The vast majority of people buying a wireless router or similar
device that has been the target of the SFLC lawsuits is never going to
bother with the source code for any internal nitty-gritty of that device.
The few who might are certainly astute enough to know all about GPL software
and astute enough to go to the original project source for any information
rather than some discrete hand me down copy coming from someone using the
code in their product.
Post by Rahul Dhesi
Yes, it may reasonable to require a plaintiff to show what damages he
has suffered, but not because that's the goal of copyright law.
You are mixing up (a) the goal of copyright law and (b) the goal of this
specific lawsuit.
--
Rahul
http://rahul.rahul.net/
Hyman Rosen
2009-01-09 15:07:00 UTC
Permalink
Post by amicus_curious
Why would anyone really care unless there were some benefit to be
obtained by the author due to the right to control the distribution?
These enforcement lawsuits demonstrate that some authors do care.
Post by amicus_curious
It is silly to suppose that the the purpose of a
copyright is to lock up the author's work and deny the public access.
Nevertheless, the constitution grants exclusive rights to authors,
and without saying anything about financial compensation. The law
is written from the normal point of view, where creators do want
just money for their work, but in light of the increasing use of
public license, going back to original construction is important.

That exclusive grant is for a limited time, so eventually the
public does gain access.
Post by amicus_curious
It would seem obvious that no license at all would fit even more
nicely into the notion of widely disseminating some work.
Some authors, hewing to the FSF philosophy, would find that to be
a disincentive - other people taking their work and denying users
the four freedoms. Fortunately, the constitution recognizes that
offering authors control of their work encourages them to produce
it.
Post by amicus_curious
these silly suits.
If the copiers of the software do not wish to obey the terms of its
license, then they may not make and distribute copies. Regardless
of whether they think the terms are silly.
Post by amicus_curious
the only opportunity for determining any value.
The constitution gives authors exclusive right to their work, be it
genius or drivel. Value is not material.
Post by amicus_curious
It is hard to see how such republication has any meaning
for the public as well.
Meaning is not material either. But in any case, the GPL explains
its meaning in its preamble, and it has great significance for the
public. One does not need to be a programmer to see how the four
freedoms are being actively withheld - region-coded DVD players,
encrypted connections between cable boxes and TV sets, cell phones
which can run only approved programs and communicate with approved
service providers. Free software works against the conspiracy to
deny users access to and knowledge of devices they own.

A different recent example is the worldwide crash of Zune 30 players
that occurred on December 31. Had its software been free, a fix
would have been available in minutes, or even more likely, would
have been available before the problem occurred.

Republication is important so that users can get exactly the source
that is used to build the software they receive. Without this, users
who need the source must hunt for it, with no assurance that what they
find exactly matches what they have.
Post by amicus_curious
The vast majority of people ... is never going to bother
But they benefit anyway, in the same way that they benefit when they
can receive service for their cars or appliances or buy replacement
parts from someone who is not beholden to the original manufacturer.
Rahul Dhesi
2009-01-09 15:21:21 UTC
Permalink
Post by amicus_curious
Why would anyone really care unless there were some benefit to be
obtained by the author due to the right to control the distribution?
The copyright act contains language such as "...to distribute copies or
phonorecords of the work to the public by sale or other transfer of
ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;", all clearly implying a
financial value of the work and direct financial benefit to the author.
It is silly to suppose that the the purpose of a copyright is to lock
up the author's work and deny the public access.
Presumably you, like most of us, simply skip past the numerous case law
links that Rjack posts, having realized that they seldom help us
understand how free software licensing works. Once in a while, though,
he posts something useful that has a significant bearing on how and why
copyright law is actually designed for the same purpose as free software
licenses. Here is an excerpt from one of his numerous links.

http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=fedclaim&vol=1999/97476c

The enactment of copyright legislation by Congress under the terms of
the Constitution is not based upon any natural right that the author has
in his writings, . . . but upon the ground that the welfare of the
public will be served and progress of science and useful arts will be
promoted by securing to authors for limited periods the exclusive rights
to their writings.

* * *

In enacting a copyright law Congress must consider . . . two questions:
First, how much will the legislation stimulate the producer and so
benefit the public, and, second, how much will the monopoly granted be
detrimental to the public? The granting of such exclusive rights, under
the proper terms and conditions, confers a benefit upon the public that
outweighs the evils of the temporary monopoly.
--
Rahul
http://rahul.rahul.net/
amicus_curious
2009-01-09 16:23:21 UTC
Permalink
Post by Rahul Dhesi
Post by amicus_curious
Why would anyone really care unless there were some benefit to be
obtained by the author due to the right to control the distribution?
The copyright act contains language such as "...to distribute copies or
phonorecords of the work to the public by sale or other transfer of
ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;", all clearly implying a
financial value of the work and direct financial benefit to the author.
It is silly to suppose that the the purpose of a copyright is to lock
up the author's work and deny the public access.
Presumably you, like most of us, simply skip past the numerous case law
links that Rjack posts, having realized that they seldom help us
understand how free software licensing works. Once in a while, though,
he posts something useful that has a significant bearing on how and why
copyright law is actually designed for the same purpose as free software
licenses. Here is an excerpt from one of his numerous links.
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=fedclaim&vol=1999/97476c
The enactment of copyright legislation by Congress under the terms of
the Constitution is not based upon any natural right that the author has
in his writings, . . . but upon the ground that the welfare of the
public will be served and progress of science and useful arts will be
promoted by securing to authors for limited periods the exclusive rights
to their writings.
* * *
First, how much will the legislation stimulate the producer and so
benefit the public, and, second, how much will the monopoly granted be
detrimental to the public? The granting of such exclusive rights, under
the proper terms and conditions, confers a benefit upon the public that
outweighs the evils of the temporary monopoly.
--
The issue, again, is that the copyright will protect the author's benefits
obtained and so motivate the author to create. Benefits are directly
related to the harm suffered if they are not protected. No harm, no foul is
the conventional wisdom.

It seems curious to me why you would cite this case. As far as I can tell,
RT Computer Graphics sued the Post Office on the basis that their copyright
was violated due to the Post Office's failure to attribute the source of the
graphic used on some stamp to the original author. The finding was that the
Post Office had not violated the copyright since the requirement to
attribute was not a "condition precedent" which is the issue in the JMRI
case, too.
Alexander Terekhov
2009-01-09 17:37:58 UTC
Permalink
amicus_curious wrote:

[... RT COMPUTER GRAPHICS, INC. vs UNITED STATES ...]
Post by amicus_curious
It seems curious to me why you would cite this case. As far as I can tell,
RT Computer Graphics sued the Post Office on the basis that their copyright
was violated due to the Post Office's failure to attribute the source of the
graphic used on some stamp to the original author. The finding was that the
Post Office had not violated the copyright since the requirement to
attribute was not a "condition precedent" which is the issue in the JMRI
case, too.
I also like this part:

-----
In addition, prior to the filing of the infringement suit, RT Graphics
never took affirmative steps to terminate the license which it had
granted. This court agrees with other courts which have previously held
that such a measure is necessary on the part of the copyright holder. In
Graham v. James, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that
"[e]ven assuming [the publisher] materially breached the licensing
agreement and that [the programmer] was entitled to rescission, such
rescission did not occur automatically without some affirmative steps on
[the programmer's] part." 144 F.3d at 237-38. In Maxwell, the Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit expressed a similar view:

[E]ven assuming arguendo that the Miracle's conduct constituted a
material breach of the parties' oral understanding, this fact alone
would not render the Miracle's playing of the song pursuant to
[Albion's] permission a violation of [Albion's] copyright. Such a breach
would do no more than entitle [Albion] to rescind the agreement and
revoke [his] permission to play the song in the future, actions [he] did
not take during the relevant period.

Like the programmer in Graham v. James and the songwriter in Maxwell, RT
Graphics never formally withdrew previously-given permission which
allowed the alleged infringer to use the copyrighted material. See also
Fosson v. Palace (Waterland), Ltd., 78 F.3d 1448, 1455 (9th Cir. 1996)
(even assuming that movie producer materially breached licensing
agreement to use composer's song in film, composer never attempted to
exercise any right of rescission and summary judgment of noninfringement
of copyright was proper); Cities Serv. Helex, Inc. v. United States, 543
F.2d 1306, 1313 (Ct. Cl. 1976) ("A material breach does not
automatically and ipso facto end a contract. It merely gives the injured
party the right to end the agreement; . . . .").
-----

Now, back in February 2008 "David A. Temeles, Jr." <***@nvalaw.com>
("represents businesses on intellectual property, corporate and tax
issues. In addition to managing his own firm, Dave has practiced with
two of AmLaw's top 100 law firms. He has litigated matters in state and
federal courts resulting in settlements and judgments in excess of
$30,000,000 and has negotiated numerous multi-million dollar business
transfers and technology licenses. Whether your business is in startup,
growth or transfer mode, Dave can provide valuable guidance in
maximizing your potential and avoiding catastrophic pitfalls.") opined:

http://www.crynwr.com/cgi-bin/ezmlm-cgi?3:mss:15586

-----
Sorry guys, another email that was meant for the list but ended up going
through private email... I have put the disclaimer in lower case as John
suggested and incorporated John's reply [noted as: JOHN COWAN Further
Replies] for your edification.

DISCLAIMER:

The following discussion is not legal advice nor necessarily an
expression of the author's personal position on the matters discussed.

Please seek the advice of counsel regarding your specific situation.
Seemingly insignificant facts could dramatically alter the applicability
of the issues discussed to your specific case.
Post by amicus_curious
(Even if the court finds that Katzer's license to
continue using the software is terminated, what would prevent Katzer
from obtaining another license to the software? Afterall, anyone
having obtained the software under the Artistic License could license
it to him.)
JOHN COWAN STATES:
That seems extreme. Surely if a copyright license is terminated with
respect to someone by reason of breach of covenant, *every* such license
with identical terms is terminated. The license comes from the original
licensor, remember (or a contributor with respect to his contributions),
not from a mere verbatim-copy distributor.

Otherwise, we'd have to say that there is no such thing as revocation
of a public license at all. *Do* you mean to say that?

DAT RESPONDS: It is not inconceivable to me that a court would hold that
certain public licenses that fail to provide for a termination right
cannot be revoked. Nevertheless, I think you would agree that even if
a court theoretically determined that my license to a copy of Vista was
terminated, I could go to Best Buy or CompUSA and buy another copy.
The fact that my license to one copy is terminated would not render
invalid my license to all subsequent copies that I lawfully acquire.
What is the basis for arguing that the situation is any different with
respect to open source software?

JOWN COWAN Further Responds:
OSS licenses exist for a different purpose from proprietary ones. In
the former, the license exists primarily to defend the copyright,
whereas in the latter, the copyright is maintained primarily to defend
the license (by allowing violators to be sued for copyright violation
instead of, or in addition to, breach of the license).

What is more, a proprietary license is unquestionably a bilateral
contract, whereas OSS licenses are often bare licenses. If you are
willing to create a new bilateral contract with me after the first one
is breached, that's one thing: but if I enter upon your land pursuant
to a bare license (a notice board, say, saying HUNTING AND FISHING
PERMITTED) and you then decide to revoke my license and eject me even
though I am hunting and/or fishing, do you suppose I can take advantage
of the notice board again and re-enter your land? I doubt it.

(In civil-law countries, my entering the land pursuant to the notice
board creates a "facio ut facias" contract, so the position is
different.)

DAT Further Responds:
I'll address the whole bare license v. contract issue another day (need
to get to work!). If the Artistic License is a bare license as you
suggest, the remedy the licensor would seek is not a termination of the
license, but an injunction prohibiting the licensee from committing
future acts in violation of the license (and likely seeking monetary
damages or specific performance related to the past violations).

Returning to my original hypothetical, however, it implicitly assumes
that the bare license argument is out the window. It treats the
Artistic License as a contract just like the judge in Jacobsen v.
Katzer. If the license is terminated, what would prohibit the former
licensee from lawfully acquire another license to the software? Where
in the Artistic License does it say that past infringers are prohibited
from obtaining a license? The answer is nowhere. Why? Because the
Artistic License assumes that an injunction remedy is available - the
point of an injunction being to secure compliance with the terms of the
license, not the termination of the licensee's right to use the software
in compliance with the license. Upon what grounds do you think a judge
would even have the authority to prospectively bar the licensee's
future lawful use of the license? The hunting hypo you mention
is slightly off target in that the landowner likely would not grant the
hunter a new right to enter upon his lands to hunt - yet the licensor
under the Artistic License is inviting everyone in the world to use his
software - without exception for past infringers...
Post by amicus_curious
In essence, the OWNER of a particular copy of software is entitled
to transfer that copy regardless of what the licensor or the license
agreement.
JOHN COWAN STATES:
Quite so.
Post by amicus_curious
Let's assume that the court finds that the Artistic License authorizes
Katzer to make as many copies of the software as he desires. In fact,
let's assume that the court finds that the license authorizes Katzer's
modification of the software and his creation of as many copies
of the modified version as he desires. (Arguably, the attribtion
and change notice requirements are directed to the distribution of
modified copies or the use of modified copies, rather than the act of
modifying the software itself). Let's also assume that the court finds
that Katzer is the owner of the modified copies. If this is the case,
then Section 109(a) arguably permits Katzer to distribute the modified
copies without the permission of Jacobsen as the copyright holder.
JOHN COWAN STATES:
On that rather complex chain of assumptions, then yes: which is another
way of saying "if the license is broken, it's broken".

DAT Responds: I do not think that the chain of assumptions is all that
unrealistic - please see my recent reply to Russ Nelson's comments.
Post by amicus_curious
Equitable estoppel
"applies both in law and in equity to deny a party the right to plead
or prove an otherwise important fact--here, the act of
infringement--because of something he has done or omitted to do."
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Hearst/ABC Viacom Entertainment Services, 746
F. Supp. 320, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (Keenan, J.)).
JOHN COWAN STATES:
It's awfully shaky ground, though. We've had it come up before in
dealing with the hypo "What happens if a GPLv2 licensor revokes the
license?" All past conduct seems clearly safe on general principles,
and equally all future acts of copying, distributing, modifying are
forbidden. The gray area where e.e. may or may not operate is in what
happens to people who are currently in compliance as to their "in-
flight" copies and modifications.

DAT Responds: I do not necessarily agree that EE is on shaky ground or
that it would apply solely to past acts/grants.

JOHN COWAN STATES:
BTW, the disclaimer usual on this list is "I am not a lawyer [or: I am
a lawyer but not *your* lawyer]; this is not legal advice."

DAT Responds: I appreciate the tip, but I am very cautious about meeting
ethical requirements and I want to mitigate, to the extent possible, the
risk that someone would take my post out of context and try to use it
against me and my client in litigation.

JOHN COWAN Further Responds:
I understand why you are trying to be safe, but the effect of CAPITALS
is that you are SHOUTING at the people you are trying to talk with.
This is a deeply ingrained synaesthetic reflex for people on Internet
mailing lists. If you *must* include such a disclaimer, at least write
it in conventional upper and lower case.

DAT Further Responds:
Duly noted and adopted.
-----

regards,
alexander.

--
http://gng.z505.com/index.htm
(GNG is a derecursive recursive derecursion which pwns GNU since it can
be infinitely looped as GNGNGNGNG...NGNGNG... and can be said backwards
too, whereas GNU cannot.)
Rjack
2009-01-09 20:24:14 UTC
Permalink
Post by Alexander Terekhov
I understand why you are trying to be safe, but the effect of CAPITALS
is that you are SHOUTING at the people you are trying to talk with.
This is a deeply ingrained synaesthetic reflex for people on Internet
mailing lists. If you *must* include such a disclaimer, at least write
it in conventional upper and lower case.
A typical regurgitation from one of the nut-jobs over at
license-discuss.org.

Sincerely,
Rjack :)
Alexander Terekhov
2009-02-13 18:09:27 UTC
Permalink
LOL

Developments!

Katzer filed an answer to the complaint (denying any wrong doing) and
countersuing JMRI for copyright infringement regarding proprietary (no
licensing involved at all) "NMRA DCC Reference Manual for QSI Quantum HO
Equipped Locomotives-Version 3.0. KAM registered its copyright rights
with the United States Copyright Office and obtained Copyright
Registration Number TX 6-445-094, effective November 13, 2006
(“Copyrighted Materials”)" asking for damages "in excess of $6,000,000
and any additional profits of the infringer as a result of Plaintiff’s
infringement".

http://jmri.sourceforge.net/k/docket/290.pdf

LOL

regards,
alexander.

--
http://gng.z505.com/index.htm
(GNG is a derecursive recursive derecursion which pwns GNU since it can
be infinitely looped as GNGNGNGNG...NGNGNG... and can be said backwards
too, whereas GNU cannot.)
Alexander Terekhov
2009-04-07 22:53:04 UTC
Permalink
Developments:

1.

In http://jmri.sourceforge.net/k/docket/284.pdf, Judge Jeffrey S. White
issued an order "DENYING [236] Motion for Preliminary Injunction;
DENYING [267] Motion to Strike Declarations; DENYING IN PART AND
GRANTING IN PART [192] Third MOTION to Dismiss; DENYING Motion to
Strike; GRANTING [203] MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction;
GRANTING [272] Motion for Leave to File a Sur-Reply; and DENYING [273]
Motion for Leave to File a Sur-Reply. (jswlc2, COURT STAFF) (Filed on
1/5/2009) "

2.

JMRI went again to the Federal Circuit:

"02/04/2009 286 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to [284] Order on Motion for
Preliminary Injunction,, Order on Motion to Strike,, Order on Motion for
Leave to File by Robert Jacobsen. Filing fee $ 455-#34611028425. (hdj,
COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/4/2009)

02/06/2009 287 Copy of Notice of Appeal and Docket sheet mailed to all
counsel (hdj, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/6/2009)

02/06/2009 288 Copy of Notice of Appeal and Docket sheet mailed to all
counsel (hdj, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/6/2009)

[...]

03/02/2009 293 USCA Case Number 2009-1221 USCA-Federal Circuit for [286]
Notice of Appeal, filed by Robert Jacobsen. (hdj, COURT STAFF) (Filed on
2/27/2009)

03/12/2009 294 Transcript Designation and Ordering Form (Federal
Circuit) (hdj, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/10/2009)

03/12/2009 295 Certificate of Record Mailed to USCA re appeal [286]
Notice of Appeal, : (hdj, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/12/2009) "

3. KAM filed a motion to transfer the case to the 9th Circuit:

http://jmri.sourceforge.net/k/docket/cafc-pi-2/Katzer_Motion_to_Transfer_to_Ninth_Circuit_3-10-09.pdf

regards,
alexander.

--
http://gng.z505.com/index.htm
(GNG is a derecursive recursive derecursion which pwns GNU since it can
be infinitely looped as GNGNGNGNG...NGNGNG... and can be said backwards
too, whereas GNU cannot.)
Rjack
2009-04-08 00:17:40 UTC
Permalink
Post by Alexander Terekhov
http://jmri.sourceforge.net/k/docket/cafc-pi-2/Katzer_Motion_to_Transfer_to_Ninth_Circuit_3-10-09.pd
Perhaps we will see the final copyright ruling in this case brought to
a conclusion that is in agreement with the prevailing law of all
Circuits *except* the rogue CAFC.

Sincerely,
Rjack :)
Alexander Terekhov
2009-04-29 12:32:55 UTC
Permalink
Post by Rjack
Post by Alexander Terekhov
http://jmri.sourceforge.net/k/docket/cafc-pi-2/Katzer_Motion_to_Transfer_to_Ninth_Circuit_3-10-09.pd
Perhaps we will see the final copyright ruling in this case brought to
a conclusion that is in agreement with the prevailing law of all
Circuits *except* the rogue CAFC.
Well, not soon.

http://jmri.sourceforge.net/k/docket/300.pdf

"Defendants moved to transfer the appeal from the Federal Circuit to the
Ninth Circuit. The Federal Circuit denied Defendants’ motion on Monday,
April 20, 2009.

On a related note, the Federal Circuit Mediation program contacted both
parties on Friday, April 3, 2009, in an attempt to mediate the appeal
and the dispute pending before this Court. Jacobsen has consented to
mediation. Defendants stated that they would not participate voluntarily
unless the scope of mediation was limited to preliminary injunction
issues and excluded all patent issues that Jacobsen could appeal at
final judgment."

regards,
alexander.

--
http://gng.z505.com/index.htm
(GNG is a derecursive recursive derecursion which pwns GNU since it can
be infinitely looped as GNGNGNGNG...NGNGNG... and can be said backwards
too, whereas GNU cannot.)
Alexander Terekhov
2009-06-18 18:35:02 UTC
Permalink
ROFL!

http://www.softwarefreedom.org/resources/2009/jacobsen-amicus-brief.html

------
Amicus Curiae: Jacobsen v. Katzer
Software Freedom Law Center

June 15, 2009



Download PDF | Download Postscript


2009-1352



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



ROBERT JACOBSEN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,


v.


MATTHEW KATZER and KAMIND ASSOCIATES, INC.
(doing business as KAM Industries),

Defendants-Appellees.



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California in case No. 06-CV–1905,
Judge Jeffrey S. White



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE SOFTWARE FREEDOM LAW CENTER
IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANT

Daniel B. Ravicher, Esq.
Software Freedom Law Center
1995 Broadway, Fl. 17
New York, NY 10023
Tel.: (212) 212-461-1900
Fax: (212) 598-580-0898
Counsel for Amicus Curiae




CERTIFICATE OF INTEREST

Counsel for Amicus Curiae certifies the following:

The full name of every party or amicus represented by me is: Software
Freedom Law Center, Inc.
The name of the real party in interest (if the party named in the
caption is not the real party in interest) represented by me is: Not
Applicable.
All parent corporations and any publicly held companies that own 10
percent or more of the stock of the party or amicus curiae represented
by me are: None.
The names of all law firms and the partners or associates that appeared
for the party or amicus now represented by me in the trial court or
agency or are expected to appear in this court are:
Daniel B. Ravicher, Esq.
Software Freedom Law Center
1995 Broadway, Fl. 17
New York, NY 10023
Tel.: (212) 212-461-1900
Fax: (212) 598-580-0898


Dated: June 15, 2009


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Daniel B. Ravicher, Esq.
Software Freedom Law Center
1995 Broadway, Fl. 17
New York, NY 10023
Tel.: (212) 212-461-1900
Fax: (212) 598-580-0898
Attorney for Amicus Curiae



Table of Contents
CERTIFICATE OF INTEREST
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
ARGUMENT
I. DEVELOPERS USE FOSS LICENSES TO PROMOTE FREEDOM
II. LICENSE VIOLATION HARMS COMMUNITIES OF DEVELOPERS
III. LICENSE VIOLATION INJURES THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FOSS DEVELOPERS
AND THEIR USERS
IV. LICENSE VIOLATION HARMS THE PUBLIC INTEREST
V. THE HARM CAUSED TO FOSS DEVELOPERS BY COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT FROM
LICENSE VIOLATION MEETS WINTER’S REQUIREMENT OF IRREPARABLE INJURY
Conclusion
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE


TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Harris, 625 F.2d 1328, 1331 (7th Cir.
1980)............. 7

Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 138182 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
................ 8

Wedel v. United States, 2 F.2d 462, 463 (9th Cir.
1924).................... 7

Wildmon v. Berwick Universal Pictures, 983 F.2d 21, 24 (5th Cir. 1992)
... 5, 7

Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S.Ct. 365, 374
(2008)......... 7

Other Materials

The Free Software Foundation, GNU General Public License v2.0 (1991) 3



STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE

This brief amicus curiae is filed on behalf of the Software Freedom Law
Center (“SFLC”) 1. SFLC is a not-for-profit legal services organization
that provides legal representation and other law-related services to
protect and advance Free and Open Source Software (FOSS), defined as
software distributed under terms that give recipients freedom to copy,
modify and redistribute the software. SFLC provides pro bono legal
services to non-profit and individual FOSS developers, all of whom
distribute software under FOSS licenses. SFLC also helps the general
public better understand the legal aspects of FOSS.

FOSS is a valuable public good, and copyright law should preserve the
incentives, interest, and choices of FOSS developers. Because these
incentives are primarily dependent upon mutual respect for and
enforcement of the communal norms defined in FOSS licenses, damages are
typically an insufficient remedy for infringement of FOSS copyrights.
The availability of injunctive relief is necessary to enforce those
norms as they are embodied in FOSS copyright licenses. The district
court’s reasoning in this case threatens to broadly foreclose injunctive
relief to FOSS developers, stripping them of effective remedy and
dampening their motivation to contribute to the common good. Thus, SFLC
submits this brief to express support of Plaintiff-Appellant’s position
and the reasoning of this Court in the prior appeal.

This brief is submitted with the consent of the Plaintiff-Appellant.
Consent of Defendant-Appellee was requested, but no response was
received.



SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The goal of Free and Open Source Software (FOSS) communities is to
create and distribute software exclusively under terms that perpetuate
freedom. When software written by these communities is distributed
without regard for those terms, the product is turned directly against
the developers’ purposerather than spreading free software, the violator
abuses the efforts of FOSS developers, spreading non-free software and
depriving other users of the rights the developers intended them to
have. This directly and immediately harms the developers, and also
undermines the community’s unifying values, working a harm as diffuse
and complex as the relationships that compose the community. These harms
cannot be adequately quantified or compensated, and thus the traditional
equitable view is that they must be prevented. The injured developers
require and deserve injunctive relief because money damages alone cannot
redress the injury caused by the infringement of their copyrights.



ARGUMENT

I. DEVELOPERS USE FOSS LICENSES TO PROMOTE FREEDOM

Developers apply FOSS licenses to their software to grant others the
freedom to use, copy, modify and redistribute the software for no cost.
In return, they require those who take advantage of their generous terms
to perpetuate that freedom when they do so. In many FOSS licenses this
purpose is explicit; the most popular license says that it “is intended
to guarantee your freedom to share and change free softwareto make sure
the software is free for all its users.” The Free Software Foundation,
GNU General Public License v2.0(1991), at
http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl–2.0.html [hereinafter GPL].

These freedoms are not sentimental or abstract. They allow downstream
developers to build atop FOSS instead of starting from scratch (a
process that is often a cost-prohibitive barrier to entry), and they
give users real, immediate power. With access to source code and the
right to modify it, those downstream developers and users can make the
software more useful, remake it into something wholly new, or even turn
it into a competing product. For example, there are dozens of successful
operating systems built on top of Linux, the operating system “kernel”
included in GNU/Linux products sold by companies such as Red Hat,
Novell, and Nokia, as well as non-commercial operating system
distributions such as Debian and Ubuntu. Because these rights that FOSS
developers share so freely are ones that competitive entities regard as
valuable property, proprietary software publishers do not offer them to
end users at any price.2 In commercial software contracts, they command
substantial royalties. FOSS developers, however, typically forgo
royalties and instead take their compensation in the spread of freedom.

The positive freedoms granted in FOSS licenses are protected by
corresponding restrictions which preserve the same freedoms for the
developers and all users. For example, GPL licensees must: (i) grant to
others the same rights they received; (ii) include a copy of the license
when they distribute the software; (iii) make recipients aware of their
rights; and (iv) license programs derived from the original program
under similarly free terms. These requirements ensure that the work of
all contributors remains free; preserving that freedom and sharing it
with others is the only consideration demanded of licensees for exercise
of all these rights inthe software.

FOSS licenses (and the freedoms they grant) are devised to be passed
among peopledevelopers and users alikewithout limit, allowing all
recipients to redistribute the software and many to add value. Cutting
off this progression by distributing under non-free license terms
curtails the freedom not just of the initial recipients but of the
unknown number of others who will never receive the software from them
or have the opportunity to build upon the enhanced software. In turn,
the initial developers never realize the benefit of those lost
contributions.

Those who violate the conditions of FOSS licenses appropriate all the
value of the software, but deny its authors the sole object of their
efforts, the freedom embodied in and protected by the FOSS license. This
misappropriationdestroys the very purpose for which the developers write
the software. In this way, every violation harms the developers directly
and immediately. In the proprietary software licensing context, the harm
done by an infringer is the loss of license revenue to the copyright
holder. In the FOSS context, the infringer harms every present and
future possessor or developer of every copy of the software.

II. LICENSE VIOLATION HARMS COMMUNITIES OF DEVELOPERS

Unlicensed and non-free distribution of FOSS harms the developers not
only by directly subverting their efforts, but also by damaging the
mechanism of cooperation by which they produce software. FOSS developers
work within communities in which almost all work is strictly voluntary,
i.e., not financially compensated. If developers’ work is exploited,
their choice to participate in the community is reduced to a prisoner’s
dilemma: anyone can defect from the common terms, receiving the benefit
of others’ cooperation and also punishing it as described above. Over
time, the community will be deprived of contributions, as developers are
discouraged from contributing by repeated exploitation. This harm cannot
be compensated by money damages, as no amount of money can reconstitute
a community.

Other developers in the affected community suffer in several different
ways. First, they lose the software enhancements the contributions would
add. As a result, they cannot build upon the missing contributions or
have their own contributions improved by others. The software suffers,
as do the developers and users who depend on its quality and continued
improvement.

Second, the community’s collaborative spirit suffers because it depends
upon mutual trust, which the violation undermines. FOSS is produced by
mass collaboration, often among people who have never met face to face,
heard each other’s voices, or even seen pictures of one another. It is
difficult to build and maintain trust when the terms for cooperation can
be flouted without reprisal. FOSS licenses enforce a minimal set of
common values and goals, and allow strangers to collaborate without fear
that their FOSS contributions will simply be hidden, packaged and sold
without their consent.

These harms to the developers’ interest in productive, trustworthy
development communities are impossible to quantify; their manifestations
are as varied as the motivations of individual members and the
relationships between them. Therefore, money damages are incapable of
compensating for them, and injunctive relief is necessary and
appropriate.

III. LICENSE VIOLATION INJURES THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FOSS DEVELOPERS
AND THEIR USERS

FOSS copyright licenses are not just dry recitations of grants and
conditionsthey are themselves advocacy and outreach efforts, and they
define the relationships between participants in a community. By giving
people freedom, developers make a potent argument about the value of
that freedom, and they invite users to join them in extending that
freedom to others by making more FOSS. FOSS licensees do not only submit
to the legal boundaries of the license, they also by implication adopt
its political and non-economic principles.

A license violation destroys the invitation. It converts free software
into merely software; participants in a community into merely end users.
Because every user is a potential volunteer, interrupting the connection
between projects and users deprives the projects of their most valuable
resource, people’s time and attention. Over time, renewing this resource
is the difference between the projects that are successful and those
that are defunct.

Projects cannot buy volunteers, goodwill, or word-of-mouth, which is why
they secure user freedoms through license conditions rather than
contractual covenants. Copyright doctrine recognizes that money damages
are often insufficient in infringement cases, and favors injunctive
relief when the resulting harm is noneconomic. See Wildmon v. Berwick
Universal Pictures, 983 F.2d 21, 24 (5th Cir. 1992). To FOSS developers,
the cost of violations far exceeds any financial price.

Because money is rarely a means and never an end in FOSS communities,
money damages can never repair the harm done when a community’s message
to potential new developers and FOSS adherents is lost as a result of a
license violation. This unrealized potential for growth cannot be
estimated, much less measured in dollars. For these reasons, injunctive
relief is the only way to protect FOSS developers when their copyright
licenses are violated.


IV. LICENSE VIOLATION HARMS THE PUBLIC INTEREST

FOSS development provides enormous benefit to the public. For the
average user, it provides an alternative to the royalty-based,
unmodifiable, proprietary software that is the only other option in the
marketplace. Already, a freely modifiable and free-of-cost FOSS program
is available to perform any task commonly required by home and
enterprise computer users. They can share these programs freely,
enabling them to collaborate without concern for incompatibility. And
they can access the development process and work with others to improve
the quality and functionality of the software.

Businesses that use FOSS also have greater choice in selecting a
software service provider. Many companiesincluding Canonical, Red Hat,
and Oraclepackage GNU/Linux operating system distributions for
enterprise users, but those users are not bound to their initial
suppliers for support. Because an enterprise user, like all users, has
the right to receive the source code to the FOSS running its systems, it
can turn elsewhere or to itself for support if its vendor proves
unsatisfactory.

Contrary to a popular myth, FOSS developers don’t just produce low-cost
clones of proprietary software. FOSS is qualitatively different in that
it favors open standards and data portability where proprietary vendors
often choose lock-in. FOSS programs rarely come with the restrictive end
user license agreements that are standard parts of almost every
proprietary software package. Dispensing with collecting money also
allows FOSS communities to avoid the need to control the flow of
software and data, which means FOSS software always seeks to facilitate
novel facilities, even in the absence of an ability to tax them.

Consumer electronics manufacturers use FOSS to develop products and
bring them to market more quickly.3 The routers and modems in our homes
and the cellphones in our pockets all benefit from enhanced features at
a reduced price because they are built on FOSS. By eliminating software
development and licensing costs, more companies can competitively
produce software-embedded appliances. This makes markets more
competitive and new technology available to a broader range of
consumers.

FOSS lowers barriers to entry for businesses by reducing software and
hardware costs. This is especially significant in developing economies,
where the cost of proprietary software licenses is often prohibitive. By
providing world-class software at zero cost, the FOSS community levels
the playing field between fledgling businesses and large, established
market leaders.

Given the broad range of individuals, businesses, and entire industries
that benefit from FOSS, it is impossible to quantify the ultimate harm
caused when infringement dismantles the chain of FOSS development.
Because developers are motivated to contribute to FOSS by their belief
in freedom, the loss of their contributions is irrecoverable: the work
they do, on the terms they offer, is not available elsewhere at any
price. The law of public nuisance has long recognized that a swift
injunction is the only effective remedy for such harm to the public
interest. See Wedel v. United States, 2 F.2d 462, 463 (9th Cir. 1924).

V. THE HARM CAUSED TO FOSS DEVELOPERS BY COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT FROM
LICENSE VIOLATION MEETS WINTER’S REQUIREMENT OF IRREPARABLE INJURY

The Supreme Court set out the standard for a preliminary injunction in
Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S.Ct. 365, 374 (2008):

A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is
likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable
harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities
tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.

As detailed above, FOSS license violations cause two immediate harms:
they deprive the developer of the rights reserved in the license, and
they sever the developer’s legal relationship with other licensees who
never become aware of their rights. These harms are not merely likely,
but certain, because they are effected at the instant the violation
occurs. They are irreparable because they are noneconomic and so damages
cannot compensate for them. See Wildmon v. Berwick Universal Pictures,
983 F.2d 21 24(5th Cir. 1992). Nor can damages remedy the erosion of the
development community. Moreover, though this harm too begins
immediately, it is compounded by time so that its ultimate scope is
uncertain at the outset. Therefore, the community’s resulting loss
“cannot [be] remed[ied] following a final determination on the merits,”
Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Harris, 625 F.2d 1328, 1331 (7th Cir. 1980), and is
irreparable for that reason as well.

Because all of these harms are inevitable consequences of the copyright
infringement resulting from FOSS license violations, developers always
suffer irreparable harm when their software is distributed in
contravention of the license terms. Because this harm is also damaging
to the public’s interest in the availability of FOSS, an injunction is
also in the public interest.



CONCLUSION

For these reasons we agree with this Court’s prior statement in this
case:

Copyright licenses are designed to support the right to exclude; money
damages alone do not support or enforce that right. The choice to exact
consideration in the form of compliance with the open source
requirements of disclosure and explanation of changes, rather than as a
dollar-denominated fee, is entitled to no less legal recognition.
Indeed, because a calculation of damages is inherently speculative,
these types of license restrictions might well be rendered meaningless
absent the ability to enforce through injunctive relief.

Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 138182 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

Respectfully submitted,

Daniel B. Ravicher, Esq.
Software Freedom Law Center
1995 Broadway, Fl. 17
New York, NY 10023
Tel.: (212) 212-461-1900
Fax: (212) 598-580-0898
Counsel for Amicus Curiae




CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I do hereby certify pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
32(a)(7)(B) that the foregoing Brief of Amicus Curiae conforms to
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(a)(5), 32(a)(6), and 32(a)(7).

I further certify that according to the word count of the word
processing system used to prepare this brief, OpenOffice.org Writer
2.4.14, the relevant portion of this brief contains 2,501 words, is
double-spaced (except for headings) and appears in 14-point proportional
Times New Roman font.

June 15, 2009 ___________________________________________

Daniel B. Ravicher, Esq.
Software Freedom Law Center
1995 Broadway, Fl. 17
New York, NY 10023
Tel.: (212) 212-461-1900
Fax: (212) 598-580-0898
Counsel for Amicus Curiae




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Daniel B. Ravicher, hereby certify that I caused 12 copies, including
original, of the foregoing:


Brief of Amicus Curiae Software Freedom Law Center
in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant

to be sent for hand filing on the 15th Day of June, 2009 to:


Mr. Jan Horbaly, Clerk
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
717 Madison Place, NW
Washington, DC 20439



I further certify that two copies of the foregoing Brief of Amicus
Curiae were served on the 15th Day of June, 2009, by Federal Express on
the following counsel of record:


Victoria K. Hall, Esq.
Law Office of Victoria K. Hall
3 Bethesda Metro Suite 700
Bethesda, MD 20814


Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant

David McGowan, Esq.
5998 Alcala Park
San Diego, CA 92110



Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant

R. Scott Jerger, Esq.
Field Jerger LLP
610 SW Alder St. Suite 910
Portland, OR 97205



Counsel for Defendants-Appellees

June 15, 2009 ___________________________________________

Daniel B. Ravicher, Esq.
Software Freedom Law Center
1995 Broadway, Fl. 17
New York, NY 10023
Tel.: (212) 212-461-1900
Fax: (212) 598-580-0898
Counsel for Amicus Curiae


Copyright © 2009, Software Freedom Law Center. Verbatim copying of this
document is permitted in any medium; this notice must be preserved on
all copies.

1Amicus has filed a contemporaneous motion seeking leave to file this
brief. No part of this brief was authored by counsel for any party and
no party, person, or organization contributed to this brief besides
amicus and its counsel.

2“Proprietary” here means the opposite of “free and open source.”

3FOSS is found pervasively in products sold by Cisco, Palm, Google,
Nokia, and countless other companies.

4Please note that the HTML and Postscript versions of the brief were
actually converted into LATEXbefore publication; the one filed with the
court was prepared with OO.o Writer, and is available on our site in its
PDF version.
------

regards,
alexander.
--
http://gng.z505.com/index.htm
(GNG is a derecursive recursive derecursion which pwns GNU since it can
be infinitely looped as GNGNGNGNG...NGNGNG... and can be said backwards
too, whereas GNU cannot.)
Hyman Rosen
2009-06-18 18:43:29 UTC
Permalink
Post by Alexander Terekhov
ROFL!
http://www.softwarefreedom.org/resources/2009/jacobsen-amicus-brief.html
Since your thought processes are not like those of
rational human beings, I think you need to quote
more selectively from the brief the lines you find
amusing.

Although it's probably pointless. I expect they're
not particularly funny at all.
Alexander Terekhov
2009-06-18 21:06:14 UTC
Permalink
Post by Hyman Rosen
Post by Alexander Terekhov
ROFL!
http://www.softwarefreedom.org/resources/2009/jacobsen-amicus-brief.html
Since your thought processes are not like those of
rational human beings, I think you need to quote
more selectively from the brief the lines you find
amusing.
Although it's probably pointless. I expect they're
not particularly funny at all.
Just listen to Freedom Lawyers & Kuhn at

http://www.softwarefreedom.org/podcast-media/Software-Freedom-Law-Show_Special_Jacobsen-Amicus-Brief.ogg

http://www.softwarefreedom.org/podcast-media/Software-Freedom-Law-Show_Special_Jacobsen-Amicus-Brief.mp3

LMAO!

regards,
alexander.

--
http://gng.z505.com/index.htm
(GNG is a derecursive recursive derecursion which pwns GNU since it can
be infinitely looped as GNGNGNGNG...NGNGNG... and can be said backwards
too, whereas GNU cannot.)
Rjack
2009-06-18 22:26:01 UTC
Permalink
Post by Alexander Terekhov
ROFL!
http://www.softwarefreedom.org/resources/2009/jacobsen-amicus-brief.html
Since your thought processes are not like those of rational human
beings, I think you need to quote more selectively from the brief
the lines you find amusing.
Although it's probably pointless. I expect they're not particularly
funny at all.
Why follow a case from a Circuit Court that is totally without
authority to set copyright law precedent? The ruling will be utterly
useless to anyone other than the present litigants.

Sincerely,
Rjack
Hyman Rosen
2009-06-18 22:31:10 UTC
Permalink
Post by Rjack
Why follow a case from a Circuit Court that is totally without
authority to set copyright law precedent? The ruling will be utterly
useless to anyone other than the present litigants.
If a good outcome will annoy you, I'll be happy just with that.
Rjack
2009-06-18 22:47:28 UTC
Permalink
Post by Hyman Rosen
Post by Rjack
Why follow a case from a Circuit Court that is totally without
authority to set copyright law precedent? The ruling will be
utterly useless to anyone other than the present litigants.
If a good outcome will annoy you, I'll be happy just with that.
Is annoying people your reason for posting in this group?
Pity. . .

Sincerely,
Rjack
Hyman Rosen
2009-06-19 02:31:49 UTC
Permalink
Post by Rjack
Is annoying people your reason for posting in this group?
Pity. . .
No, the reason for posting is to correct errors. If you are
annoyed when your errors are demonstrated, that's just an
extra bonus.
Alexander Terekhov
2009-07-31 13:41:12 UTC
Permalink
Post by Hyman Rosen
Post by Alexander Terekhov
ROFL!
http://www.softwarefreedom.org/resources/2009/jacobsen-amicus-brief.html
Since your thought processes are not like those of
rational human beings, I think you need to quote
more selectively from the brief the lines you find
amusing.
Does the following help, Hyman?

"Amicus’s request for a presumption of irreparable harm is directly
contrary to the Supreme Court’s holding in Winter

Amicus Curiae Software Freedom Law Center (Amicus) argue that a
copyright holder should be entitled to a presumption of irreparable
harm when seeking a preliminary injunction. While this presumption
existed at one time under federal copyright law, it was critically
injured by the Supreme Court in eBay v. MercExchange, LLC, 547
U.S. 388, 391 (2006) and completely eviscerated in Winter in
late 2008.

Footnote>> It is worthwhile to note that the open source license
quoted in Amicus’s brief, the GNU General Public License v2.0 is
not the license at issue in this case. See Amicus Brief at 4-5.
The Artistic License 1.0 governed Jacobsen’s Decoder Definition
Files during the alleged infringing conduct as discussed in detail
in the opinion in the first appeal of this case (A1579). <<Footnote

Prior to eBay, a plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction under
federal copyright law who demonstrated a likelihood of success on
the merits of a copyright claim was entitled to a presumption of
irreparable harm. Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 188
F.3d 1115, 1119 (9th Cir. 1999). In 2006, however, the Supreme
Court eradicated the presumption of irreparable harm to motions for
permanent injunctions in the patent infringement context, holding
that a Plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must demonstrate
that the traditional equitable factors for granting an injunction
have been met. eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 391. As time went by, federal
courts (including this Court) applied the logic of eBay to motions
for injunctive relief in copyright and trademark cases and also
applied the strictures of eBay to preliminary injunctions. Katzer’s
brief in opposition to Jacobsen’s preliminary injunction motion
canvasses this case law.

If any doubt existed by late 2008, it was completely eviscerated by
Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S.Ct. 365, 374 (2008)
where the Supreme Court confirmed that a plaintiff seeking a
preliminary injunction “must establish that he is likely to suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief.” Winter at
374. The Ninth Circuit has acknowledged the Supreme Court’s recent
expatiation of the proper standard for preliminary injunctive
relief stating that the former standard used by the Ninth Circuit
was “much too lenient” and that “[t]o the extent our cases have
suggested a lesser standard, they are no longer controlling or even
viable.” American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 559
F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009). See AR 782-783.

The District Court correctly summarized the change in the legal
standard in its Order:

Footnote>> Jacobsen does not take issue with the legal conclusion
that the presumption of irreparable harm no longer exists for
preliminary injunctive relief for copyright claims. <<Footnote

Initially, when this matter was before the Court on a motion
for preliminary injunction, federal copyright law provided that
a plaintiff who demonstrates a likelihood of success on the
merits of a copyright claims was automatically entitled to a
presumption of irreparable harm... However, because of the
passage of time, the governing law has changed. Now, a plaintiff
is not granted the presumption of irreparable harm upon a showing
of likelihood of success on the merits. Instead, a plaintiff
seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that... he is
likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary
relief... (citing Winter).

A11-A12. Amicus’s brief, however, requests that this Court ignore
controlling Supreme Court law and apply a presumption of irreparable
harm for all preliminary injunction motions brought by open source
license holders. Amicus state that two harms must certainly, always,
occur the instant an open source license is violated: (1) the
developer is deprived of the rights reserved in the license, and (2)
the developer’s relationship with other licensees who never become
aware of their rights is severed.

Footnote>> As discussed supra, there is no evidence in the record
that Jacobsen suffered either of these potential harms. <<Footnote

Amicus Brief at 13. These harms are “inevitable” and “certain” and
developers “always suffer” these harms when an open source license
is violated. Id. Amicus are requesting that this Court presume that
Katzer caused Jacobsen irreparable harm based solely on allegations
that infringement occurred and without the proffering of any
evidence that any harm will likely occur. This is contrary to
controlling law.

Amicus’s citation to authority is inapposite and unavailing. None
of the cases cited by Amicus address the preliminary injunction
standard post-Winter. Additionally, Amicus inaccurately cites
Wildmon v. Berwick Universal Pictures, 983 F.2d 21, 24 (5th Cir.
1992) for the proposition that copyright doctrine favors injunctive
relief when the resulting harm is noneconomic. Amicus Brief at 9.
This case does not stand for this proposition at all, and, in fact,
never mentions the word “copyright.” Regardless, Amicus’s unsupported
statement regarding the favorability of injunctive relief is
certainly not the state of the law post-Winter. Amicus’s request to
apply a presumption of irreparable harm to Jacobsen is contrary to
the law and should be rejected."

http://terekhov.de/2009-1221/AppelleeBrief.pdf

regards,
alexander.

--
http://gng.z505.com/index.htm
(GNG is a derecursive recursive derecursion which pwns GNU since it can
be infinitely looped as GNGNGNGNG...NGNGNG... and can be said backwards
too, whereas GNU cannot.)
Hyman Rosen
2009-07-31 14:55:01 UTC
Permalink
Post by Alexander Terekhov
Does the following help, Hyman?
http://terekhov.de/2009-1221/AppelleeBrief.pdf
Not in the slightest. The amicus brief is correct. The
harm done by violation of open copyright licenses is
irreparable and immediate precisely because it is non-
economic in nature.

Harm caused by typical copyright violation is repaired
by forcing the violators to pay what they would have
paid had they proceeded legally. Once open-licensed
code is distributed to users without making them aware
of their extra-copyright permissions, the interests of
the copyright holder as expressed by his license can't
generally be recovered because the users aren't tracked.

Naturally the appellee brief will argue against this,
but that doesn't mean they're correct.
Alexander Terekhov
2009-07-31 15:29:05 UTC
Permalink
Post by Hyman Rosen
Post by Alexander Terekhov
Does the following help, Hyman?
http://terekhov.de/2009-1221/AppelleeBrief.pdf
Not in the slightest. The amicus brief is correct. The
harm done by violation of open copyright licenses is
irreparable and immediate precisely because it is non-
economic in nature.
Non-economic doesn't mean irreparable and immediate, silly.
Post by Hyman Rosen
Harm caused by typical copyright violation is repaired
by forcing the violators to pay what they would have
paid had they proceeded legally.
And contract laws provide for remedy known as "specific performance".
Post by Hyman Rosen
Once open-licensed
code is distributed to users without making them aware
of their extra-copyright permissions, the interests of
the copyright holder as expressed by his license can't
generally be recovered because the users aren't tracked.
Who told you that Appellees didn't track the users of allegedly
infringed material? The record is full of evidence to the contrary,
stupid.
Post by Hyman Rosen
Naturally the appellee brief will argue against this,
but that doesn't mean they're correct.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emergency_telephone_number

Hth, Hyman.

regards,
alexander.

--
http://gng.z505.com/index.htm
(GNG is a derecursive recursive derecursion which pwns GNU since it can
be infinitely looped as GNGNGNGNG...NGNGNG... and can be said backwards
too, whereas GNU cannot.)
Hyman Rosen
2009-07-31 16:39:22 UTC
Permalink
Post by Alexander Terekhov
Non-economic doesn't mean irreparable and immediate
Not necessarily, but in this case yes, for reasons
the brief and I both explained.
Post by Alexander Terekhov
And contract laws provide for remedy known as
"specific performance".
Unless the copyright violator has tracked the parties
to whom he has illegally distributed the work, he will
be unable to make good on the copyright holder's desire
that the recipients be informed of their permissions.
That's what makes the violation irreparable.
Post by Alexander Terekhov
Who told you that Appellees didn't track the users of
allegedly infringed material? The record is full of
evidence to the contrary
Remember that an amicus brief doesn't necessarily limit
itself to the specifics in the case for which it is filed:

Amicus Briefs -- Why File Them?
<http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2009_07_19-2009_07_25.shtml#1248111047>
from chapter 12.2 of Federal Appellate Practice
an amicus brief can explain the practical effects of a
particular outcome on individuals or groups not before
the court.
Alexander Terekhov
2009-07-31 17:39:55 UTC
Permalink
Post by Hyman Rosen
Post by Alexander Terekhov
Non-economic doesn't mean irreparable and immediate
Not necessarily, but in this case yes, for reasons
the brief and I both explained.
And the reasons being what, silly?

Quote the brief and yourself, Hyman.

[... "Remember that" ...]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emergency_telephone_number

Hth, Hyman.

regards,
alexander.

--
http://gng.z505.com/index.htm
(GNG is a derecursive recursive derecursion which pwns GNU since it can
be infinitely looped as GNGNGNGNG...NGNGNG... and can be said backwards
too, whereas GNU cannot.)
Hyman Rosen
2009-07-31 17:55:08 UTC
Permalink
Post by Alexander Terekhov
And the reasons being what
Quote the brief and yourself
<http://www.softwarefreedom.org/resources/2009/jacobsen-amicus-brief.html>
FOSS license violations ... sever the developer’s legal
relationship with other licensees who never become aware
of their rights.

Me:
Once open-licensed code is distributed to users without
making them aware of their extra-copyright permissions,
the interests of the copyright holder as expressed by
his license can't generally be recovered because the
users aren't tracked.
Alexander Terekhov
2009-07-31 18:09:02 UTC
Permalink
Post by Hyman Rosen
Post by Alexander Terekhov
And the reasons being what
Quote the brief and yourself
<http://www.softwarefreedom.org/resources/2009/jacobsen-amicus-brief.html>
FOSS license violations ... sever the developer’s legal
relationship
And that allegedly severed "legal relationship" being what exactly, to
begin with?
Post by Hyman Rosen
with other licensees who never become aware
of their rights.
What makes you/SFLC think that those other "licensees" *never* become
aware of their rights?
You should call emergency number and take medical help, Hyman.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emergency_telephone_number

regards,
alexander.

--
http://gng.z505.com/index.htm
(GNG is a derecursive recursive derecursion which pwns GNU since it can
be infinitely looped as GNGNGNGNG...NGNGNG... and can be said backwards
too, whereas GNU cannot.)
Hyman Rosen
2009-07-31 18:22:39 UTC
Permalink
Post by Alexander Terekhov
And that allegedly severed "legal relationship" being what
exactly, to begin with?
The extra permissions granted to them by the copyright
holder, above those allowed by copyright law.
Post by Alexander Terekhov
What makes you/SFLC think that those other "licensees" *never*
become aware of their rights?
If a distributor illegally distributes the copyrighted
work to users, and does not track who those users are,
it is possible they would never become aware of their
extra permissions. Since these extra permissions are the
main reason for the copyright holder distributing his
work in this manner, he suffers irreparable and immediate
harm.

The alleged violator is free to argue that the other party
will not prevail in his case, or that he is keeping records,
etc., and so not be subject to preliminary injunction. The
amicus brief states the general case, as is appropriate.
Alexander Terekhov
2009-07-31 18:41:53 UTC
Permalink
Post by Hyman Rosen
Post by Alexander Terekhov
And that allegedly severed "legal relationship" being what
exactly, to begin with?
The extra permissions granted to them by the copyright
holder, above those allowed by copyright law.
And on basis of what law do you think that Appeelees are obliged to let
third parties know about those "extra permissions granted to them by the
copyright
holder, above those allowed by copyright law", Hyman?
Post by Hyman Rosen
Post by Alexander Terekhov
What makes you/SFLC think that those other "licensees" *never*
become aware of their rights?
If ...
An "if" hypothetical is not evidence.

"The District Court found that the record contains no evidence of past
irreparable harm suffered by Jacobsen and the record contains no
evidence of any future threat. This finding is sound."

http://terekhov.de/2009-1221/AppelleeBrief.pdf

regards,
alexander.

P.S. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emergency_telephone_number

Hth, Hyman.

--
http://gng.z505.com/index.htm
(GNG is a derecursive recursive derecursion which pwns GNU since it can
be infinitely looped as GNGNGNGNG...NGNGNG... and can be said backwards
too, whereas GNU cannot.)
Hyman Rosen
2009-07-31 18:49:48 UTC
Permalink
Post by Alexander Terekhov
And on basis of what law do you think that Appeelees are obliged to let
third parties know about those "extra permissions granted to them by the
copyright holder, above those allowed by copyright law"
17 USC 106(3) <http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/106.html>
Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of
copyright under this title has the exclusive rights
to do and to authorize any of the following:
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the
copyrighted work to the public by sale or other
transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending;

The terms of distribution are under the control of the
copyright holder, as when he separately authorizes the
creation of hardcover and paperback copies of a book.
In the case of open licenses, one of the requirements
is that distribution be accompanied by the license.
Post by Alexander Terekhov
An "if" hypothetical is not evidence.
There is no need for evidence. One of the purposes of
an amicus brief is to point out possible consequences
of a decision, including to parties outside the case.
Post by Alexander Terekhov
http://terekhov.de/2009-1221/AppelleeBrief.pdf
The claims of a brief are not evidence either.
Alexander Terekhov
2009-07-31 19:20:49 UTC
Permalink
Hyman Rosen wrote:
[...]
Post by Hyman Rosen
The terms of distribution are under the control of the
copyright holder, as when he separately authorizes the
creation of hardcover and paperback copies of a book.
Why do you keeping confusing scope-of-use limitations of the grant with
conditions to the grant, Hyman?

Hardcover (durable copy) and paperback (non-durable copy) "uses" have
nothing to do with covenants you want the licensee to adhere to.

Face the truth, Hyman.

regards,
alexander.

P.S. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emergency_telephone_number

Hth, Hyman.

--
http://gng.z505.com/index.htm
(GNG is a derecursive recursive derecursion which pwns GNU since it can
be infinitely looped as GNGNGNGNG...NGNGNG... and can be said backwards
too, whereas GNU cannot.)
Rjack
2009-07-31 19:46:21 UTC
Permalink
Hyman Rosen wrote: [...]
The terms of distribution are under the control of the copyright
holder, as when he separately authorizes the creation of
hardcover and paperback copies of a book.
Why do you keeping confusing scope-of-use limitations of the grant
with conditions to the grant, Hyman?
You have touched on 99% of GNUtians problems concerning copyright
licensing. They inevitably fail to understand the distinction between
a condition precedent that determines the contractual *existence* of
copyright permissions and the *scope of use* of copyright permissions
that restricts the use of the rights enumerated in 17 USC sec. 106.

A requirement for a "scope of use" restriction is the the alleged use
*must* violate sec. 106 rights in the absence of any license at all.
District Judge White clearly stated this:

"The condition that the user insert a prominent notice of attribution
does not limit the scope of the license. Rather, Defendants’ alleged
violation of the conditions of the license may have constituted a
breach of the nonexclusive license, but does not create liability for
copyright infringement where it would not otherwise exist."

Obviously there is no "right of attribution" mentioned in 17 USC 106.

Neither GNUtians nor the CAFC in Jacobsen understand this critical
distinction concerning "conditions".

Sincerely,
Rjack
Hyman Rosen
2009-07-31 21:29:46 UTC
Permalink
Post by Rjack
A requirement for a "scope of use" restriction is the the alleged use
*must* violate sec. 106 rights in the absence of any license at all.
The violating use is distributing a copy of the copyrighted work,
prohibited by 17 USC 106(3). The GPL (and other open licenses)
describes the manner in which copies may be made and distributed.
Making and distributing copies in any other way is outside the
scope of use. The Artistic License may have written its permissions
too broadly, but the GPL does not have that problem.
Post by Rjack
Neither GNUtians nor the CAFC in Jacobsen understand this critical
distinction concerning "conditions".
Oh, look, it's crank vs. court again!

Here's another court, in Blizzard v. Donnelly:
<http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/arizona/azdce/2:2006cv02555/322017/82/0.pdf>
If A grants a software license to B on the express
condition that the license will remain in effect
only so long as B makes monthly payments to A, and
B then stops making payments to A, any subsequent
copying of the software to RAM by B would constitute
copyright infringement

So much for all your blather about "conditions precedent",
or that automatic termination of the license for non-compliance
is ineffective.
Rjack
2009-08-01 00:36:20 UTC
Permalink
Post by Hyman Rosen
Post by Rjack
A requirement for a "scope of use" restriction is the the alleged
use *must* violate sec. 106 rights in the absence of any license
at all.
The violating use is distributing a copy of the copyrighted work,
You truncated my statement: "Obviously there is no 'right of
attribution' mentioned in 17 USC 106. Shame on you!
Post by Hyman Rosen
prohibited by 17 USC 106(3). The GPL (and other open licenses)
describes the manner in which copies may be made and distributed.
Making and distributing copies in any other way is outside the
scope of use. The Artistic License may have written its permissions
too broadly, but the GPL does not have that problem.
Where in the Copyright Act does it give permission to force another to
publish their independent, exclusive copyrighted code?
Post by Hyman Rosen
Post by Rjack
Neither GNUtians nor the CAFC in Jacobsen understand this
critical distinction concerning "conditions".
Oh, look, it's crank vs. court again!
http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/arizona/azdce/2:2006cv02555/322017/82/0.pdf
Post by Hyman Rosen
If A grants a software license to B on the express condition that
the license will remain in effect only so long as B makes monthly
payments to A, and B then stops making payments to A, any
subsequent copying of the software to RAM by B would constitute
copyright infringement
Here's your Blizzard quote with more context:

"But to the extent MDY suggests that the act that causes the person to
fall outside the scope of the license and the act that constitutes
copyright infringement must be one and the same, MDY has cited no
Ninth Circuit authority. Nor does this proposition make logical sense.
If A grants a software license to B on the express condition that the
license will remain in effect only so long as B makes monthly payments
to A, and B then stops making payments to A, any subsequent copying of
the software to RAM by B would constitute copyright infringement --"

See the part of your Blizzard citation that says, "[M]DY has cited no
Ninth Circuit authority"?

Well I'll supply the required Ninth Circuit authority:

"In Rano, we recognized the rule applied in other circuits that once a
non-breaching party to an express copyright license obtains and
exercises a right of rescission by virtue of a material breach of the
agreement, any further distribution of the copyrighted material would
constitute infringement."; Fosson v. Palace Limited; 78 F.3d 1448 (9th
Cir. 1996).

The salient words are "... once a non-breaching party to an express
copyright license obtains and exercises...". The Second Circuit cited
*this very case* in Maxwell v. Veeck; 110 F.3d 749 2nd Cir. 1997):

"One party's breach does not automatically cause recission of a
bilateral contract. See Fosson v. Palace (Waterland), Ltd., 78 F.3d
1448, 1455 (9th Cir.1996) (recognizing "the rule applied in other
circuits that once a non-breaching party to an express copyright
license obtains and exercises a right of rescission by virtue of a
material breach of the agreement, any further distribution of the
copyrighted material would constitute infringement")".


1) This is a question concerning a *condition precedent* to existence
of the license and not one of *scope of permitted use*. THANK YOU for
affirming my claim.

2) As both the Ninth and Second Circuits have clearly ruled, recission
of a copyright license is NOT automatic and both circuit's rulings
*are* binding precedent on the district courts below them including
the Blizzard Court.
Post by Hyman Rosen
So much for all your blather about "conditions precedent", or that
automatic termination of the license for non-compliance is
ineffective.
Sorry, the blather is all yours Hyman.

Sincerely,
Rjack

Hyman Rosen
2009-07-31 19:51:05 UTC
Permalink
Post by Alexander Terekhov
Why do you keeping confusing scope-of-use limitations of
the grant with conditions to the grant, Hyman?
Fortunately, I am not doing that.
Post by Alexander Terekhov
Hardcover (durable copy) and paperback (non-durable copy) "uses" have
nothing to do with covenants you want the licensee to adhere to.
Open licenses require that distribution takes place in certain manners.
Those generally include passing along the license to the recipients, so
that the distributors bind themselves to the license requirements. It is
similar to those checks one gets which have a little contract above the
signaure line, so that cashing the check means acceptance of the contract.

The requirement of distributing the work with the license accompanying it
is where the hardcover/paperback analogy applies. And by the way, your
parenthetic durable vs. non-durable additions are meaningless. Agreements
are for format, not durability. Paperback publishers would be surprised to
hear their books described as non-durable.
Alexander Terekhov
2009-07-31 20:14:34 UTC
Permalink
Hyman Rosen wrote:
[...]
Post by Hyman Rosen
is where the hardcover/paperback analogy applies. And by the way, your
parenthetic durable vs. non-durable additions are meaningless. Agreements
are for format, not durability. Paperback publishers would be surprised to
hear their books described as non-durable.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hardcover

"Hardcover books are often printed on acid-free paper, and are much more
durable than paperbacks, which have flexible, easily damaged paper
covers and glued spines."

http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/132906/hardcover_versus_paperback_books.html

"Durability

If you plan to cart around your newly purchased novel to go camping or
hiking somewhere dirty, it may be a better idea to choose hardcover."

regards,
alexander.

--
http://gng.z505.com/index.htm
(GNG is a derecursive recursive derecursion which pwns GNU since it can
be infinitely looped as GNGNGNGNG...NGNGNG... and can be said backwards
too, whereas GNU cannot.)
Alexander Terekhov
2009-06-18 18:46:06 UTC
Permalink
LMAO!

http://www.softwarefreedom.org/podcast/2009/jun/15/jacobsen-amicus-brief/
http://www.softwarefreedom.org/podcast-media/Software-Freedom-Law-Show_Special_Jacobsen-Amicus-Brief.ogg
http://www.softwarefreedom.org/podcast-media/Software-Freedom-Law-Show_Special_Jacobsen-Amicus-Brief.mp3

regards,
alexander.

--
http://gng.z505.com/index.htm
(GNG is a derecursive recursive derecursion which pwns GNU since it can
be infinitely looped as GNGNGNGNG...NGNGNG... and can be said backwards
too, whereas GNU cannot.)
Alexander Terekhov
2009-07-29 13:26:02 UTC
Permalink
Post by Alexander Terekhov
LMAO!
http://www.softwarefreedom.org/podcast/2009/jun/15/jacobsen-amicus-brief/
http://www.softwarefreedom.org/podcast-media/Software-Freedom-Law-Show_Special_Jacobsen-Amicus-Brief.ogg
http://www.softwarefreedom.org/podcast-media/Software-Freedom-Law-Show_Special_Jacobsen-Amicus-Brief.mp3
From pacer:

7/28/2009 Brief of Appellees . BY Kamind Associates, Inc. (d/b/a KAM
Industries), et al. (Appellees ). SERVED BY Mail ON 7/28/2009. FILED
ON 7/28/2009 . (NON-CONFIDENTIAL)

I'm grabbing my popcorn...

regards,
alexander.

--
http://gng.z505.com/index.htm
(GNG is a derecursive recursive derecursion which pwns GNU since it can
be infinitely looped as GNGNGNGNG...NGNGNG... and can be said backwards
too, whereas GNU cannot.)
Alexander Terekhov
2009-07-29 13:58:05 UTC
Permalink
BTW, it appears that GNU arch legal beagles at SFLC are champions in
brief rejection:

(from pacer)

"Brief of Amicus Curiae Software Freedom Law Center in Supporet of
Appellant . BY Software Freedom Law Center (Amicus ). SERVED BY Mail ON
6/15/2009. REJECTED ON 6/30/2009"

Corrected Brief of Amicus Curiae Software Freedom Law Center in Support
of Appellant . BY Software Freedom Law Center (Amicus ). SERVED BY Mail
ON 6/15/2009. REJECTED ON 6/30/2009"

(the NON-REJECTED corrected brief of SFLC was "SERVED BY Mail ON
7/8/2009").

LOL.

regards,
alexander.

--
http://gng.z505.com/index.htm
(GNG is a derecursive recursive derecursion which pwns GNU since it can
be infinitely looped as GNGNGNGNG...NGNGNG... and can be said backwards
too, whereas GNU cannot.)
Hyman Rosen
2009-07-29 14:23:16 UTC
Permalink
Post by Alexander Terekhov
Brief of Amicus Curiae
The Volokh Conspiracy legal blog recently had some good posts
on amicus briefs - what they're for, and why they should be short.
Well worth reading.

Amicus Briefs -- Why File Them?
<http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2009_07_19-2009_07_25.shtml#1248111047>
from chapter 12.2 of Federal Appellate Practice
an amicus brief can provide...background for the issues[,]...
the views of experts[,]...the practical effects of a particular
outcome[,]...alternative legal ground for deciding the case.
...
Courts often are influenced by the practical consequences of
adopting one or another of the legal rules under consideration.
That is particularly true in “highly technical” cases in which
decisions by generalist judges may have “a tremendous impact on
people and institutions in the real world.”

Less Is More in Amicus Briefs
<http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2009_07_19-2009_07_25.shtml#1248277083>
Alexander Terekhov
2009-07-29 18:16:43 UTC
Permalink
Post by Alexander Terekhov
Post by Alexander Terekhov
LMAO!
http://www.softwarefreedom.org/podcast/2009/jun/15/jacobsen-amicus-brief/
http://www.softwarefreedom.org/podcast-media/Software-Freedom-Law-Show_Special_Jacobsen-Amicus-Brief.ogg
http://www.softwarefreedom.org/podcast-media/Software-Freedom-Law-Show_Special_Jacobsen-Amicus-Brief.mp3
7/28/2009 Brief of Appellees . BY Kamind Associates, Inc. (d/b/a KAM
Industries), et al. (Appellees ). SERVED BY Mail ON 7/28/2009. FILED
ON 7/28/2009 . (NON-CONFIDENTIAL)
I'm grabbing my popcorn...
Enjoy:

http://terekhov.de/2009-1221/AppelleeBrief.pdf

(images will not be displayed. Download the original.)

Page 1

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Page 2

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Page 3
i TABLE OF CONTENTSI. Statement of Related Cases
.......................................................................
1 II. Jurisdictional
Statement.............................................................................
1 III.Statement of the
issue................................................................................
2 IV. Statement of the Case
................................................................................
2 V. Statement of the
Facts................................................................................
4 A. Corrections to Missstatements of Fact in Appellant’s Brief…………4 B.
Katzer’s Statement of Relevant Background Facts………………….8 VI. Summary of
the Argument
......................................................................
11 VII.
Argument.................................................................................................
12 A. Standard of
Review............................................................................
12 B. The District Court applied the correct legal
standard........................ 13 C. Jacobsen failed to submit any
evidence of irreparable harm............. 17 D. Jacobsen failed to
provide any evidence of any future threat ........... 21 E. Jacobsen has
not shown that he will succeed on the merits of his copyright
claim.........................................................................
25 1. Plaintiff has failed to identify his copyrighted
work................. 25 2. Katzer owns the copyright to the only
Decoder Definition File in the Record
................................................... 26
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Page 4
ii F. Amicus’s request for a presumption of irreparable harm is directly
contrary to the Supreme Court’s holding in
Winter........................... 28 VIII.
Conclusion...............................................................................................
31
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Page 5
iii TABLE OF AUTHORITIESCases Page(s) American Trucking Associations,
Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9thCir.
2009).................................................. 14, 29 Apotex v.
Thompson, 347 F.3d 1335, 1342 (Fed. Cir.
2003)....................................................... 1 Atari,
Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc. 747 F.2d 1422, 1438-40 (Fed. Cir.
1984)................................................ 12 Bracco v.
Lackner, 462 F. Supp 436, 442 n.3 (N.D. Cal.
1978)............................................. 17 Buchanan v. United
States Postal Service, 508 F.2d 259, 267 n.24 (5thCir.
1975).................................................... 13 City of Los
Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983)
..........................................................................
22 Deltak, Inc. v. Advanced Systems, Inc., 767 F.2d 357 (7thCir. 1985)
...................................................................... 7
eBay v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006)
.................................................................. 28,
29 FDIC v. Faulkner, 991 F.2d 262, 265 (5thCir.
1993)............................................................ 19
Goldie’s Bookstore v. Superior Court, 739 F.2d 466, 472 (9thCir.
1984)............................................................ 22
GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1204-1205 (9thCir.
2000)................................................. 3
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Page 6
iv Hutchins v. Zoll Med. Corp., 492 F.3d 1377, 1383 (Fed. Cir.
2007)..................................................... 12 Jacobsen
v. Katzer (2008-1001), 535 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir.
2008)......................................................... 1, 3, 6
Louis Epstein Family Partnership v. Kmart Corp., 13 F.3d 762 (3rdCir.
1994)......................................................................
25 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555
(1992).................................................................................
17 Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997)
........................................................................
17 Midgett v. Tri-County Metro. Transp. Dist. of Oregon, 254 F.3d 846,
850-851 (9thCir.
2001)..................................................... 21 Miss
Universe, Inc. v. Flesher,605 F.2d 1130, 1133 & n.8 (9thCir.
1979).............................................. 13 Paramount Land
Co. v. Cal. Pistachio Comm’n, 491 F.3d 1003, 1012 (9thCir.
2007)........................................................ 21 Sampson
v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 90 (1974)
............................................................................
19 Simula, Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc., 175 F.3d 716, 725 (9thCir.
1999)............................................................ 21
Sports Form, Inc. v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 686 F.2d 750, 753 (9th
Cir. 1982)........................................................... 12
Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 188 F.3d 1115, 1119 (9thCir.
1999).................................................... 3, 28 U.S. v.
International Harvester Co., 387 F.Supp. 1338 (D.D.C.
1974)............................................................. 17
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Page 7
v United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)
........................................................................
13 Wildmon v. Berwick Universal Pictures, 983 F.2d 21, 24 (5thCir.
1992)................................................................ 31
Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, --- U.S.---; 129 S.Ct. 365,
374 (2008) .............................................. passim Wright
v. Rushen, 642 F.2d 1129, 1132 (9thCir
1981)......................................................... 12 Yakus
v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440 (1944)
........................................................................
17 Statutes17 U.S.C. §
504(b)...............................................................................................
7 28 U.S.C. §§ 1292(c)(1) and
1295.......................................................................
1 28 U.S.C. §
1338..................................................................................................
1 28 U.S.C. §
1631..................................................................................................
2 Rules and Regulations37 C.F.R. §
1.321(a).............................................................................................
2 Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(1)........................................................................................
1 Other AuthorityNimmer, Nimmer on Copyright, § 14.02
(2007)............................................................................................
7
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Page 8
1 I. Statement of Related Cases This case is the second appeal to this
Court of a denial of Plaintiff-Appellant Robert Jacobsen’s (“Jacobsen”)
motion for a preliminary injunction for alleged copyright infringement
by the district court. The first appeal was resolved by this Court in
Jacobsen v. Katzer (2008-1001), 535 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008) on August
13, 2008 before the panel of judges Michel, Prost, and Hochberg. II.
Jurisdictional Statement Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1292(c)(1) and 1295, this
Court has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from interlocutory orders
of district courts refusing injunction requests as long as the District
Court’s jurisdiction was based in whole or in part upon 28 U.S.C. §
1338. See Apotex v. Thompson, 347 F.3d 1335, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2003),
Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F3d. at 1377. In addition to denying Jacobsen’s
motion for a preliminary injunction, the Order being appealed in this
case, inter alia, granted Matthew A. Katzer and Kamind Associates,
Inc.’s (hereinafter collectively “Katzer”) motion to dismiss allof
Jacobsen’s claims for declaratory relief on the Katzer patent-in-suit,
the ‘329 patent, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Order Granting Motion to Dismiss for Mootness; Denying
in Part and Granting in Part Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a
Claim; Denying Motion to Strike; and Denying Motion for Preliminary
Injunction (hereinafter “District Court’s Order”)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Page 9
2 at A3-A6. The District Court found that the statutory Disclaimer of
Patent under 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(a) filed by KAM with the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office on February 1, 2008, disclaiming all claims in the ‘329
patent (Disclaimer), divested the district court of jurisdiction over
all of the patent claims in the case. District Court’s Order at A3,
A5-A6. Katzer filed a motion to transfer this case to the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631 on March 10,
2009. This motion was denied by this Court in an Order dated April 20,
2009. III. Statement of the issue• Did the District Court err in finding
that Jacobsen failed to put forward any evidence of irreparable harm in
support of his motion for a preliminary injunction for copyright
infringement? IV. Statement of the Case In October 2006,
Plaintiff-Appellant Robert Jacobsen (Jacobsen) moved for a preliminary
injunction based on his claim for copyright infringement in the
underlying complaint. On August 17, 2007, the District Court denied
Jacobsen’s motion for a preliminary injunction. At that time, under
Ninth Circuit law, a plaintiff was entitled to a preliminary injunction
if she could demonstrate either: (1) a combination of probable success
on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury, or (2) the
existence of serious questions going to the merits,
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Page 10
3 where the balance of hardships tips sharply in plaintiff’s favor.
GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1204-1205 (9thCir.
2000). Also, at the time, under federal copyright law, a plaintiff who
demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of a copyright claim
was arguably entitled to a presumption of irreparable harm. Sun
Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 188 F.3d 1115, 1119 (9thCir.
1999). The District Court held that Jacobsen had waived his right to sue
in copyright by granting a nonexclusive license to the copyrighted
materials and that Jacobsen’s claim sounded only in contract and not in
copyright. A1420. On August 13, 2008, this Court vacated the District
Court’s decision. This Court disagreed with the District Court’s
conclusion that Jacobsen’s claim sounded only in contract and not in
copyright and remanded the case to the District Court “to enable the
District Court to determine whether Jacobsen has demonstrated (1) a
likelihood of success on the merits and either a presumption of
irreparable harm or a demonstration of irreparable harm; or (2) a fair
chance of success on the merits and a clear disparity in the relative
hardships and tipping in his favor” for purposes of determining whether
a preliminary injunction should issue. A1596-A1597; Jacobsen v. Katzer,
535 F.3d at 1382. On January 5, 2009, the District Court, again, after
another round of briefing and evidentiary submissions, denied Jacobsen’s
motion for a preliminary
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Page 11
4 injunction finding that Jacobsen has failed to put forward any
evidence of harm, irreparable or otherwise. District Court’s Order at
A14 (emphasis in original). The District Court also concluded that the
law governing preliminary injunctions had changed due to the passage of
time since Jacobsen filed his first motion for a preliminary injunction.
The District Court concluded that a plaintiff is no longer entitled to a
presumption of irreparable harm upon a showing of likelihood of success
on the merits. Rather, a plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must
now establish that she is likely to succeed on the merits, that she is
likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief,
that the balance of equities tips in her favor, and that an injunction
is in the public interest. Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
--- U.S.---; 129 S.Ct. 365, 374 (2008). Jacobsen does not contest this
conclusion of law regarding the new legal standard for preliminary
injunctions established by the Supreme Court in Winter. Rather, Jacobsen
contests the District Court’s application of this legal standard to his
motion. V. Statement of the Facts A. Corrections to Misstatements of
Fact in Appellant’s briefJacobsen’s “Statement of the Facts” contains
numerous misrepresentations worthy of clarification at the outset.
Jacobsen’s assertion that the parties agree on a number of facts
regarding Jacobsen’s copyright claim is inaccurate. Brief of
Plaintiff-Appellant Robert Jacobsen (Appellant’s Brief) at 12.
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Page 12
5 First, Jacobsen states, without support, that Katzer has “never
contested” Jacobsen’s copyright registrations. Appellant’s Brief at 13,
35. This is not true. So far, Katzer has only had the opportunity to
contest these registrations at the pleading stage, which he has done by
denying, based on lack of knowledge or information, that Jacobsen is the
owner, assignee, and registrant of copyrighted works. See e.g. A1698
(Answer to Complaint, page 13, ¶88). Second, Jacobsen states that “the
record reflects no disagreement” that the manufacturer data in the JMRI
software is “selected, arranged, and supplemented” by JMRI programmers.
Appellant’s Brief at 15. This statement addresses the copyrightability
of Jacobsen’s work, which Katzer has contested in his answer to the
complaint. See e.g. AR1697 at ¶ 80. Third, Jacobsen states that he
“submitted evidence showing that Katzer’s program incorporated original
JMRI expression from each of approximately 100 Decoder Definition
Files…”. Appellant’s Brief at 15. This is incorrect. As discussed in
detail, infra, the record contains only one Decoder Definition File (to
which Katzer owns the copyright). Fourth, Jacobsen states that “Katzer
has conceded that Jacobsen was the owner and/or assignee of JMRI
materials, as claimed by Jacobsen’s copyright registrations.”
Appellant’s Brief at 33 (citing to Jacobsen’s Complaint as authority for
this proposition). Katzer has not conceded that Jacobsen is the owner of
any
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Page 13
6 JMRI materials because these materials have never been identified by
Jacobsen. Jacobsen appears confused about a statement in KAM’s Appellee
Brief in the firstappeal to this Court where Katzer states that he
“concedes, for purposes of this appeal, that Jacobsen is the owner or
assignee of the copyright...” in order to framethe narrow legal issue on
appeal regarding whether Jacobsen’s license contained covenants or
conditions. Appellee’s Brief in Jacobsen v. Katzer (2008-1001) at 11
(emphasis added). For purposes of this second appeal, Katzer does not
concede that Jacobsen is the owner of any copyrighted material. This is
clear from the briefing at the District Court on Jacobsen’s second
motion for a preliminary injunction and was a primary issue before the
District Court. As discussed in detail in Katzer’s briefing at the
District Court, Jacobsen has never identified the work to which he
claims a copyright. Fifth, Jacobsen states repeatedly that Katzer
concedes or “admits that damages are inadequate.” See Appellant’s Brief
at 24-25, 29. Katzer does not admit that copyright damages are
inadequate. The cited authority for this proposition is the undersigned
discussions with Judge Hochberg at oral argument in the first appeal
relating to damages associated with a claim for breach of contract.
Appellant’s Brief at 24-25. Ignoring the evidentiary problems associated
with citing a transcript of an oral argument discussion by counsel and
this Court based on hypothetical questions and qualified statements, the
conduct at issue in
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Page 14
7 this appeal (allegedly copyright infringement) is different than the
conduct at issue in the above-cited discussion at oral argument on the
first appeal (breach of license term requiring attribution). Therefore,
any damages associated with each “breach” are significantly
different.1Additionally, the measure of damages for a breach of contract
claim is significantly different than and irrelevant to the measure of
actual damages allowed for copyright infringement under the Copyright
Act. Most notably, the Copyright Act allows recovery of lost profits due
to the infringement to the plaintiff as well as allowing recovery of any
profits of the infringer attributable to the infringement. 17 U.S.C. §
504(b). See Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright, § 14.02 (2007). Additionally, a
plaintiff can arguably seek the “value of the use” to the infringer
should there be no out-of-pocket losses to the plaintiff and no profits
to the defendant. See Deltak, Inc. v. Advanced Systems, Inc., 767 F.2d
357 (7thCir. 1985). None of these measures of recovery are strictly
applicable in a breach of contract action which allows a damage recovery
to restore the plaintiff to the position she would have been in had the
defendant performed the contract. Lastly, Jacobsen continually states
that Katzer misappropriated “JMRI code.” See e.g. Appellant’s Brief at
26-28. It is worthwhile to note that while the 1Indeed the entire point
of Judge Hochberg’s line of questioning addressed the fairness of
Jacobsen’s position of being forced to pursue only a breach of contract
remedy without the availability of copyright damages.
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Page 15
8 data contained in the Decoder Definition Files allegedly infringed by
Katzer in and the QSI manual allegedly infringed by Jacobsen is on a
very broad level “code,” it is not “source code” as that term is used in
computer science because the information allegedly taken by both parties
is just raw data and not code compiled in a human-readable computer
programming language (i.e. JAVA) that can be usedto execute a program.
Katzer’s software is written in a different computer programming
language than Jacobsen’s. A799, ¶ 5. B. Katzer’s Statement of Relevant
Background FactsJacobsen is appealing the denial of a motion for a
preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin Katzer from copying and
distributing Jacobsen’s copyrighted works entitled “JMRI Program and
Decoder Definitions or JMRI Decoder Definitions.” A776 (Proposed Order
for Preliminary Injunction). These Decoder Definition Files contain data
from decoder manufacturers to help the software user program a decoder.
A442-A443. Additionally, Jacobsen seeks to enjoin Katzer from, inter
alia, providing and distributing “copyright management information that
is false.” A776. Jacobsen claims to have copyrighted somewhere between
100 and 195 Decoder Definition Files. A443; Appellant’s Brief at 15.
Only one of these Decoder Definition Files is contained in the record.
This is the QSI Decoder located at Exhibit AD to A441. Jacobsen’s
declaration at the District Court
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Page 16
9 provides specific examples of textual information that was allegedly
authored by JMRI in this QSI Decoder Definition File, and then allegedly
stolen and copied by Katzer. A454-A457, A458, and A464 at ¶¶ 71-73, 80,
109. Jacobsen, however, has no copyright rights to this textual
information contained in this particular QSI Decoder Definition File
which he accuses Katzer of infringing. A807-808, ¶¶ 48-52. Rather, this
information was originally created by QS Industries, Inc. and then
published by QS Industries, Inc. in a work entitled “NMRA DCC Reference
Manual for QSI Quantum HO Equipped Locomotives – Version 3.0” (QSI
Manual) before it was copied by Jacobsen. A807-808, ¶¶ 48, 51. Katzer
owns all the copyright rights to the QSI manual work. A807, ¶ 48.
Jacobsen submitted two lengthy declarations in support of his motion for
a preliminary injunction (A441-A763 and A1103-A1130). However neither of
these declarations discusses, at all, the harm that Jacobsen has
suffered from Katzer’s alleged conduct or the harm that Jacobsen will
likely suffer should an injunction not issue. In 2006, to address
Jacobsen’s concerns regarding the alleged copyright infringement, Katzer
recalled his previous software and released Decoder Commander, version
307. A801-A802 at ¶¶14-18. Decoder Commander V307 contains only
manufacturer’s specifications data manually entered by Katzer and does
not contain any manufacturer’s specifications data copied from any JMRI
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Page 17
10 Decoder Definition Files. A802-A803, ¶ 18. KAM has ensured the
inability to allegedly infringe JMRI works because Decoder Commander
V307 cannot read or write any decoder definition data files from JMRI or
anyone else. A802-A803, ¶ 18. This is because Decoder Commander V307
uses a separate and new database of manufacturer’s specifications data.
A802, ¶ 18. None of the JMRI Decoder Definition Files were used in any
way to construct this database. A802-A803, ¶ 18. The record reflects
that Decoder Commander does not now include support for the old decoder
definition file based technology and will never revert to the old
decoder definition file based technology. A803, ¶ 20. Katzer also
testified that all software released prior to November 2006 (V306 and
earlier) is incompatible with any KAM software released after that date
and all previous copies of Decoder Commander have been recalled or
destroyed. A803, ¶ 21. Additionally, all registered customers and
dealers have been sent new updated replacement copies of Decoder
Commander. A803, ¶ 21. In response, Jacobsen submitted a declaration
opining that Katzer is still infringing because there is “[n]o technical
reason” preventing Katzer from infringing. A1107. Based on the above,
the District Court concluded that Jacobsen failed to offer any evidence
of any harm suffered from the alleged infringement, that Jacobsen failed
to demonstrate that there is any continuing or ongoing conduct that
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Page 18
11 indicates that future harm is imminent, that Jacobsen failed to
identify with the requisite particularity the extent of his copyright
ownership over the disputed underlying material, and that the JMRI
Project Decoder Definition Files incorporate many manufacturers’
specifications data as well as specific terms whose copyright is owned
by Katzer. District Court’s Order at A14. VI. Summary of the Argument
The District Court correctly applied the legal standard for a
preliminaryinjunction, stating the correct standard four times in its
Order. Jacobsen’s argument that the District Court applied an incorrect
legal standard is based on a mis-reading of the Order. Regardless, under
any legal standard, Jacobsen cannot prevail on his preliminary
injunction motion. The District Court found that the record contains no
evidence of past irreparable harm suffered by Jacobsen and the record
contains no evidence of any future threat. This finding is sound.
Jacobsen failed to submit any evidence of harm at the District Court
level (despite submitting two lengthy declarations in support of his
motion). Even more telling, Jacobsen’s Appellant’s Brief does not
contain any cites to the record which discuss harm. Additionally,
Jacobsen has failed to show that he will succeed on the merits of his
copyright infringement claim since the underlying data contained in the
only work allegedly copyrighted by Jacobsen in the record is owned by
Katzer.
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Page 19
12 Finally, Amicus’ request for a presumption of irreparable harm for
preliminary injunctions in the copyright context is directly contrary to
the Supreme Court’s recent holding in Winter and should be rejected.
VII. Argument A. Standard of Review Katzer agrees with Jacobsen that
this court looks to the interpretive law of the regional circuit, here
the Ninth Circuit in this copyright appeal. Hutchins v. Zoll Med. Corp.,
492 F.3d 1377, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing Atari, Inc. v. JS & A
Group, Inc. 747 F.2d 1422, 1438-40 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (for
issues not exclusively assigned to the Federal Circuit, to avoid
inconsistency and forumshopping we apply the law of the regional circuit
in which the case was tried). To expand on the standard of review in
Jacobsen’s brief, Katzer submits the following. An order granting or
denying the injunction will be reversed only if the district court
relied on an erroneous legal premise or abused its discretion. Wrightv.
Rushen, 642 F.2d 1129, 1132 (9thCir 1981). Unless the district court's
decision relies on erroneous legal premises, it will not be reversed
simply because the appellate court would have arrived at a different
result if it had applied the law to the facts of the case. Sports Form,
Inc. v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 686 F.2d 750, 753 (9th Cir. 1982).
Rather, a reviewing court is not empowered to substitute its
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Page 20
13 judgment for that of the district court and can reverse only if the
district court abused its discretion. Miss Universe, Inc. v. Flesher,
605 F.2d 1130, 1133 & n.8 (9thCir. 1979). A district court’s order
denying a preliminary injunction is only reversible for factual error
when the district court rests its conclusions on clearly erroneous
findings of fact. Id. (citing Buchanan v. United States Postal Service,
508 F.2d 259, 267 n.24 (5thCir. 1975)). A finding of fact is clearly
erroneous when "the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed."
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). B.
The District Court applied the correct legal standard Jacobsen’s primary
argument is that the District Court applied the wrong legal standard for
irreparable harm by requiring a showing of “actual harm instead of
likelihood of harm.” Appellant’s Brief at 21. Setting aside the fact
that Jacobsen has failed to introduce any evidence of harm that would
satisfy any legal standard, the record clearly reflects that the
District Court applied the correct legal standard per Winter. As
Jacobsen acknowledges, Winter requires that: A plaintiff seeking a
preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on
the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence
of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor,
and that an injunction is in the public interest.
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Page 21
14 Winter, 129 S.Ct. at 374 (emphasis added); Appellant’s Brief at 20.
The Supreme Court has spoken in clear terms and has rejected the Ninth
Circuit’s former standard, holding that a “possibility” of irreparable
harm is “too lenient” and an “incorrect legal standard.” Winter, 129
S.Ct. at 375-76 (“Issuing a preliminary injunction based only on a
possibility of irreparable injury is inconsistent with our
characterization of injunctive relief as an extraordinary remedy that
may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled
to such relief.”). The Ninth Circuit has adopted and acknowledged the
new Winter standard for preliminary injunctions holding that “[t]o the
extent our cases have suggested a lesser standard, they are no longer
controlling, or even viable.” American Trucking Associations, Inc. v.
City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9thCir. 2009). Jacobsen does
not contest the District Court’s conclusion that Winterapplies to
preliminary injunctions in the copyright context, rather Jacobsen
believes that the District Court did not apply the Winter standard in
this case. The District Court correctly applied the Winter standard
regarding the showing required for irreparable harm. In its opinion, the
District Court accurately stated the Winter standard on four occasions.
On page 12 of the District Court’s order, the District Court sets out
the four-prong standard recited above verbatimfrom the Supreme Court’s
opinion. A12. In regard to irreparable harm, on the same page, the
District Court sets out the correct standard stating that a plaintiff
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Page 22
15 “must demonstrate that irreparable injury is ‘likely in the absence
of an injunction.’” (emphasis in original). A12. On page 13, the
District Court again recites the correct standard stating that “[i]n
order to grant Jacobsen a preliminary injunction, the Court must find,
based on the entire record that Jacobsen is likely to succeed on the
merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and
that an injunction is in the public interest.” A13. On page 14, the
District Court again cites the correct standard stating that the Federal
Circuit did not find that “there was a likelihood of irreparable harm
that tipped the balance of equities in Jacobsen’s favor.” A14. After
reciting the correct legal standard four times, the District Court
concluded that Jacobsen failed to proffer any evidence of any
harm-possible, potential, likely, actual or otherwise. A14. Jacobsen’s
contention that the Court “required a showing of actual harm instead of
likelihood of harm” (Appellant’s Brief at 21) is based on an inaccurate
reading of the District Court’s Order. The language that concerns
Jacobsen is on A14 of the District Court’s Order. In the Order, the
District Court states that “Jacobsen has failed to proffer any evidence
of any specific and actual harm suffered as a result of the alleged
copyright infringement and he has failed to
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Page 23
16 demonstrate that there is any continuing or ongoing conduct that
indicates future harm is imminent.” A14; Appellant’s Brief at 21
(emphasis in brief). Contrary to Jacobsen’s contention, the District
Court did not require Jacobsen to prove “specific and actual injury” for
purposes of obtaining a preliminary injunction. Appellant’s Brief at 22.
Rather, the Court states that Jacobsen has failed to proffer any
evidence of any specific or actual harm suffered as a result of Katzer’s
alleged past infringement2and has also failed to proffer any evidence of
any conduct indicating that future harm is imminent. Any evidence of
past harm would necessarily be “actual” and “specific” because there is
no such thing as “likely” past harm-it either happened or it did not.
This distinction between past and present/future harm made by the
District Court is made clear in footnote 3 to the opinion where the
District Court states: “Although Jacobsen makes legal arguments
regarding the alleged harm he may suffer, for instance delays and
inefficiency in development and time lost in the open source development
cycle, he has failed to put forward any evidence of such harms. Jacobsen
has failed to proffer evidence of harm suffered or any evidence of a
real or immediate threat of imminent harm in the future.” (italics
emphasis in original, underlined emphasis added). A14, n.3. Similarly,
Jacobsen takes issue with the District Court’s statement that “[t]here
is no showing on the record before this Court that Jacobsen has actually
suffered any of these potential harms,” i.e. the potential harms listed
in the 2The Record reflects that the allegedly infringing conduct began
in 2005 and was discovered by Jacobsen in 2006. See e.g. A88, ¶ 271;
A91, ¶ 310; ¶ 313.
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Page 24
17 original Federal Circuit decision. (Appellant’s Brief at 21)
(emphasis in brief). Again, the Court is referring to any past harm that
would have occurred from the allegedly infringing activities that began
in 2005. Simply put, the District Court applied the correct standard of
“likely irreparable harm” and correctly concluded that the record is
devoid of any scintilla of evidence that (1) any past harm occurred or
(2) future harm is imminent or likely. C. Jacobsen failed to submit any
evidence of irreparable harm A preliminary injunction is a drastic and
extraordinary remedy. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944). A
party moving for a preliminary injunction must present evidence that he
or she will be injured by the threatened conduct before a court issues
injunctive relief. See Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997);
U.S. v. International Harvester Co., 387 F.Supp. 1338 (D.D.C. 1974).
This factual evidence must be set forth in “affidavits,” “oral
testimony,” or “on depositions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 43 (c); see also Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Bracco v. Lackner, 462
F.Supp 436, 442 n.3 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (noting that submission of
affidavits in support or in opposition to a preliminary injunction is
customary and appropriate). In the Northern District of California, the
local rules require that factual contentions made in support of a motion
for a
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Page 25
18 preliminary injunction “must be supported by an affidavit or
declaration…”. Civ. Local Rule 7-5. In furtherance of his most recent
motion for a preliminary injunction, Jacobsen has submitted two
declarations, a 24-page declaration with hundreds of pages of
attachments in support of his motion [A441-A763] and a seven-page
supplemental declaration in reply to Katzer’s opposition with
attachments [A1103-A1130]. However, neither of these declarations
(including, remarkably, the reply declaration)3contains any evidence of
harm that Jacobsen will suffer without injunctive relief. Jacobsen has
failed twice in his moving papers and also, now, in his Appellant’s
Brief in this Court to cite to one-sentence in either declaration that
addresses harm. That is because the record is devoid of any evidence
addressing irreparable harm. A review of the “evidence” of harm cited in
Jacobsen’s Appellant’s brief reveals that none of the “evidence” is
contained in the factual record of this case, but rather consists of
legal arguments of theoretical harm. Additionally, most of the cited
“evidence” is non-responsive to the issue of irreparable harm. 3Katzer’s
memorandum in opposition to the motion discusses, in detail, Jacobsen’s
failure to submit evidence of irreparable harm with his moving papers.
See A788-789.
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Page 26
19 First, Jacobsen states that monetary damages are difficult to prove
citing to the oral argument and opinion in the first Federal Circuit
appeal, without citation to the factual record. Appellant’s Brief at 25.
As discussed supra, this discussion centered around the availability of
contract damages for the breach of the attribution term in the licensing
agreement, not copyright infringement. Even assuming for the sake of
argument that monetary damages are unavailable under copyright law, this
is relevant only to the “irreparable” nature of any harm, it does not
address whether any harm occurred or is likely to occur. Sampson v.
Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 90 (1974); see also FDIC v. Faulkner, 991 F.2d 262,
265 (5thCir. 1993) (a legal remedy indicates that a party’s injury is
not irreparable). Second, Jacobsen states that “copyright law’s right to
exclude” supports a finding of irreparable harm citing to case law,
without citation to the record. Appellant’s Brief at 25. The District
Court found that Jacobsen proffered no evidence that such harm had
occurred or is likely to occur and this finding is sound. Third,
Jacobsen states that “[c]ompetition by an infringer threatens shifts in
market share arising from one competitor’s misappropriation of another’s
intellectual property” citing to case law, without citation to the
record. Appellant’s Brief at 26. The District Court found that Jacobsen
proffered no evidence that such harm had occurred or is likely to occur
and this finding is sound.
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Page 27
20 Fourth, Jacobsen states that the alleged infringement “undercuts the
‘creative collaboration’ that this Court previously recognized” citing
to the prior opinion in this case and other cases, without citation to
the factual record. Appellant’s Brief at 26. The District Court found
that Jacobsen proffered no evidence that such harmhad occurred or is
likely to occur and this finding is sound. Fifth, Jacobsen states that
the alleged infringement “denied JMRI programmers credit for the work
they did” citing to law review articles, this Court’s prior opinion and
case law, without citation to the record. Appellant’s Brief at 27. The
District Court found that Jacobsen proffered no evidence that such harm
had occurred or is likely to occur and this finding is sound. Sixth,
Jacobsen states that the alleged infringement “harmed the goodwill
associated with JMRI” citing to an email in the record wherein Katzer
allegedly “touted his software” to a yahoo newsgroup. A452; Appellant’s
Brief at 28. This email is neither responsive nor relevant evidence to
the issue of Jacobsen’s alleged harm, therefore, the District Court’s
finding that Jacobsen proffered no evidence that such harm had occurred
or is likely to occur is sound. Jacobsen summarizes this “evidence” by
stating that the District Court had: “uncontradicted evidence that (a)
Katzer admitted damages were inadequate, (b) Katzer, a competitor,
knowingly copied, modified and distributed JMRI code in violation of
license terms, (c) Katzer did not give proper attribution, (d) he
intentionally concealed his copying, and then (e) in an attempt to grab
a larger share of the market, he went into the market bragging that his
product was better than the code on which, it was, secretly based.”
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Page 28
21 Appellant’s Brief at 29. Even assuming that the record did contain
evidence of the above, which it does not, none of the statements above
address the issue of Jacobsen’s harm. Subsection (a) relates to the
irreparableness of any harm as discussed supra. Subsections (b)-(d) are
merits issues addressing whether Katzer committed copyright
infringement. Subsection (e) is irrelevant to both the merits and the
harm inquiry. Based on the above, this Court should affirm the District
Court’s finding that Jacobsen has failed to present any evidence of harm
as this finding is sound and not clearly erroneous. D. Jacobsen failed
to provide any evidence of any future threat The District Court’s
finding that Jacobsen “failed to demonstrate that there is any
continuing or ongoing conduct that indicates that future harm is
imminent” (A14) is also sound. Jacobsen’s declaration provides only mere
speculation that a future threat is imminent. Additionally, Katzer
submitted evidence that future infringement is impossible and has been
for quite some time. The Ninth Circuit, like other circuits, rejects
claims of irreparable harm that are merely speculative, remote, or
tenuous. See Winter, 129 S.Ct. at 374, Paramount Land Co. v. Cal.
Pistachio Comm’n, 491 F.3d 1003, 1012 (9thCir. 2007); Simula, Inc. v.
Autoliv, Inc. 175 F.3d 716, 725 (9thCir. 1999); Midgett v. Tri-County
Metro. Transp. Dist. of Oregon, 254 F.3d 846, 850-851 (9thCir. 2001);
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Page 29
22 Goldie’s Bookstore v. Superior Court, 739 F.2d 466, 472 (9thCir.
1984) (holding that speculative injury does not constitute irreparable
harm). Additionally, past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself
show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief. City of
Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983).Jacobsen has failed to
allege that there is a real and immediate threat that the alleged
copyright infringement will continue. Jacobsen provides two record cites
for his evidence of future, threatened harm: A464 and A1107 (both
Jacobsen declarations). Appellant’s Brief at 30. A464, contains pure
speculation that Katzer is infringing. At A464 ¶ 110, Jacobsen states
that he “believe[s] that Defendants have motive to continue using JMRI
software as a basis for their product” since Model Railroad News is
reviewing Katzer’s software. Jacobsen then opines that KAM’s new Decoder
Commander must use “infringing files” because it is “essentially
unusable without additional decoder definitions.” A464, ¶ 110. Finally,
Jacobsen speculates that “Katzer is ridding himself of infringing CDs at
a low price so that he can obtain tax breaks for a business loss” based
on his belief that KAM CDs are distributed through a veterinary website.
A464, ¶ 110. Previously, in the same declaration, Jacobsen states that
he is unsure whether Katzer’s new database is infringing because he
could not get the latest version of Decoder Commander to work (through
no fault of Katzer, see A805, ¶ 25). A462, ¶ 97.
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Page 30
23 Katzer responded by providing clear evidence that future infringement
of the Decoder Definition Files is impossible. First, Katzer points out
that Jacobsen’s declaration uses version 304 of Decoder Commander as
evidence of alleged infringement. A454-455, ¶¶ 70-72. Version 304 became
fully non-functional on October 10, 2006. A802, ¶ 17. Katzer’s more
recent versions of Decoder Commander contains no allegedly infringing
data files as the software now uses a new database technology (based
upon an SQL database) and does not use template files from JMRI or
anyone else. A802-A803, ¶¶18-21. This database is not encrypted and
includes textual information which is readily viewable by anyone with
appropriate software tools. A803, ¶ 20; Exhibit A to A798. The supported
decoder definitions in this database are only those for which KAM has
permission to use from the copyright owner. A804, ¶ 28. KAM’s new
Decoder Commander is fully functional with the included decoder
definitions for those decoders that it supports. A803, ¶ 22. At this
time, the most recent version of Defendants’ Decoder Commander available
(and mailed as a replacement to all registered customers and dealers)
does not contain any of the decoder definition file data (i.e.
manufacturer specification data) to which Jacobsen alleges he owns
copyright rights. A802-A803, ¶¶18-20. This version does not read, write
or run previous versions of Decoder Commander, including KAM’s previous
decoder template files containing
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Page 31
24 the manufacturer specifications data. A802, ¶18. KAM’s template
verifier tool, the tool that plaintiff alleges allows others to make
unauthorized copies of plaintiff’s copyrighted work (A457, ¶ 74) is not
contained in and does not function with the most recent versions of
Decoder Commander. A803, ¶ 24. Additionally, this tool is not available
on the KAM website and has not been available since September 18, 2006.
A802, ¶ 16. Decoder Commander now uses an entirely new database for its
decoder template files. A802, ¶ 18. There is absolutely no possibility
that Defendants could or will use Plaintiff’s alleged copyrighted
materials in the future, especially since such JMRI Decoder Definition
Files, and all other decoder definition files, are completely
non-compatible with all versions of Decoder Commander since November
2006. A802-A803, ¶¶ 18-21. Jacobsen’s supplemental reply declaration
cite to A1107 in response to Katzer’s evidence is similarly lacking and
contains only pure speculation that Katzer’s product infringes. A1107
(there is “[n]o technical reason prevents Katzer from copying JMRI
content into his new storage method.”) The remainder of Jacobsen’s
statements in his brief addressing the threat of future harm are
unsupported by any citation to the record and are irrelevant to the
issue of future harm in the preliminary injunction context. Appellant’s
Brief at 31-32. Jacobsen statements regarding Katzer’s alleged “course
of conduct” and his “pattern of misappropriation and obfuscation” are
unrelated to the copyright
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Page 32
25 infringement issue and relate to whether Jacobsen is in reasonable
apprehension of suit over Katzer’s ‘329 patent, the patent that Jacobsen
filed a declaratory action on, but has since been dismissed from this
case by the District Court. See A3-A6. E. Jacobsen has not shown that he
will succeed on the merits of his copyright claim 1. Plaintiff has
failed to identify his copyrighted work This Court will search the
record in vain for the material to which Jacobsen is claiming copyright
ownership. A sin qua non to a preliminary injunction is the
identification of the work that is the subject of the injunction. See
Louis Epstein Family Partnership v. Kmart Corp., 13 F.3d 762 (3rdCir.
1994). The record contains numerous copyright registrations for “JMRI
Program and Decoder Definitions” and “JMRI Decoder Definitions.” See Ex.
C-I of A47. Jacobsen’s proposed injunction seeks to enjoin Defendants
from using “Plaintiff Robert Jacobsen’s copyrighted works entitled JMRI
Program and Decoder Definitions.” A776. However, Jacobsen failed to
submit the actual works described by the phrase “JMRI Program and
Decoder Definitions” into the record. The only Decoder Definition File
contained in the record is the QSI Decoder Definition File, where the
underlying data is owned by Katzer.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Page 33
26 2. Katzer owns the copyright to the only Decoder Definition File in
the Record The record reflects that the JMRI Decoder Definition Files
are not foundational works and they incorporate many manufacturer’s
specifications data initially created by multiple manufacturers as well
as specifications data created by the National Model Railroad
Association. A801, ¶ 12. For example, Jacobsen uses the “JMRI Decoder
Definition File, QSI_Electric.tpl.xml” to highlight instances of
Defendants alleged copyright infringement of “variable structure,
selection, naming and default variable values.” A454, ¶ 71. A441 at
Exhibit AD contains the JMRI Decoder Definition File and A441 at Exhibit
AE contains KAM’s comparable work from the Version 304 of Decoder
Commander (which became non-functional on October 10, 2006, A802, ¶ 17).
Jacobsen’s declaration discusses various instances of Katzer’s alleged
infringement of this JMRI Decoder Definition File by comparing similar
lines of text in Exhibits AD and AE and conclude that KAM had copied
numerous fields of text from the “author of the JMRI file.” A454-455,
A458, and A464 (¶¶ 71-73, 80, 109). However, Jacobsen does not have any
rights to the QSI terms and associated values described in his
declaration. The variable structures, selection, naming and default
variable values contained in the JMRI Decoder Definition File are copied
directly from the NMRA DCC Reference Manual for QSI Quantum HO Equipped
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Page 34
27 Locomotives-Version 3.0 (QSI Manual). A807-A808, ¶ 51, A798 at
Exhibit E. This QSI Manual was originally created by QSI Industries,
Inc. and then published in February 2005 by QSI Industries, Inc.
A807-A808, ¶ 51. The JMRI Decoder Definition File containing this
information was subsequently published in June 2005. A807-808, ¶ 51.
Exhibits F through AO to A798 demonstrate that the textual information
used by Plaintiff as examples of alleged infringement of JMRI
intellectual property was copied by JMRI directly from the QSI Manual
into the JMRI Decoder Definition File. KAM is the owner, via assignment,
of all copyright rights in the QSI Manual. Katzer A807, ¶ 48, A798 at
Exhibit C. KAM registered its copyright rights with the United States
Copyright Office and obtained Copyright Registration Number TX
6-445-094, effective November 13, 2006. A807, ¶ 48. A copy of this
registration is attached as Exhibit D to A798. This QSI Manual copyright
protects expressions of code, structure, sequence, and organization for
programming QSI decoders. A807, ¶ 49. Based on this copyright, KAM has
the right to use all of the QSI material in its Decoder Commander
software. A808, ¶ 52. The record demonstrates that Jacobsen is not the
copyright owner of the QSI works, the works that Jacobsen chose as his
best example of Katzer’s alleged misconduct. The record shows that
Katzer has the right to use the works contained in the QSI Manual and
Jacobsen has no copyright rights in this material. Katzer is
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Page 35
28 counterclaiming against Jacobsen for copyright infringement of the
QSI manual (A1686), but at this time has not sought to enjoin Jacobsen’s
use of this material. F. Amicus’s request for a presumption of
irreparable harm is directly contrary to the Supreme Court’s holding in
WinterAmicus Curiae Software Freedom Law Center (Amicus) argue that a
copyright holder should be entitled to a presumption of irreparable harm
when seeking a preliminary injunction. While this presumption existed at
one time under federal copyright law, it was critically injured by the
Supreme Court in eBay v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) and
completely eviscerated in Winter in late 2008.4Prior to eBay, a
plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction under federal copyright law
who demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of a copyright
claim was entitled to a presumption of irreparable harm. Sun
Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 188 F.3d 1115, 1119 (9thCir.
1999). In 2006, however, the Supreme Court eradicated the presumption of
irreparable harm to motions for permanent injunctions in the patent
infringement context, holding that a Plaintiff seeking a permanent
injunction must demonstrate that the traditional 4It is worthwhile to
note that the open source license quoted in Amicus’s brief, the GNU
General Public License v2.0 is not the license at issue in this case.
SeeAmicus Brief at 4-5. The Artistic License 1.0 governed Jacobsen’s
Decoder Definition Files during the alleged infringing conduct as
discussed in detail in the opinion in the first appeal of this case
(A1579).
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Page 36
29 equitable factors for granting an injunction have been met. eBay
Inc., 547 U.S. at 391. As time went by, federal courts (including this
Court) applied the logic of eBay to motions for injunctive relief in
copyright and trademark cases and also applied the strictures of eBay to
preliminary injunctions. Katzer’s brief in opposition to Jacobsen’s
preliminary injunction motion canvasses this case law. See AR 782-783.
If any doubt existed by late 2008, it was completely eviscerated by
Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S.Ct. 365, 374 (2008)
where the Supreme Court confirmed that a plaintiff seeking a preliminary
injunction “must establish that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm
in the absence of preliminary relief.” Winter at 374. The Ninth Circuit
has acknowledged the Supreme Court’s recent expatiation of the proper
standard for preliminary injunctive relief stating that the former
standard used by the Ninth Circuit was “much too lenient” and that “[t]o
the extent our cases have suggested a lesser standard, they are no
longer controlling or even viable.” American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v.
City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9thCir. 2009). The District
Court correctly summarized the change in the legal standard in its
Order:55Jacobsen does not take issue with the legal conclusion that the
presumption of irreparable harm no longer exists for preliminary
injunctive relief for copyright claims.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Page 37
30 Initially, when this matter was before the Court on a motion for
preliminary injunction, federal copyright law provided that a plaintiff
who demonstrates a likelihood of success on the merits of a copyright
claims was automatically entitled to a presumption of irreparable
harm…However, because of the passage of time, the governing law has
changed. Now, a plaintiff is not granted the presumption of irreparable
harm upon a showing of likelihood of success on the merits. Instead, a
plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that…he is
likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary
relief…(citing Winter). A11-A12. Amicus’s brief, however, requests that
this Court ignore controlling Supreme Court law and apply a presumption
of irreparable harm for all preliminary injunction motions brought by
open source license holders. Amicusstate that two harms must certainly,
always, occur the instant an open source license is violated: (1) the
developer is deprived of the rights reserved in the license, and (2) the
developer’s relationship with other licensees who never become aware of
their rights is severed.6Amicus Brief at 13. These harms are
“inevitable” and “certain” and developers “always suffer” these harms
when an open source license is violated. Id. Amicus are requesting that
this Court presume that Katzer caused Jacobsen irreparable harm based
solely on allegations that infringement occurred and without the
proffering of any evidence that any harm will likely occur. This is
contrary to controlling law. 6As discussed supra, there is no evidence
in the record that Jacobsen suffered either of these potential harms.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Page 38
31 Amicus’s citation to authority is inapposite and unavailing. None of
the cases cited by Amicus address the preliminary injunction standard
post-Winter. Additionally, Amicus inaccurately cites Wildmon v. Berwick
Universal Pictures, 983 F.2d 21, 24 (5thCir. 1992) for the proposition
that copyright doctrine favors injunctive relief when the resulting harm
is noneconomic. Amicus Brief at 9. This case does not stand for this
proposition at all, and, in fact, never mentions the word “copyright.”
Regardless, Amicus’s unsupported statement regarding the favorability of
injunctive relief is certainly not the state of the law post-Winter.
Amicus’s request to apply a presumption of irreparable harm to Jacobsen
is contrary to the law and should be rejected. VIII. Conclusion For the
foregoing reasons, Katzer respectfully requests that this Court
affirmthe District Court’s denial of Jacobsen’s motion for preliminary
injunction. Dated: July 28, 2009 Respectfully submitted by:
________________________ R. Scott Jerger (OSB#02337) Field Jerger LLP621
SW Morrison Street, Suite 1225 Portland, Oregon 97205 Tel: (503)
228-9115 Fax: (503) 225-0276 Of Attorneys for Defendants- Appellees
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Page 39
1 2009-1221 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
ROBERT JACOBSEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. MATTHEW KATZER, and KAMIND
ASSOCIATES, INC. (doing business as KAM Industries),
Defendants-Appellees. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA IN CASE NUMBER C06-1905-JSW, JUDGE
JEFFREY S. WHITE PROOF OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on July 28, 2009
I filed the original and eleven copies of Defendants-Appellees’ Appellee
Brief on the Clerk of the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit at
the following address via hand delivery: Clerk of Court United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 717 Madison Place, NW
Washington, DC 20439
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Page 40
2 I further certify that on July 28, 2009, I served two true copies of
Defendants-Appellees’ Appellee brief following parties, through their
attorneys, at the following address via UPS Next Day Air: Victoria K.
Hall Law Office of Victoria K. Hall 3 Bethesda Metro Suite 700 Bethesda
MD 20814 David McGowan Warren Hall 5998 Alcala Park San Diego, CA 92110
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant Robert Jacobsen Daniel B. Ravicher,
Esq. Software Freedom Law Center 1995 Broadway, FL 17 New York, NY
10023-5882 Attorney for Amicus CuriaeDated: July 28, 2009.
_______________________________ R. Scott Jerger (OR State Bar #02337)
Field Jerger LLP 621 SW Morrison Street, Suite 1225 Portland, Oregon
97205 Tel: (503) 542-2015 Fax: (503) 225-0276 Email:
***@fieldjerger.comAttorneys for Defendants-Appellees
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Page 41

regards,
alexander.

--
http://gng.z505.com/index.htm
(GNG is a derecursive recursive derecursion which pwns GNU since it can
be infinitely looped as GNGNGNGNG...NGNGNG... and can be said backwards
too, whereas GNU cannot.)
Rjack
2009-01-10 17:12:52 UTC
Permalink
Post by Rahul Dhesi
Presumably you, like most of us, simply skip past the numerous case law
links that Rjack posts, having realized that they seldom help us
understand how free software licensing works. Once in a while, though,
he posts something useful that has a significant bearing on how and why
copyright law is actually designed for the same purpose as free software
licenses.
Rahul !!! BE CAREFUL!!

You are actually starting to think for yourself instead of blindly
consuming GNU Koolaid. This is considered to be heretical behavior
and is not easily suffered by Stallman's Free software worshipers.
Next thing you know you'll be calling a copyright license a contract:

The GPL is a License, Not a Contract, Which is Why the Sky Isn't Falling

http://www.groklaw.net/article.php?story=20031214210634851

Sincerely,
Rjack :)
Rahul Dhesi
2009-01-11 04:50:18 UTC
Permalink
I'm staying out of this license/contract debate, but since you are not,
how do you justify calling it a contract in the specific case that the
person downloading GPL software hasn't agreed to the license terms?
--
Rahul
http://rahul.rahul.net/
Rjack
2009-01-11 13:31:44 UTC
Permalink
Post by Rahul Dhesi
I'm staying out of this license/contract debate, but since you are not,
how do you justify calling it a contract in the specific case that the
person downloading GPL software hasn't agreed to the license terms?
=======================================================================

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

ARTICLE 50
Acceptance of Offer Defined; Acceptance by Performance; Acceptance
by Promise:
(1) Acceptance of an offer is a manifestation of assent to the terms
thereof made by the offeree in a manner invited or required by the
offer.
(2) Acceptance by performance requires that at least part of what
the offer requests be performed or tendered and includes acceptance
by a performance which operates as a return promise.
(3) Acceptance by a promise requires that the offeree complete every
act essential to the making of the promise.

========================================================================

"Downloading" constitutes "a manifestation of assent".

Sincerely,
Rjack
David Kastrup
2009-01-11 13:38:11 UTC
Permalink
Post by Rjack
Post by Rahul Dhesi
I'm staying out of this license/contract debate, but since you are
not, how do you justify calling it a contract in the specific case
that the person downloading GPL software hasn't agreed to the license
terms?
=======================================================================
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
ARTICLE 50
Acceptance of Offer Defined; Acceptance by Performance; Acceptance by
(1) Acceptance of an offer is a manifestation of assent to the terms
thereof made by the offeree in a manner invited or required by the
offer.
(2) Acceptance by performance requires that at least part of what the
offer requests be performed or tendered and includes acceptance by a
performance which operates as a return promise.
(3) Acceptance by a promise requires that the offeree complete every
act essential to the making of the promise.
========================================================================
"Downloading" constitutes "a manifestation of assent".
"in a manner invited or required by the offer". If you have to click "I
agree" or similar, this might be somewhat debatable. But most commonly
downloads of GPLed software don't require any such thing.

I have downloaded a _lot_ of software, checked its conditions, and then
removed the software again. Certainly not a manifestation of assent.
--
David Kastrup, Kriemhildstr. 15, 44793 Bochum
Rjack
2009-01-11 13:43:08 UTC
Permalink
Post by David Kastrup
Post by Rjack
Post by Rahul Dhesi
I'm staying out of this license/contract debate, but since you are
not, how do you justify calling it a contract in the specific case
that the person downloading GPL software hasn't agreed to the license
terms?
=======================================================================
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
ARTICLE 50
Acceptance of Offer Defined; Acceptance by Performance; Acceptance by
(1) Acceptance of an offer is a manifestation of assent to the terms
thereof made by the offeree in a manner invited or required by the
offer.
(2) Acceptance by performance requires that at least part of what the
offer requests be performed or tendered and includes acceptance by a
performance which operates as a return promise.
(3) Acceptance by a promise requires that the offeree complete every
act essential to the making of the promise.
========================================================================
"Downloading" constitutes "a manifestation of assent".
"in a manner invited or required by the offer". If you have to click "I
agree" or similar, this might be somewhat debatable. But most commonly
downloads of GPLed software don't require any such thing.
I have downloaded a _lot_ of software, checked its conditions, and then
removed the software again. Certainly not a manifestation of assent.
You mean to say "downloading" isn't "required" to download GPL
software? Hmmmm.....

Sincerely,
Rjack :)
Rahul Dhesi
2009-01-12 03:55:20 UTC
Permalink
Post by Rjack
Post by Rahul Dhesi
I'm staying out of this license/contract debate, but since you are not,
how do you justify calling it a contract in the specific case that the
person downloading GPL software hasn't agreed to the license terms?
...
Post by Rjack
"Downloading" constitutes "a manifestation of assent".
So if the downloader doesn't know about the license, or knows about it
but explicitly refuses to agree to it as he does the download, this is
still a manifestation of assent?

Merriam-Webster says assent means "to agree to something especially
after thoughtful consideration". Are you using the word with some other
meaning?
--
Rahul
http://rahul.rahul.net/
Rjack
2009-01-12 13:09:40 UTC
Permalink
Post by Rahul Dhesi
Post by Rjack
Post by Rahul Dhesi
I'm staying out of this license/contract debate, but since you are not,
how do you justify calling it a contract in the specific case that the
person downloading GPL software hasn't agreed to the license terms?
...
Post by Rjack
"Downloading" constitutes "a manifestation of assent".
So if the downloader doesn't know about the license, or knows about it
but explicitly refuses to agree to it as he does the download, this is
still a manifestation of assent?
Merriam-Webster says assent means "to agree to something especially
after thoughtful consideration". Are you using the word with some other
meaning?
If you raise the license as a defense in a copyright infringement
action then you "assented" (accepted). Many people get confused by
the term "acceptance". You can "accept" a license even though the
license is later ruled unenforcible. If a term in a contract is
ruled "illegal" then by definition a court will refuse to enforce
the term regardless of the balance of equities. Generally a
copyright license is construed against the drafter, especially
contracts of adhesion (like open source licenses). One form of
relief from an illegal license is an action for promissory estoppel.

Sincerely,
Rjack :)
Rahul Dhesi
2009-01-12 23:26:59 UTC
Permalink
Post by Rjack
Post by Rahul Dhesi
Post by Rjack
"Downloading" constitutes "a manifestation of assent".
So if the downloader doesn't know about the license, or knows about it
but explicitly refuses to agree to it as he does the download, this is
still a manifestation of assent?
Merriam-Webster says assent means "to agree to something especially
after thoughtful consideration". Are you using the word with some other
meaning?
If you raise the license as a defense in a copyright infringement
action then you "assented" (accepted)...
Ignoring for now the fact that you never stated whether or not you used
the word "assent" with any mesaning other than the one provided by
Merriam-Webster:

I find your reasoning fascinating. If the downloader doesn't know about
the license or doesn't agree to it, then it seems that at the time of
the download, at least, there is no assent and contract.

But later, if the downloader is sued and raises the license as a
defense, then we go back in time, and decide that at the time of the
download he did "assent" and that a contract had actually formed?
--
Rahul
http://rahul.rahul.net/
Rjack
2009-01-13 00:37:04 UTC
Permalink
Post by Rahul Dhesi
I find your reasoning fascinating. If the downloader doesn't know about
the license or doesn't agree to it, then it seems that at the time of
the download, at least, there is no assent and contract.
If a downloader don't know about the license or doesn't agree to the
license terms then DON'T DOWNLOAD THE DAMN MATERIAL. OK?

What's so hard about that?

Sincerely,
Rjack :)
David Kastrup
2009-01-15 13:31:33 UTC
Permalink
Post by Rjack
Post by Rahul Dhesi
I find your reasoning fascinating. If the downloader doesn't know about
the license or doesn't agree to it, then it seems that at the time of
the download, at least, there is no assent and contract.
If a downloader don't know about the license or doesn't agree to the
license terms then DON'T DOWNLOAD THE DAMN MATERIAL. OK?
What's so hard about that?
Congrats, you have just now abolished shrink-wrap licensing. No more
sales of computers with Windows on them.
--
David Kastrup
Rjack
2009-01-15 17:24:08 UTC
Permalink
Post by David Kastrup
Post by Rjack
Post by Rahul Dhesi
I find your reasoning fascinating. If the downloader doesn't know about
the license or doesn't agree to it, then it seems that at the time of
the download, at least, there is no assent and contract.
If a downloader don't know about the license or doesn't agree to the
license terms then DON'T DOWNLOAD THE DAMN MATERIAL. OK?
What's so hard about that?
Congrats, you have just now abolished shrink-wrap licensing. No more
sales of computers with Windows on them.
Hmmmmm........

Sincerely,
Rjack
Alexander Terekhov
2008-06-27 22:51:12 UTC
Permalink
Post by amicus_curious
Post by Alexander Terekhov
http://jmri.net/k/docket/cafc-pi-1/39.pdf
(JMRI's post-argument "citation of supplemental authority")
http://jmri.net/k/docket/cafc-pi-1/40.pdf
(Amici's "response")
http://jmri.net/k/docket/cafc-pi-1/41.pdf
(Katzer's response)
I'm shocked by Amici's citation of Nimmer on Copyright talking about
"appropriate contractual provisions" and "appropriate contract
construction"... What!? I thought that licenses are not contracts in
"free as in free speech" world.
There is a recording of the oral arguments (or lack thereof) at
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oralarguments/mp3/2008-1001.mp3
It seems to me that an appropriate punishment for presenting such nonsense
from both sides should be that both attorneys are barred from ever
litigating in court again. Clearly neither knew how to present a case.
The amicus brief file by Moglen and his minions framed the issue pretty
"The District Court's decision that the asserted violations of the Artistic
License at issue in this case sound in contract, not copyright, was
erroneous. If the
decision were applied broadly, it could disrupt the settled expectations of
literally
millions of copyright holders who have depended upon the copyright system to
secure the right to enforce public licenses....
Yeah, yeah. "Literally millions of copyright holders"... except MySQL

http://www.groklaw.net/pdf/MySQLcounterclaim.pdf
("COUNT VIII Breach of Contract (GPL License)"

COUNT VIII
Breach of Contract (GPL License)
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

(subsequent motion for preliminary injunction was denied
<http://pacer.mad.uscourts.gov/dc/opinions/saris/pdf/progress%20software.pdf>)

and IBM (literally mentioned in Amici's "response" brief)

http://www.groklaw.net/article.php?story=20061123091221786
(The GPL, Stage Front and Center - IBM Answers SCO's Attack)

"SCO's GPL violations entitle IBM to at least nominal damages on the
Sixth Counterclaim for breach of the GPL. See Bair v. Axiom Design LLC
20 P.3d 388, 392 (Utah 2001) (explaining that it is "well settled"
that nominal damages are recoverable upon breach of contract); Kronos,
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Inc. v. AVX Corp., 612 N.E.2d 289, 292 (N.Y. 1993) ("Nominal damages
are always available in breach of contract action".). "
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

See the phrase "breach of contract"?

LOL.

regards,
alexander.

--
http://gng.z505.com/index.htm
(GNG is a derecursive recursive derecursion which pwns GNU since it can
be infinitely looped as GNGNGNGNG...NGNGNG... and can be said backwards
too, whereas GNU cannot.)
Hyman Rosen
2008-07-02 20:41:39 UTC
Permalink
Post by Alexander Terekhov
I'm shocked by Amici's citation of Nimmer on Copyright talking about
"appropriate contractual provisions" and "appropriate contract
construction"... What!? I thought that licenses are not contracts in
"free as in free speech" world.
Perhaps you would be less shocked if you quoted in context?
After the quote from Nimmer about contractual conditions,
the brief states

"Nimmer ... support the proposition that a copyright
licensor may recover in copyright for violations of
a license condition ..."

That is, the argument states that since it is fine for a
contract to require attribution, it makes sense for a license
that requires it to be enforceable as well. It does not argue
that the license is a contract.
Alexander Terekhov
2008-07-02 21:02:41 UTC
Permalink
Post by Hyman Rosen
Post by Alexander Terekhov
I'm shocked by Amici's citation of Nimmer on Copyright talking about
"appropriate contractual provisions" and "appropriate contract
construction"... What!? I thought that licenses are not contracts in
"free as in free speech" world.
Perhaps you would be less shocked if you quoted in context?
After the quote from Nimmer about contractual conditions,
the brief states
"Nimmer ... support the proposition that a copyright
licensor may recover in copyright for violations of
a license condition ..."
Hint:

Suppose that a copyright license of mine states that:

*Before* you make use of my exclusive right(s) you must tell the world
that I am "Alexander The Great and Powerful."

That is a license condition (violation of which I may recover in
copyright.)

Got it now?

regards,
alexander.

--
http://gng.z505.com/index.htm
(GNG is a derecursive recursive derecursion which pwns GNU since it can
be infinitely looped as GNGNGNGNG...NGNGNG... and can be said backwards
too, whereas GNU cannot.)
Hyman Rosen
2008-07-02 21:46:35 UTC
Permalink
Post by Alexander Terekhov
Got it now?
No. I still fail to understand what you find shocking
about the citation of Nimmer.
Alexander Terekhov
2008-07-02 22:26:56 UTC
Permalink
Post by Hyman Rosen
Post by Alexander Terekhov
Got it now?
No. I still fail to understand what you find shocking
about the citation of Nimmer.
Go and drop am email to Nimmer et. al. asking whether a copyright
license is a contract or not. Let us know about his response.

http://www.fsf.org/news/wallace-vs-fsf

"What is there left to test? The GPL is a software license, it is not a
contract."

Professional lawyers hired to defend FSF (REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT FREE SOFTWARE FOUNDATION, INC) to dismiss for failure to state
a claim:

"Plaintiff's mischaracterization of the GPL in his Response has no
bearing on the resolution of the pending Motion to Dismiss because the
Court can examine the GPL itself. "[T]o the extent that the terms of an
attached contract conflict with the allegations of the complaint, the
^^^^^^^^
contract controls."
^^^^^^^^

The court didn't examine the GPL contract but dismissed nevertheless
(disclaiming jurisdiction).

"The final judgment in Wallace v. Free Software Foundation, Inc.
constitutes a void judgment under Seventh Circuit precedent. Judge
Tinder granted dismissal [Red Hat and Novell’s Supp. App. at 12]
pursuant to F.R.Civ.P. Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted although the reason given was lack of
“antitrust injury” (lack of standing). In the Seventh Circuit, since the
decision in Frederiksen v. City of Lockport, 384 F.3d 437 at 438 (7th
Cir.
2004), issues of standing are required to be dismissed pursuant to
F.R.Civ.P. Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter-jurisdiction."

LOL.

regards,
alexander.

--
http://gng.z505.com/index.htm
(GNG is a derecursive recursive derecursion which pwns GNU since it can
be infinitely looped as GNGNGNGNG...NGNGNG... and can be said backwards
too, whereas GNU cannot.)
Hyman Rosen
2008-07-03 03:25:47 UTC
Permalink
Post by Alexander Terekhov
Post by Hyman Rosen
I still fail to understand what you find shocking
about the citation of Nimmer.
Go and drop am email to Nimmer et. al. asking whether a copyright
license is a contract or not. Let us know about his response.
No, I don't think I will.

People quote all sorts of stuff in lawsuits. In the case of this
brief, it claims that a license is sufficiently like a contract
that you can make similar claims for infringement.

Here's an idea - why don't you go ahead and willfully defy the
GPL on some piece of code, get yourself sued, and see how it all
works out.
Alexander Terekhov
2008-07-03 11:08:01 UTC
Permalink
Post by Hyman Rosen
Post by Alexander Terekhov
Post by Hyman Rosen
I still fail to understand what you find shocking
about the citation of Nimmer.
Go and drop am email to Nimmer et. al. asking whether a copyright
license is a contract or not. Let us know about his response.
No, I don't think I will.
People quote all sorts of stuff in lawsuits. In the case of this
brief, it claims that a license is sufficiently like a contract
that you can make similar claims for infringement.
Here's an idea - why don't you go ahead and willfully defy the
GPL on some piece of code, get yourself sued, and see how it all
works out.
We all know how it works out.

1. Ignoring jurisdictional requirement SFLC files a complaint
(warranting atomatic dismissal).

2. Shortly thereafter SFLC moves to dismiss the case WITH PREJUDICE
against own clients (without any stipulation of settlement).

3. A face-saving press release appears claiming a "settlement" with
NON-DEFENDANT third party.

4. Defendant continues wilfully defy the GPL (from now on with impunity
due to res judicata since the case was dismissed WITH PREJUDICE against
plaintiffs).

http://www2.verizon.net/micro/actiontec/actiontec.asp
http://blog.internetnews.com/skerner/2008/06/verizon-ceo-doesnt-know-about.html

regards,
alexander.

--
http://gng.z505.com/index.htm
(GNG is a derecursive recursive derecursion which pwns GNU since it can
be infinitely looped as GNGNGNGNG...NGNGNG... and can be said backwards
too, whereas GNU cannot.
rjack
2008-07-04 16:03:33 UTC
Permalink
Post by Alexander Terekhov
Post by Hyman Rosen
Post by Alexander Terekhov
Post by Hyman Rosen
I still fail to understand what you find shocking
about the citation of Nimmer.
Go and drop am email to Nimmer et. al. asking whether a copyright
license is a contract or not. Let us know about his response.
No, I don't think I will.
People quote all sorts of stuff in lawsuits. In the case of this
brief, it claims that a license is sufficiently like a contract
that you can make similar claims for infringement.
Here's an idea - why don't you go ahead and willfully defy the
GPL on some piece of code, get yourself sued, and see how it all
works out.
We all know how it works out.
1. Ignoring jurisdictional requirement SFLC files a complaint
(warranting atomatic dismissal).
2. Shortly thereafter SFLC moves to dismiss the case WITH PREJUDICE
against own clients (without any stipulation of settlement).
3. A face-saving press release appears claiming a "settlement" with
NON-DEFENDANT third party.
4. Defendant continues wilfully defy the GPL (from now on with impunity
due to res judicata since the case was dismissed WITH PREJUDICE against
plaintiffs).
http://www2.verizon.net/micro/actiontec/actiontec.asp
http://blog.internetnews.com/skerner/2008/06/verizon-ceo-doesnt-know-about.html
regards,
alexander.
--
http://gng.z505.com/index.htm
(GNG is a derecursive recursive derecursion which pwns GNU since it can
be infinitely looped as GNGNGNGNG...NGNGNG... and can be said backwards
too, whereas GNU cannot.
The most accurate summary of the bogus SFLC cases I have ever read.

Sincerely,
Rjack :)

"Facts are stubborn things; and whatever may be our wishes, our inclinations,
or the dictates of our passion, they cannot alter the state of facts and
evidence." -- John Adams, 'Argument in Defense of the Soldiers in the Boston
Massacre Trials,' December 1770
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